2 
HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE 


STUDIES  IN  HISTORY,  ECONOMICS  AND  PUBLIC  LAW 

EDITED   BY  THE   FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  OF 
COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY 

Volume  LXXXIV]  [Number  2 

Whole  Number  195 


HELLENIC    CONCEPTIONS 
OF    PEACE 


WALLACE  E.  CALDWELL,  Ph.D. 

Sometime  Assistant  in  Ancient  History,  Cornell  University 

University  Fellow  in  Ancient  History 

Instructor  in  History,  Columbia  University 


Ntw  Work 
COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY 

LONGMANS,  GREEN  &  CO.,  AGENTS 

London  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son,  Ltd. 

1919 


Copyright,  1919 

BY 

WALLACE  E.  CALDWELL 


OF 

HENRY  AUGUSTUS  SILL 

AND 

GEORGE  WILLIS  BOTSFORD 


THE  LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


PREFACE 

Ancient  Hellas  was  a  land  of  small  city-states,  each 
with  its  own  political  systems,  its  own  economic  interests, 
its  own  social  customs,  and  often  its  own  dialect.  The  high- 
est aim  of  the  citizen  was  to  possess  that  patriotism  which 
subordinated  all  to  the  service  of  the  state,  which  used  every 
talent  for  its  glorification  and  which  handed  down  the 
fatherland  greater  and  better  than  it  had  been  handed  down 
to  him.  Out  of  such  ideals  came  that  keen  rivalry  which 
produced  the  finest  works  of  Hellenic  culture.  But  from  it 
also  came  devastating  wars  and  the  downfall  of  its  very 
products,  Hellenic  freedom  and  civilization. 

In  the  early  period  of  Greek  history  wars  were  of  fre- 
quent, almost  annual,  occurrence ;  and  warfare  became  a  nat- 
ural part  of  the  citizen's  existence  with  careful  rules  and  reg- 
ulations— almost  a  sport.  The  great  Persian  war  in  the  first 
half  of  the  fifth  century  B.  C,  however,  brought  home  to  the 
Greeks  most  clearly  the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages 
of  war.  With  the  wars  between  Athens  and  Sparta  and  the 
long  and  wearisome  series  of  struggles  for  supremacy  which 
followed  in  the  fourth  century,  there  came  a  realization  of 
the  ruinous  effects  of  strife,  which  led  in  turn  to  the  growth 
of  a  strong  peace  movement  and  to  a  variety  of  attempts  to 
solve  the  problem  of  inter-Hellenic  relations.  The  develop- 
ment of  a  desire  for  peace,  with  an  appreciation  of  its  bene- 
fits, along  with  suggestions  for  its  perpetuation,  found  ex- 
pression in  the  productions  of  the  writers  of  Hellas.  In  the 
history  of  their  age  lay  the  background  on  which  their  ideas 
were  founded  and  the  methods  which  were  developed  to 
carry  them  into  execution. 

399]  5 


6  PREFACE  [4qo 

Much  has  been  done  in  the  study  of  the  international  law 
and  practice  of  the  Greeks  from  the  institutional  point  of 
view.  For  this  the  reader  is  referred  to  Phillipson,  Inter- 
national Law  and  Customs  of  Ancient  Greece  and  Rome 
(London,  191 1);  Raeder,  L' Arbitrage  International  chez 
les  Hellenes  (New  York,  191 2) ;  Tod,  Greek  International 
Arbitration  (Oxford,  1913).  On  their  conclusions  that  part 
of  this  study  which  deals  with  those  topics  is  based.  The 
purpose  of  this  work,  however,  is  to  study  rather  the  ideas 
than  the  institutions  of  the  Greeks  and  to  examine  the  re- 
sults of  their  efforts  to  secure  peace  among  themselves.  For 
this  it  is  necessary  to  review  the  historical  background  and 
to  examine  the  attitude  of  the  writers  toward  the  general 
topic  of  war  and  peace.  This  study  terminates  with  the 
end  of  the  classic  period.  Consideration  of  the  conceptions 
of  peace  in  the  Hellenistic  Age  is  reserved  for  a  future 
study. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface  5 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Epic  Age 

i.  Minoan  Civilization 9 

2.  The  Mycenaean  Period I: 

3.  The  Invasions 14 

4.  The  World  of  Homer 15 

The  Homeric  Attitude  toward  Peace  and  War __20_ 

6.  Peace  and  War  in  the  Epic  Cycle 35 

7.  The  Views  of  Hesiod 36 

CHAPTER  II 
The  Early  Period  of  the  City-State 

^  The  Growth  of  the  City-state 38 

„  Causes  of  Disunion 3« 

^*3V  Elements  of  Union 39 

4.  Life  and  Literature  in  the  Asiatic  Cities 51 

5.  The  Asiatic  Cities  at  War  with  Lydia  and  Persia 57 

^6_^_Cultural  Conditions  in  Sparta 59 

j^-The  Significance  of  Theognis  of  Megara 62 

JL-The  Development  of  Athens 63 

9.  The  Greeks  of  Sicily  and  Italy 65 

CHAPTER  III 
I.  The  Persian  Wars  and  Hellenic  Peace 

1.  Historical  Survey  of  the  Period  490-461  B.  C 67 

2>  Peace  and  War  in  Literature 70 

a1.  Aeschylus 71 

b.  Bacchylides 76 

c.  Pindar 77 

d.  Heraclitus 79 

401]  7 


8  CONTENTS  [402 

PAGB 

II.  The  Age  of  Pericles 

1.  Athens  and  Sparta,  461-431  B.C 80 

^ft  The  Attitude  of  Sophocles 84 

•3?)  The  Views  of  Herodotus 85 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Peloponnesian  War 

{j^/The  Causes  of  the  War  and  the  Failure  of  Arbitration 87 

^5)  The  Events  of  the  War  and  their  Effects 91 

§  Aristophanes  and  the  Peace  Party 99 

Thucydides  and  the  War 100 

The  Attitude  of  Euripides 103 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Fourth  Century 

1.  Wars  and  Peace,  404-338  B.  C 108 

2.  War  and  Peace  in  Fourth-Century  Literature 125 

a.  Xenophon 125 

b.  Demosthenes 127 

c.  Socrates 127 

d.  Plato 127 

e.  Aristotle 130 

f.  Isocrates 131 

3.  Conclusion 138 


CHAPTER  I 
The  Epic  Age 

The  earliest  expression  of  thought  known  to  us  from 
the  ancient  Hellenes  is  to  be  found  in  the  epic  poets  of  the 
Middle  Age :  Homer,  the  writers  of  the  Epic  Cycle,  and 
Hesiod.  Many  diverse  elements,  however,  go  to  make  up 
the  ideas  and  pictures  of  the  poems,  the  traditions  of  earlier 
days,  the  character  of  the  incoming  northerner,  the  society 
in  which  the  poets  lived,  and  above  all  the  depth  of  their 
understanding  of  life  and  its  emotions.  One  may  single 
out  material  things  and  claim  from  archaeological  evi- 
dence that  they  belonged  to  earlier  days;  one  may  place 
political  and  social  institutions  in  the  time  of  the  poets  with 
some  security.  It  is  a  much  more  difficult,  in  many  respects 
an  impossible,  task  to  treat  the  expression  of  ideas  in  this 
fashion.  One  may  only  endeavor  to  point  out  something  of 
that  which  preceded  the  poets  and  venture  to  draw  conclu- 
sions with  reserve. 

Far  in  the  background  of  the  poems  lay  the  civilization 
known  as  the  iEgean,  and  divided  usually  into  the  Minoan 
and  Mycenean  periods.  The  .^Egean  basin  was  inhabited 
from  neolithic  times,  probably  by  members  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean race.  With  the  introduction  of  bronze,  civilization 
developed  among  them  rapidly  until  it  reached  its  culmina- 
tion in  the  splendor  of  the  Minoan  Age,  the  center  of  which 
was  the  city  of  Cnossus  on  the  island  of  Crete,  where  Minos 
traditionally  held  sway  and  whence  he  extended  his  con- 
quests and  spread  his  culture.  Legend  records  that  he  was 
the  first  to  drive  pirates  from  the  sea  and  to  establish  peace 
403]  9 


I0  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [404 

in  the  yEgean.1  With  this  came  a  wide  development  of 
trade  and  great  prosperity.  Everywhere  around  the  Medi- 
terranean the  Minoan  merchant  found  markets  for  his 
wares  while  the  closest  relations  prevailed  with  the  wealthy 
and  powerful  kingdom  of  Egypt.  Under  such  influences 
there  appeared  in  Cnossus  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  mate- 
rial civilizations  replete  with  splendor  and  luxury  and  all 
that  wealth  might  bring.  At  the  height  of  its  power  no 
fear  or  disaster  of  war  could  interfere  to  check  its  pleasures 
so  long  as  the  fleet  ruled  the  sea  and  kept  the  strife  of  the 
continent  from  its  shores.  Save  for  bastions  to  guard  the 
wealth  of  the  palace  against  a  raid  of  stray  marauders, 
no  fortifications  were  necessary  and  no  wall  was  built.  A 
professional  archery,  supported  and  supplied  by  the  palace, 
took  care  of  ordinary  defense.  When  called  upon,  how- 
ever, the  noble  took  his  heavy  shield,  shaped  like  a  figure 
eight,  and  rode  to  the  combat  in  his  chariot.  But  war  and 
its  deeds  had  little  share  in  his  thoughts.  In  comparative 
security  the  noble  gave  himself  over  to  the  merry  life  of 
the  court,  and  the  commoner  plied  his  tasks  in  peace  and 
comfort.  Memories  of  more  warlike  times  survived  in  the 
court  dress  when  youths  in  the  dance  wore  "  daggers  of 
geld,  hanging  from  silver  baldrics,  inlaid  with  marvelous 
workmanship,"  -  ornaments  rather  than  weapons.  In  the 
reproductions  of  the  decorations  of  the  palaces  of  Crete  no 
pictures  of  the  combat  are  to  be  found.  The  life  of  the 
court  with  its  pomp  and  grandeur,  its  throngs  of  people,  its 
dances  on  the  choros  and  its  games,  is  reflected  in  the  many 
frescoes  on  the  palace  walls.  Plants  and  flowers,  familiar 
animals  and  the  fish  of  the  sea  take  the  place  of  scenes  of 
battle  in  the  art  of  the  time.3 

1  Thucydides,  ed.  Jones,  H.  S.  (Oxford,  1902),  i,  8. 
^  Iliad,  ed.  Monro,  D.  B.  and  Allen,  T.  W.  (Oxford,  1902),  xvii,  597,  8. 
3  Cf.  publications  in  the  Annual  of  the  British   School  at  Athens, 
the  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  and  elsewhere. 


405]  THE  EPIC  AGE  II 

The  carvings  on  gems,  in  which  the  Minoans  excelled, 
deal  mostly  with  religion,  and  here  too  nature  is  the  domi- 
nating factor.  The  figure-eight  shield,  token  apparently  of 
the  youthful  war-god,  appears  but  seldom,  and  then  usually 
in  conjunction  with  the  omnipresent  nature-goddess.  This 
great  mother  divinity  appears  on  the  mountain-tops  with 
her  attendant  animals,  or  she  sits  under  a  tree  with  her 
doves,  or  she  rules  the  underworld  with  its  symbolic  snakes. 
The  prevalent  religion  was  chthonic.  Symbols  of  various 
kinds  were  worshipped.  The  dead  were  feared  and  courted, 
and  in  their  tombs  were  placed  all  kinds  of  objects  needed 
for  a  future  life.  That  the  spirit  of  the  departed  might 
have  company  and  service,  animals  and  apparently  human 
beings  were  sacrificed.  Jewelry  and  treasures  in  great 
abundance  were  placed  beside  the  corpse,  to  the  ultimate 
impoverishment  of  the  realm. 

With  all  the  refinement  and  art  there  was  a  strong  cur- 
rent of  brutality.  Boxing  with  the  heavy  cestus  was  a 
favorite  sport.  But  most  popular  of  all  was  bull-leaping, 
with  its  opportunity  for  the  display  of  skill  and  agility  and 
its  concomitant  danger  of  bloodshed  and  death  of  a  most 
horrible  kind.  The  legend  of  the  tribute  of  human  sacri- 
fice of  the  Athenians  to  the  Minotaur  suggests  the  means 
by  which  the  athletes  were  secured,  and  indicates  at  the 
same  time  great  cruelty  in  the  treatment  of  subject  peoples.1 

When  the  Minoan  crossed  to  the  mainland  he  found  there 
a  different  race  of  people.  In  the  middle  of  the  third  mil- 
lennium B.  C,  northerners  had  begun  to  move  down  from 
the  Danube  valley  across  the  passes  of  the  Balkans  into  the 
peninsula   to  the    south.      They   occupied   Macedonia  and 

1  This  resume  of  Minoan  culture  is  based  on  a  study  of  the  pub- 
lished archaeological  material  in  the  Annual  of  the  British  School  at 
Athens,  the  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  and  on  the  writings  of  Burrows, 
Hawes,  and  Mosso.  The  character  of  the  sources  makes  the  picture 
largely  conjectural. 


I2  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [406 

pushed  down  into  Thessaly  on  the  one  side,  and  entered 
Thrace  and  crossed  the  Hellespont  into  the  Troad  and 
Phrygia  on  the  other.  In  the  course  of  the  first  half  of 
the  second  millennium  they  penetrated  farther  south  into 
Greece,  blending  doubtless  with  the  earlier  inhabitants 
whom  they  found  there.  Among  these  people  Minoan  cul- 
ture began  to  develop  afresh.  The  gradual  nature  of  the 
infiltration  and  the  blending  of  the  peoples  facilitated  the 
process.  Thessaly,  in  a  continuous  turmoil  from  fresh  in- 
vasions, and  backward  in  civilization,  acted  as  a  buffer,  and 
protected  and  made  possible  the  southern  development.1 

At  strategic  points  which  controlled  trade  routes  or  in 
fertile  valleys  were  built  the  fortress  cities  of  the  new- 
comer, possibly  under  Minoan  control,  as  the  Attic  legend 
indicates,  but  surely  under  Minoan  influence.  The  plain  of 
Messene,  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas,  the  Argive  plain  with  its 
roads  to  the  isthmus,  the  isthmus  of  Corinth  itself,  the  val- 
leys of  Attica  and  the  fertile  land  of  Boeotia  were  the  cen- 
ters of  these  new  people.  Possibly  some  of  the  cities  were 
earlier  Minoan  foundations  into  which  the  invader  came 
through  invitation  to  aid  in  defense  or  through  marriage 
into  the  ruling  family.  In  any  case  commerce  with  Crete, 
and  doubtless  also  the  presence  of  Minoan  artist  and  archi- 
tect, brought  the  influence  of  the  older  civilization  strongly 
to  bear  and  produced  the  legendary  Heroic  Age  of  Greece. 
The  northerner  took  over  the  material  civilization  of  the 
southerner,  his  pictures,  furniture,  jewelry,  and  personal 
adornments,  his  gold  and  silver  work,  but  preserved  his  own 
northern  type  of  dwelling  with  its  central  hearth.  Neces- 
sity here  compelled  the  erection  of  huge  fortresses,  and 
there   arose   the  mighty  walls   and   elaborate   defenses   so 

1  For  the  invasions  cf.  Beloch,  Griechische  Geschichte  (2nd  ed. 
Strassburg,  1912),  vol.  i,  pp.  67,  et  seq.  On  the  condition  of  Thessaly,  cf. 
Wace  and  Thompson,  Prehistoric  Thessaly  (Cambridge,  1912). 


407]  THE  EPIC  AGE  13 

familiar  at  Mycenae  and  Tiryns.  War  was  a  natural  part 
of  life,  and  hence  played  a  larger  part  in  art  than  among 
the  Cretans.  Warriors  and  the  siege  of  cities  appear  on 
vases,  and  the  shield  symbol  of  the  war  god  was  a  favorite 
mural  decoration.  The  warrior  adopted  Minoan  methods 
of  warfare,  the  chariot  and  the  huge  shield,  and  to  his  own 
barbaric  character  he  added  the  refinements  of  Minoan 
brutality.  The  use  of  the  poisoned  arrow,  the  heartless 
treatment  of  the  conquered  foe,  the  maltreatment  of  the 
enemy's  corpse,  the  human  sacrifice  to  appease  the  dead,  are 
features  which  are  characteristic  of  most  peoples  in  the 
stage  of  civilization  known  as  the  Heroic  Age.1 

With  new  conditions  all  ties  of  kindred  and  tribe  were 
broken  and  strong  monarchies  were  developed.  Bound  by 
bonds  of  equal  rank  and  common  military  necessity,  royal 
families  kept  closely  in  touch  with  one  another.  Visits  were 
frequent  between  them,  and  marriages  bound  them  together. 
Traditions  recorded  these  things  and  indicated  that  the 
ruler  of  Mycenae  was  overlord  of  all,  strong  enough  to  call 
on  all  for  their  services  and  to  obtain  them.  A  more  gen- 
eral feeling  of  unity  and  good-will  appears  to  have  pre- 
vailed then  than  at  any  later  period  in  the  history  of  Hellas, 
the  indications  of  which  appear  in  the  later  legends  of  the 
Trojan  and  Theban  wars.  Under  such  conditions  of  life 
there  developed  the  art  of  epic  poetry,  when  court  poets 
recited  the  glorious  deeds  of  the  warriors  and  the  splendors 
of  life  in  the  court.2 

1  Cf.  Chadwick,  H.  M.,  The  Heroic  Age  (Cambridge,  1912),  p.  462. 

2  This  description  of  the  Heroic  Age  is  based  in  general  on  Chad- 
wick, op.  £it.,  and  on  Leaf,  Homer  and  History  (London,  1915)-  On 
the  Mycenean  origins  of  the  epics  cf.  Evans,  A.  J.,  "  The  Minoan  and 
Mycenaean  Elements  in  Hellenic  Life  "  in  the  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies, 
32  (1912);  Meillet,  Apercu  d'une  histoire  de  la  langue  grecque  (Paris, 
I9I3),PP-  193-4- 


I4  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [408 

With  strength  came  expansion.  Marauding  bands  occu- 
pied the  islands  of  the  ^Egean.  The  Cretans,  excluded 
from  those  waters,  turned  to  other  regions  and  appeared  in 
Spain,  in  Sicily,  in  Cyprus  and  in  Palestine.  Internal  dis- 
ease of  convention  and  caste  had  prepared  the  way,  and 
when  plunderers  brought  catastrophe  the  end  was  swift. 
Minos  became  a  name  and  the  power  of  Cnossus  a  tradi- 
tion embodied  in  the  court  poetry  to  be  handed  down  to 
future  ages.  The  pirates  reached  even  to  the  shores  of 
the  Nile  delta  in  their  wanderings,  while  on  the  north  a 
wealthy  settlement  on  the  hill  of  Hissarlik  in  the  Troad  was 
destroyed.  Egyptian  inscriptions  record  that  the  isles  of  the 
sea  were  in  confusion. 

In  the  twelfth  century  new  elements  appeared  in  fresh 
invasions  from  the  northwest.  The  old  cities  on  the  main- 
land fell  a  prey  to  the  invader  and  the  older  settlers 
were  pushed  out  to  seek  homes  beyond  the  sea.  Save  in 
mountainous  Arcadia  and  barren  Attica,  all  was  confusion. 
The  people  were  migratory,  either  looking  for  better  lands 
for  themselves  or  pushed  out  by  new  tribes  seeking  their 
lands.  Maintenance  was  all  they  sought  from  the  soil. 
Fortifications  were  either  unnecessary  or  impossible.  The 
tribes  were  war-loving  and  sought  subsistence  rather  by 
plunder  than  by  work.  Robbery  on  land  and  piracy  by  sea 
were  freely  practised,  and  regarded  as  no  disgrace.  All 
men  went  armed  and  were  quick  to  resent  the  least  slight 
with  combat.1  Thucydides'  description  of  the  early  days 
of  Hellas  has  been  accepted  as  a  picture  of  the  conditions 
which  put  an  end  to  Mycenean  culture  and  plunged  Greece 
into  its  Middle  Age.  Early  and  late  comers  mingled  and 
pushed  on.  Crete  became  a  land  of  many  cities  and  men, 
with  confusion  of  tongues.  Cyprus  received  a  colony  of 
the  earlier  peoples.    The  islands  of  the  ^Egean  were  popu- 

1  Thucydides,  i,  I,  2. 


409]  THE  EPIC  AGE  1 5 

lated,  old  foundations  on  the  Anatolian  coast  were  increased 
in  size  and  new  ones  were  founded.  In  general  the  move- 
ments took  parallel  lines,  the  Thessalians  occupying  the 
northern  islands  and  the  region  called  iEolis,  the  Ionians, 
the  central  position,  with  the  Dorians  to  the  south.  A  large 
amount  of  fusion  followed,  both  among  themselves  and 
with  the  old  inhabitants  of  their  new  homes. 

As  the  movements  gradually  died  down  and  times  of 
comparative  peace  returned,  civilization  began  to  build 
afresh.  In  the  south  where  the  centers  of  Mycenean  or 
Minoan  influence  had  been,  culture  appeared  first  in  a  nucleus 
of  Minoan  ideas,  while  to  the  north  the  civilization  of  the 
newcomer  was  predominant.  One  thing  all  treasured  in 
common — the  epic  poetry  which  told  of  the  traditions  of  for- 
mer glory.  These,  reflecting  sometimes  the  language,  more 
often  the  material  customs  and  glories  of  Mycenean  courts, 
were  sung  by  bards  throughout  the  new  settlements  on  the 
mainland  of  Greece  and  in  /Eolis  and  Ionia  alike.  In  the 
old  songs  the  bards  found  their  material,  and  into  that 
material  as  warp  they  wove  the  ideas  and  customs  of  their 
own  times  and  conditions. 

The  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  were  the  products  of  the 
greatest  of  these  bards.  Homer  took  the  old  Achaean 
songs  and  traditions  and  with  the  fire  of  his  genius  forged 
them  afresh  into  the  finest  of  epic  poems.1  The  traditional 
stories  contained  many  things  foreign  to  the  spirit  of  the 
poet.    In  them  the  poisoned  arrow  was  deadly,  the  slaughter 

1  The  Homeric  question  has  been  a  subject  so  widely  discussed  and  with 
such  varying  views  that  the  writer  has  felt  it  best  to  adhere  to  the 
opinion  upheld  by  Botsford  in  his  Hellenic  History  (in  manuscript) 
without  entering  into  a  discussion  of  the  question.  In  accordance  with 
that  opinion  the  changes  in  the  matter  and  spirit  of  the  tradition  noted  by 
Gilbert  Murray  in  his  Rise  of  the  Greek  Epic  (2nd  ed.  Oxford,  1911). 
have  been  treated  as  a  part  of  Homer's  work  in  his  handling  of  the  old 
stories. 


1 6  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [4IO 

of  foemen  knew  no  mercy.  The  dead  was  despoiled  of  his 
armor,  his  head  placed  upon  the  stakes  of  the  wall  and  his 
body  defiled  and  left  as  a  prey  to  the  dogs  and  vultures. 
When  a  city  was  captured  it  was  wasted  by  fire,  the  war- 
riors were  slain  in  the  presence  of  their  wives,  and  their 
bodies  left  to  be  torn  to  pieces  by  the  very  dogs  they  had 
raised ;  while  the  women  were  driven  with  blows  from  the 
corpses  of  their  husbands  and  led  into  a  far-off  land  as 
slaves,  and  "  in  Argos  ply  another's  loom  and  bring  water 
of  Messeis  or  Hypereia,  though  unwilling  stern  compulsion 
presses  on."  *  The  infant  children  not  worth  carrying  off 
were  dashed  to  the  ground  and  not  even  the  man-child  in 
the  mother's  womb  was  spared.2  At  the  bier  of  the  fallen 
hero  captured  warriors  were  slain  as  a  sacrifice  to  appease 
the  dead.  The  gods,  too,  demanded  human  sacrifice  and 
purificatory  rites  for  blood  guilt.3 

The  strength  of  tradition  prevented  the  omission  of  many 
of  these  things,  though  they  were  contrary  to  the  spirit  of 
the  poet.  So  many  as  he  could,  he  omitted;  others  he  ex- 
cused or  palliated  on  other  grounds.  He  declared  that  the 
gods  themselves  forbade  the  use  of  deadly  drugs  on  arrows.* 
In  his  treatment  of  the  stories,  the  captured  were  not  slain, 
except  in  the  heat  of  fiercest  battle,  but  held  for  ransom.5 
The  suppliant,  though  he  were  one's  dearest  enemy,  was  al- 
ways spared,  for  Zeus  was  his  protector.6  Despoliation  and 
defilement  were  often  threatened  but,  save  for  the  taking  of 
armor,  never  performed.     The  word  which  meant  defile- 

1  //.  vi,  456-8. 

2Il.  vi,  410-465;  xvii,  125-7,  238-45;  xviii,  176-7,  334-5 ;  xix,  291-4; 
xxii,  59-76;  ix,  590-4;  vi,  55-60;  xxiv,  730-1 ;  Od.  viii,  522  et  seq. 

3  Vide  infra,  p.  35. 

4  Od.  i,  260-3. 

5//.  ii,  229-30;  xi,  131-5,  104-106. 
*//.  xxiv,  185-7. 


41 1  ]  THE  EPIC  AGE  I7 

ment  was  changed  to  mean  decent  covering.1  In  addition, 
truces  were  arranged  to  provide  for  the  burial  of  the  dead." 
The  maltreatment  of  Hector's  corpse,  a  grievous  deed  in 
the  mind  of  the  poet,  was  excused  because  of  the  excessive 
grief  of  Achilles.  Nay  more,  the  gods  intervened  to  pre- 
serve the  body  unharmed  and  to  save  him  from  a  terrible 
sin.3  The  gods  forbade  loud  thanksgiving  over  slaughtered 
men.  The  fate  of  conquered  and  captured  is  predicted, 
feared,  and  made  a  subject  for  lamentation  in  general, 
though  the  lot  of  Briseis  was  certainly  not  entirely  unhappy. 
The  stories  of  human  sacrifice  and  purificatory  rites  were 
omitted,  and  the  slaughter  of  the  twelve  noble  youths  at  the 
funeral  pyre  of  Patroclus  was  laid  rather  to  grief  and  wrath 
than  to  any  desire  to  appease  the  dead.4 

The  stage  of  society  which  Homer  represents  was  natural 
to  an  age  which  had  seen  the  end  of  wanderings  and  the 
first  suggestions  of  settled  life.  Cities,  governments  and 
customs  were  just  beginning  to  assume  stable  forms.  The 
days  of  the  mighty  warriors  of  the  epic  when  men  were 
greater  and  stronger  and  more  warlike  "than  men  are  now," 
were  past.  Between  the  tribes  there  still  existed  a  relation- 
ship of  neither  war  nor  peace.  Communities  and  individ- 
uals preyed  on  each  other  or  kept  peace  as  necessity  or  greed 
dictated,  without  formalities  of  declarations  or  treaties. 
Piracy  was  a  recognized  profession  grouped  with  legiti- 
mate trade  and  adventure  and  carried  no  disgrace.  Raiding 
parties  seized  the  cattle  on  the  hillsides  and  sold  the  herds- 
man into  slavery,  or  wasted  the  harvest  and  carried  off  the 
oxen  and  the  horses.     The  only  recourse  for  the  injured, 

1  Murray,  Rise  of  the  Greek  Epic,  p.  147. 
*//.  vii,  375-8. 

9 II.  xxiii,  24  et  seq.;  xxiv,  15-21. 

*On  the  subject  of  these  changes  cf.  Murray,  op.  cit.,  ch.  v.     As  will 
be  seen,  they  are  thoroughly  in  consonance  with  the  spirit  of  the  poem. 


1 8  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [4I2 

whether  tribe  or  individual,  was  retaliation  and  open  war- 
fare.1 Personal  or  family  quarrels  between  princes  led  to 
strife  between  tribes.2  The  poet  considered  the  violation  of 
hospitality  and  the  invasion  of  the  family  circle  in  the  theft 
of  Helen  a  cause  entirely  sufficient  for  the  ten  years'  war 
and  the  destruction  of  Troy.  But  back  of  it  he  saw  the  final 
cause  in  the  guiding  power  of  Zeus,  swaying  the  destiny  of 
nations.  Helen  was  but  a  pawn  in  his  hands  for  the  de- 
struction of  Troy.  He  was  the  final  arbiter  and  "  hath 
brought  down  the  head  of  many  cities."  3 

Yet  the  seeds  of  future  interstate  law  existed  and  played 
their  part  in  the  alleviation  of  strife.  The  privilege  of  em- 
bassy was  considered  inviolate  under  the  protection  of  Zeus, 
as  when  Menelaus  and  Odysseus  visited  Troy  in  their  vain 
effort  to  avoid  the  war.  The  act  of  those  Trojans  who  pro- 
posed in  the  assembly  that  they  be  slain  forthwith  was  held 
to  be  a  foul  shame.4  Truces  were  frequently  made,  sur- 
rounded with  religious  ceremonies,  and  their  binding  force 
was  recognized,  that  the  dead  might  be  buried,  that  Hector 
might  address  the  warriors,  or  that  champions  might  fight 
to  decide  the  issue  and  save  the  host  from  further  grievous 
strife.  The  violation  of  the  truce  was  considered  a  craven 
and  irreligious  act  and  brought  renewal  of  the  combat.5 
The  institution  of  guest-friendship  existed  and  formed  a 
bond  sufficient  to  cause  foemen  to  spare  each  other  in  the 
fight  and  to  reconcile  them.6  The  respect  which  the  strong 
and  generous  man  felt  for  a  worthy  foeman  led  to  brief 
reconciliation  and  exchange  of  gifts.     Later  they  might  re- 

1Jl.  i,  152-6;  Od.  iii,  103-6;  ix,  252;  //.  i,  124,  5;  xxiii,  341,  2;  xi,  104-6. 

2Chadwick,  Heroic  Age,  pp.  331,  et  seq. 

»//.  ii,  117,  177,  8;  iii,  164,  5;  ix,  337-41 ;  H,  38-40. 

*Il.  xi,  138-42. 

5  77.  iii,  250-311;  vii,  375-8;  iv,  86-222;  iv,  220-239;  ix,  338-41. 

*//.  vi,  215-31;  Od.  xv,  196,  7. 


413]  THE  EPIC  AGE  IO, 

new  the  fight,  but  for  the  time  men  might  say,  "  these  twain 
fought  for  the  sake  of  strife  that  tears  the  heart,  then  in 
friendship  joined  together  they  parted."  1  Age  with  honor 
received  its  due  respect  and  gained  for  Eetion  all  the  honors 
of  a  warrior's  burial  from  Achilles  when  high-gated  Thebes 
was  sacked.2  Between  the  deadliest  enemies  only  was  this 
of  no  avail.  Hector  offered  it  but  Achilles  refused,  for 
friendship  was  impossible,  nor  could  any  agreement  be 
made  until  one  or  the  other  fell.3 

Warfare  in  the  Homeric  Age  was  a  personal  or  tribal 
matter.  The  poet  represents  the  warrior  of  his  day  as  fight- 
ing to  protect  his  parents,  wives  and  children,  to  defend  the 
safety  of  his  allies  or  to  gain  honor  for  his  chief.4  He  suf- 
fered toil  cheerfully  that  he  might  obtain  booty  and  wealth 
for  himself.  Preeminence  might  be  gained  by  oratory  in 
the  council;  indeed  many  of  the  most  renowned  fighters 
were  distinguished  for  their  ability  in  that  respect,  but  that 
served  only  to  accentuate  their  preeminence  in  the  fight.5 
Lands  and  dominions  obligated  men  to  stand  in  the  first 
rank  and  prove  their  merit  in  the  combat.0  The  highest 
prize  of  all  was  the  personal  glory  which  war  as  kydaneira, 
the  giver  of  glory  to  men,  might  secure  for  the  warrior.  His 
prowess  in  the  combat  was  his  proudest  boast.  That  his 
glory  might  be  celebrated  everywhere  and  for  all  time  was 
the  summit  of  his  ambition.7  For  this  he  gave  up  all  the 
pleasures  of  life,  suffered  all  manner  of  hardships,  courted 

1  II.  vii,  288-302.  2  II.  vi,  416-420. 

3  7/.  xxii,  261-272,  a  characteristic  feature  of  heroic  poetry,  cf.  Chad- 
wick,  op.  cit.,  p.  462. 

4 II,  viii,  55-57;  xvii,  156-8,  220-8;  i,  148-168;  xiii,  266-71;  xx,  661-6; 
xvi,  270  et  seq. 

b II.  i,  400;  ii,  202;  iii,  204  et  scq.;  xiii,  260,  et  seq.;  i,  124,  5;  xi,  407-410. 

6  77.  xii,  310-28. 

7  Chadwick,  op.  cit.,  p.  326. 


20  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [4^4 

death  in  his  youth,  even  chose  death  that  his  fame  might 
live  through  the  ages. 

War,  therefore,  is,  in  the  mind  of  the  poet,  the  chief 
business  of  men  from  youth  to  age.1  But  he  regards  it  as 
the  especial  flower  of  youth.  The  valor  wherein  is  highest 
power,  the  reckless  courage  of  the  young  man,  fosterling  of 
Zeus,  sweeps  him  on  without  the  caution  of  age  and  secures 
for  him  distinction.  If  he  falls  torn  by  the  sharp  spear  in 
the  field  of  honorable  battle,  his  fame  is  sure  and  it  is  a 
seemly  sight  to  his  comrades.2 

The  reaction  of  the  battle  on  the  warrior  soul,  Homer 
knows  well  and  stirringly  describes.  The  very  sight  of 
steel  is  enough  to  stir  up  the  martial  spirit  in  the  hero's 
breast.3  When  the  stubborn  fight  draws  near,  the  man  of 
war  becomes  hardy  and  war  is  dear  to  him.  He  yearns  for 
it  and  prays  to  mingle  in  the  dread  combat.4  Then  pre- 
eminence gained  by  words  in  the  council  is  of  no  avail.  The 
time  for  words  has  ended  and  the  councillor  finds  glory  in 
the  contest.5  To  express  the  spirit  that  grips  the  warrior's 
soul  in  the  charge.  Homer  used  a  special  word  Charme,  joy 
in  battle.6  Gods  and  men  alike  were  possessed  by  it  in  the 
mclcc  of  the  contest.  It  brought  lust  for  battle  and  made 
men  fight  unwearied  and  unwearying.7  Under  its  influence 
they  were  insatiate  of  the  combat  and  thought  war  far 
sweeter  than  dear  native  land.8    When  the  favorable  omen, 

lIl.  vi,  492,  3;  xiv,  84-89. 

7 11.  vi,  492;   iii,   108-110;  ix,  39;  xiii,  484;  xiv,  85,  6;   xvi,  626-31; 
xxii,  59-76. 
1  Od.  xvi,  294. 

*  //.  ii,  473;  iv,  225;  xiii,  270-1 ;  xv,  486-8;  xvi,  492-4. 
3 //.  xvi,  627-31. 
6//.  v,  608,  etal. 

*  //.  xv,  £96-8. 
8//.  ii,  451-4;  xi,  3-14;  xiii,  636-9. 


415]  THE  EPIC  AGE  21 

the  bird  of  Zeus,  brought  the  fervor  of  success,  it  was  the 
war  god  Ares  himself  who  entered  into  men  and  gave  them 
untold  powers.1  Poseidon  strengthened  the  Ajantes  and 
rilled  them  with  the  will  for  strife  even  with  mighty  Hector: 

And  of  the  twain  Oileus'  son,  the  swift-footed  Ajax,  was  the 
first  to  know  the  god  and  instantly  he  spake  to  Ajax,  son  of 
Telamon.  ".  .  .  For  lo !  the  courage  within  my  own  breast  is 
roused  up  the  more  for  war  and  battle  while  my  feet  below  and 
my  hands  above  quiver  with  eagerness."  Then,  answering  him, 
spake  Telamonian  Ajax.  "  So  even  now  my  hands  invincible 
lust  for  the  spear-handle,  and  my  spirit  is  arisen  and  my  feet 
speed  beneath  me.  So  do  I  yearn  to  fight  the  rage  unceasing 
even  of  Hector,  son  of  Priam."  2 

But  the  poet  understands  the  effects  of  disaster  on  the 
morale  of  the  fighter.  Charme  is  not  a  constant  thing. 
The  pain  of  a  wound  causes  it  to  disappear.3  When  the 
tide  of  battle  turns  and  defeat  impends  and  the  death- 
dealing  arrows  pour  in  thickly,  all  memory  of  the  joy  of 
battle  is  lost  and  the  fighters  think  longingly  of  home  and 
family  and  peace.4 

Death  is  no  dishonorable  thing,  Homer  feels,  when  by 
this  means  family  and  home  are  saved.5  Far  more  is  cow- 
ardice that  flees  the  fight  disgraceful ;  it  is  the  most  venom- 
ous charge  that  can  be  made  against  a  warrior.6  Craven 
Paris  is  but  a  sorry  figure  beside  glorious  Hector.7  The 
man  who  flees  the  combat  is  fit  only  for  death.8  The  cow- 
ards were  driven  into  the  center  of  the  ranks  whence  there 

1 II.  viii,  251-2;  xv,  379-80. 

2  //.  xiii,  73-80.     Quotations  from  the  Iliad  are  based  upon  the  trans- 
lation by  Lang,  Leaf  and  Myers  (London,  191 7). 
s  II.  xii,  389-94;  xvii,  602. 
*//.  xiii,  620-39;  xiii,  721. 

5  //.  xv,  494-9  6  //.  i,  225-8. 

7  //.  iii,  38,  et  seq.  8  77.  xii,  241-50. 


22  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [4I6 

was  no  escape  and  thus  compelled  to  fight.1  This  made  fear 
of  shame  in  the  eyes  of  comrades  and  of  the  women,  the 
greatest  spur  to  the  warrior's  soul."  Men  are  summoned 
not  to  the  dancing  floor  but  to  the  battlefield,  and  there  all 
fear  and  weakness  must  be  laid  aside  and  with  eagerness 
and  strength  the  battle  joined  at  risk  of  life  or  death.3 
"  Friends,"  said  Atreides,  "  be  men  and  brave  of  heart. 
Fear  the  shame  of  others  in  the  stubborn  fight.  Of  men 
fleeing  from  shame,  more  survive  in  safety  than  are  slain, 
but  for  those  that  flee  the  fight  there  arises  neither  fame  nor 
safety."  4  So  spoke  the  chieftain  and  men  knew  it  to  be 
just.  Yet  they  felt  the  bitterness  that  justice  did  not  always 
prevail.  "  Equal  lot  falleth  to  him  that  remaineth  and  to 
him  that  goeth  forth  to  fight;  in  the  same  honor  are  held 
the  evil  and  the  good;  both  must  die,  the  toilless  man  and 
the  hero  of  many  deeds."  5 

The  glorification  of  war,  the  gleam  and  glory  of  battle, 
were  the  subjects  of  the  finest  word-pictures  the  master  of 
poets  could  paint.  He  describes  the  hosts  as  they  move  into 
battle,  as  the  west  wind  which  the  goatherd  sees  as  it  blows 
across  the  sea  and  gradually  becomes  the  great  whirlwind 
that  drives  the  flocks  scurrying  to  the  cave.6  The  Trojans 
with  their  clamor  and  shouting  seem  to  him  like  the  cranes 
that  come  to  the  ocean  fleeing  the  cold  of  winter,7  as  count- 
less as  the  leaves  and  flowers  of  spring  or  as  the  flies  that 
hover  about  the  milkman's '  pails  when  the  milk  has  been 
poured  from  them,  or  the  feathered  birds,  wild  geese  or 
cranes  or  long-necked  swans  flying  by  the  river  Caystrus  on 
the  Asian  plain,  and  crying  as  they  fly,  rejoicing  in  their 
plumage.    The  dazzling  gleam  of  their  bronze  is  like  a  rav- 

1Il.  iv,  293-309.  2  II.  vi,  441-4. 

3 II.  xv,  502-13.  *//.  v,  528-32;  xv,  561-4. 

b  II.  ix,  318-32.  6  //■  iv,  273-82  ;  cf.  xv,  379-389- 

'//.  iii,  1-9. 


417]  THE  EPIC  AGE  23 

aging  fire  in  a  boundless  forest  on  a  mountain-top.1  The 
finest  picture  of  all  is  that  of  the  Greek  host  in  the  thir- 
teenth book. 

Spear  on  spear  made  close-set  fence,  and  shield  on  serried 
shield,  buckler  pressed  on  buckler,  and  helm  on  helm,  and  man 
on  man.  The  horsehair  crests  on  the  bright  helmet  ridges 
touched  each  other  as  they  nodded,  so  close  they  stood  each  by 
other,  and  spears  brandished  by  bold  hands  were  interlaced  and 
their  hearts  were  steadfast  and  lusted  for  battle.2 

In  the  stress  of  battle  itself,  Homer  sees  a  fire  that  leaps 
upon  a  city  of  men  and  roars  out  with  the  wind,  or  a  cloud 
of  dust  which  the  wind  stirs  up  on  a  day  when  the  dust  lies 
thickest  on  the  roads.3 

To  the  scenes  and  details  of  the  battle  the  poet  devotes 
his  highest  art,  and  the  modern  reader  still  must  thrill  at  the 
tales  of  combat  as  did  the  listeners  of  ancient  days.  But 
the  genius  of  Homer  is  greater  than  that.  Beneath  the 
glitter  and  the  gleam  he  penetrates  to  the  darker  side,  the 
exhaustion  of  men  and  beasts,  the  mind-shaking  confusion, 
the  darts,  the  dust,  the  shattered  arms,  the  groans  of  the 
fallen  and  the  black  blood.4 

The  baldrick  of  the  shield  man-sheltering  shall  become  wet  on 
the  breast  and  hand  shall  become  weary  round  the  spear,  and 
the  horse  as  he  draws  the  well-polished1  chariot  shall  be  drenched 
with  sweat,  for  the  coming  of  night  only  shall  separate  the 
warriors.5 

In  the  battle-fever  he  sees  Ares,  bane  of  mortals,  and  his 

*//.  i,  455-73!  iv,  273-282;  xvii,  735-4*- 

2  //.  xiii,  125-35 ;  cf.  xvi,  165  et  seq. 

s  II.  xvii,  735-41 ;  xiii,  333-44- 

*Il.  iv,  446-51 ;  x,  297-8;  xi,  163-4;  xi,  53-55. 

6  //.  ii,  386-90. 


24  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [4I8 

dear  son  Panic,  that  terrifies  even  the  hardy  warrior,  and 
Terror  and  Rout  and  Strife,  Eris  whose  fury  wearieth  not, 
own  sister  and  mistress  of  murderous  Ares,  who  drags  the 
wounded  and  the  dead  through  the  melee,  her  cloak  red 
with  the  blood  of  men.  It  was  she  who  first  cast  discord 
among  men.  From  small  beginnings  she  causes  strife  to 
arise.  At  first  she  rears  her  crest  but  little,  and  then  her 
head  towers  towards  heaven  and  she  walks  upon  the  earth.1 
Men  fall  in  battle  as  the  thickets  of  trees  before  the  fire 
when  the  wind  rages  or  as  the  grain  in  the  rich  man's  field 
before  the  reapers.2  Not  even  Ares  nor  Athena  may  de- 
spise the  sight,  and  Eris  alone  is  glad;  while  of  men,  the 
poet  declares,  only  the  hard  of  heart  may  not  sorrow  at  the 
sight.3  This  is  the  final  hazard  of  war  and  each  man  prays 
to  one  of  the  immortal  gods  for  escape  from  death  and  the 
melee  of  Ares.4 

A  great  many  adjectives  are  used  in  the  poems  for  vivid- 
ness in  the  description  of  war,  furious  and  stubborn,  keen 
and  raging,  incessant  and  mighty  in  its  dread  battle-cry,  but 
always  a  bringer  of  glory  to  men.  On  the  other  hand,  Ares 
is  called  the  sacker  of  cities,  insatiate  of  war,  reckless  and 
ruthless,  all  destructive,  a  blood-stained  bane  to  mortals, 
man-slaying  and  glutted  with  blood,  evil,  loathsome,  ill- 
sounding,  toilsome,  grievous,  sad  and  full  of  tears,  murder- 
ous and  bringing  a  pitiable  sleep,  epithets  which  show  the 
other  side  of  the  combat. 

That  war  brings  hardship  and  toil  as  well  as  glory,  Homer 
knows  full  well.5  He  shows  how  the  warrior  must  stay  for 
long  periods  away  from  wife  and  child,  and  must  refrain 

lIl.  iv,  439-45;  xviii,  535-8;  xiii,  298-300. 

2 II.  xi,  67-74,  150-162. 

S/Z.  xi,  73-4;  xiii,  343-4;  iv,  539-44;  xvii,  360-5. 

*//.  ii,  400-1. 

5  Od.  iii,  100. 


419]  THE  EPIC  AGE  25 

from  honey-hearted  wine  lest  he  be  crippled  of  his  courage 
and  forgetful  of  his  might.1  He  sets  forth  the  uncertainty 
of  war.  Ares  rageth  confusedly  and  men  live  or  die  as  fate 
decrees.2  The  war  god  has  no  favorites  and  he  that  would 
kill  is  killed. a  Then  many  a  noble  young  man  falls  into 
darkness;  all  his  accomplishments  are  of  no  avail  and  the 
soul,  leaving  manhood  and  youth,  departs  wailing  to  Hades' 
realm,  that  most  wretched  of  all  lands.4  The  body  is  left 
far  from  loving  hands  for  the  birds  that  eat  raw  flesh  to 
shroud  it  with  their  wings.5  The  living  may  mourn  but  for 
a  day,  for  the  foeman  ever  presses  on.G  Such  burdens  and 
fears  would  be  enough  to  make  a  man  depart  disheartened 
were  it  not  a  shame  to  wait  so  long  and  go  away  empty.7 
In  the  end,  however,  the  glorious  rewards  of  praise  and 
booty  make  it  all  worth  while  in  the  eyes  of  the  warrior.8 

But  there  -is  still  another  side  of  the  picture.  Parents, 
wives  and  children  and  the  possessions  which  the  needy 
covet  are  left  at  home.  The  return  of  the  absent  one  brings 
joy,  but  his  death,  grief  unspeakable.  Nor  ever  do  his  chil- 
dren prattle  on  his  knees  when  he  comes  back  from  war  and 
the  dread  combat.9  The  aged  father  whose  sons  have  fal- 
len, never  repaid  for  their  nurture,  is  broken  with  sorrow, 
and  kinsmen  divide  his  property.  Or  if  sons  remain  at 
home,   they   are   the  shameful   ones,    false-tongued,   light- 

1Il.  ii,  134-7,  291-8;  vi,  264-5. 
2  Od.  xi,  534,  5 ;  //■  xi,  407-410. 
*  II.  xviii,  309. 

*//.  v,  47,  68,  82  et  seq.;  xi,  161  et  seq.;  xvi,  856-7;  Od.  xi,  488  et  seq.; 
xi,  241-3,  262,  3. 
5  //.  xi,  391-5,  450-4. 
6 II.  xix,  225-33. 
7 II.  ii,  291-8. 

"//.  ii,  354-6;  xiii,  266-71 ;  xiv,  84-9. 
'//.  v,  407-9,  479-81  ;  ii,  690-702;  v,  687-8;  xvii,  34-37. 


26  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [420 

hearted  heroes  of  the  dance.1  But  the  doom  of  the  captive 
woman  who  sees  husband,  brothers,  father,  warrior  son  and 
all.  slain,  her  infant  son  hurled  from  the  walls,  and  then  in 
captivity  suffers  the  vengeance  of  the  conqueror,  is  the 
hardest  lot  of  all.2  The  lament  of  Andromache  is  one  of 
the  finest  touches  of  deep  human  feeling  in  all  literature.3 

While  the  poet,  deep  in  his  understanding  of  human 
nature  and  true  to  life,  presents  both  sides  of  war,  he  often 
uses  the  evil  to  make  more  vivid  the  glorious  by  contrast. 
His  own  attitude  and  the  true  sentiment  of  the  poems  may 
be  found  in  his  treatment  of  the  two  great  figures  of  the 
Iliad,  Hector  and  Achilles.  They  call  forth  his  most  ex- 
pressive language,  arouse  him  to  the  highest  pitch  of  poetic 
achievement  and  present  in  their  careers  the  noblest  ideals 
of  his  age.  And  the  warrior's  life  was  their  choice  and 
pride.  "  For  war  is  the  task  of  all  men,  but  most  of  all  for 
me,  among  those  who  dwell  in  Ilium,"  was  Hector's  proud 
boast.4  Bravery  in  the  forefront  of  the  Trojans  was  the 
lesson  he  had  learned  in  the  battles  he  had  fought  for  his 
father's  glory  and  his  own.5  The  highest  aspiration  of  the 
chieftain  for  his  son,  one  of  the  most  genuine  expressions 
of  the  poem,  is  to  be  found  in  his  prayer  for  Astyanax : 

Zeus  and  ye  other  gods,  grant  me  this  I  pray.  May  this,  my 
son,  become  even  as  I,  most  splendid  of  the  Trojans  and  of  as 
mighty  power,  and  may  he  rule  valiantly  in  Ilium.  And  then 
may  some  one  say,  better  far  is  he  than  his  father ;  and  as  he 
comes  from  war  and  brings  the  bloody  arms  when  he  has  slain 
the  foeman,  then  may  his  mother  rejoice  in  her  heart.6 

1 II.  v,  23-4;  vi,  127;  v,  152-8;  xiv,  501-5;  xvii,  301-2;  xxiv,  253-62. 
2  //.  ii,  354-6;  vi,  410-65;  ix,  590-4;  xix,  292-4;  Od.  viii.  522  et  seq. 
»//.  xxii,  477-515- 
*  11.  vi,  492-3. 
5//.  vi,  440-65. 
6  II.  vi,  476-81. 


42I]  THE  EPIC  AGE  27 

Ability,  courage,  booty,  fame,  what  else  is  there  to  wish 
for! 

The  choice  of  Achilles,  a  short  life  and  glory  everlasting 
instead  of  uneventful  old  age,  is  the  keynote  of  the  Iliad. 
Until  his  quarrel  with  Agamemnon  he  ever  bore  the  brunt 
of  war  and  was  the  leader  of  the  Greeks  in  their  plundering 
raids.  Twelve  cities  of  men  he  sacked  from  shipboard,  and 
from  land  eleven.1  After  the  quarrel,  when  angry  pride 
kept  him  from  the  combat,  he  was  consumed  with  longing.2 
Then  when  fired  with  wrath  at  the  death  of  Patroclus,  he 
became  invincible.  The  plain  was  covered  and  the  river 
choked  with  the  bodies  of  men  he  had  slain.  He  refused 
all  ransoms,  rejected  every  covenant  and  was  ready  to  fight 
with  the  river  god  himself.3 

All  the  poet's  magic  is  employed  in  the  description  of 
these  heroes  as  they  fight.  Hector  is  a  storm-cloud  of  war, 
like  unto  a  fleet  wave  or  a  ravening  lion,  or  destructive  fire 
on  the  hills.4  "  Foam  came  about  his  mouth  and  his  eyes 
gleamed  under  his  grim  brows,  and  terribly  the  helmet  shook 
above  the  temples  of  Hector  as  he  fought,  for  Zeus  himself 
from  heaven  was  his  ally."  5  When  Achilles  fought  on  the 
plain, 

as  through  deep  glens  rageth  fierce  fire  on  some  parched 
mountain  side  and  the  deep  forest  burneth  and  the  wind  driv- 
ing it  whirleth  every  way  the  flame,  so  raged  he  every  way  with 
his  spear,  as  it  had  been  a  god,  pressing  hard  on  the  men  he 
slew  and  the  black  earth  ran  with  blood.  Even  as  when  one 
yoketh  wide-browed  bulls  to  tread  white  barley  in  a  'stablished 
threshing  floor  and  quickly  it  is  trodden  out  beneath  the  feet 
of  the  loud-lowing  bulls,  thus  beneath  the  great-hearted  Achil- 
les, his  whole-hooved  horses  trampled  corpses  and  shields  to- 

lIl.  ix,  338-9;  i,  165.  2 U  ii,  771-9;  i,  490-2. 

s  II  xx.  * II.  xv,  605-36. 

5 II.  xv,  606-11. 


28  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [422 

gether,  and  with  blood  the  axle-tree  below  was  sprinkled  and 
the  rims  that  ran  round  the  car,  for  blood  drops  from  the 
horses'  hooves  splashed  them  and  blood  drops  from  the  tires  of 
the  wheels.  But  the  son  of  Peleus  pressed  on  to  win  him  glory 
everlasting,  flecking  with  gore  his  irresistible  hands.1 

The  horror  of  the  sight  but  adds  to  the  marvel  of  the  mighty 
man  of  arms. 

Glory  everlasting  was  the  hero's  aim.  Hector  bowed  to 
the  will  of  destiny  in  death,  but  prayed  that  he  might  not 
die  without  a  struggle  but  in  some  deeds  of  arms  whereof 
men  yet  unborn  might  hear.2  For  this  it  was  that  Achilles 
gave  up  all  else  that  men  hold  dear.  When  it  had  been 
attained  he  was  willing  to  accept  death  whenever  the  im- 
mortal gods  were  minded  to  accomplish  it.3 

As  these  men  are  the  subjects  of  the  poet's  greatest  joy, 
so  is  it  fitting  that  they  be  likewise  the  subjects  of  his  great- 
est grief.  The  lament  over  the  death  of  Hector  is  one  of 
the  most  moving  of  tragic  verses.  The  old  man  Priam  has 
seen,  and  must  still  see,  full  many  ills,  of  sons  perishing  and 
daughters  carried  away,  ere  he  shall  fall  a  prey  to  the  war- 
rior's sword  and  be  torn  to  pieces  by  the  dogs  he  has  nur- 
tured.4 But  this  is  the  greatest  sorrow,  when  Hector  falls 
before  Achilles.  The  gods  themselves  take  pity  on  him, 
preserve  the  body  of  his  son  and  send  him  forth  under 
divine  guidance  to  ransom  it.  The  king  of  mighty  Ilium 
descends  to  clasp  the  knees  and  kiss  the  hands,  terrible  man- 
slaying  hands,  of  Achilles  the  victorious. 

Fear  thou  the  gods,  Achilles,  and  have  compassion  on  me,  be- 
thinking thee  of  thy  father.  Lo,  I  am  yet  more  piteous  than  he 
and  have  braved  what  none  other  man  on  earth  hath  braved 

1  //.  xx,  490-504.  '  //.  vi,  486-9 ;  xxii,  304-5. 

*  //.  xxii,  365-6.  *  //.  xxii,  59-76. 


423]  THE  EPIC  AGE  29 

before,  to  stretch  forth  my  hands  towards  the  face  of  the 
slayer  of  my  sons.1 

Achilles,  too,  has  his  sorrow.  He  knows  that  his  own  time 
is  approaching.  In  the  midst  of  his  glory  he  must  needs 
remember :  "  Yet  over  me  too  hang  death  and  forceful 
fate.  There  cometh  morn  or  eve  or  some  noon-day  when 
my  life  too  some  man  shall  take  in  battle."  a  He  thinks  of 
the  grief  of  his  aged  father  in  his  halls,  his  heart  is  melted 
within  him  and  they  weep  together  the  old  and  the  young, 
the  one  for  his  son,  the  other  for  his  father's  sake.3  So 
Homer  portrays  the  final  grief  of  war. 

Even  as  Homer's  heroes,  so  were  Homer's  gods.  The 
immortal  gods  looked  down  from  Olympus  upon  the  war; 
they  were  swayed  by  its  passions,  and  interfered  now  to 
rescue  some  favorite  from  impending  death,  now  to  stir  up 
their  chosen  side,  again  to  take  part  in  the  war  and  fight 
against  mortals,  and  finally  even  to  fight  against  each  other, 
a  foolish  thing  for  gods  to  fight  for  the  sake  of  pitiful  mor- 
tals, the  most  miserable  of  creatures.4  Then  they  withdrew 
to  their  quiet  seats  while  Discord  kept  up  the  war.  Ares, 
the  braggart  bully,  was  unpopular  because  he  loved  strife 
and  war  and  battles.5  He  was  the  stormer  of  cities,  insati- 
ate of  war.6  Athena  was  driver  of  the  spoil  for  the  Greeks 
and  was  hailed  as  the  protectress  of  the  city  by  the  Trojans.7 
Cypris,  however,  was  a  coward  goddess  and  not  one  of  those 
that  have  mastery  in  battle  of  the  warriors.8  Zeus,  the  dis- 
penser of  war  to  men,  ruled  over  all  and  swayed  the  battle 

1 II.  xxiv,  477-9,  503-6.  aIl.  xxi,  110-2. 

3  77.  xxiv,  507-12. 

*  II.  xi,  3-14;  xxi.  462-7;  ii,  451-4;  v,  23,  24,  732;  xiii,  125-135. 

5//.  v,  889-91 ;  xi,  3-14;  73-74- 

8  //.  vi,  269. 

7 II.  vi,  297.  8  II.  v,  330-3- 


30  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [424 

now  one  way  and  now  another.  It  was  he  who  broke  the 
spear  of  Ajax  and  the  bow  of  Teucer  and  made  Hector 
faint-hearted.  "  Ever  is  the  wit  of  Zeus  stronger  than  the 
wit  of  men,  for  he  driveth  valiant  men  in  flight  and  easily 
taketh  away  the  victory  and  then  again  rouseth  men  to 
fight."  1  Apollo  killed  Patroclus  and  Athena  betrayed  Hec- 
tor to  his  death.2  Truly  "  the  issues  lie  on  the  knees  of  the 
gods  and  from  on  high  they  guide  the  threads  of  victory."  3 

Above  gods  and  men  alike  the  poet's  vision  descries  Des- 
tiny whom  none  may  gainsay  or  escape,  be  he  coward  or  be 
he  valiant.  The  hero  warrior  will  accept  its  decree  of  life 
or  death  without  question  and  meet  it  fearlessly  and  glor- 
iously as  did  Hector  and  Achilles,  for  not  even  Zeus  may 
turn  it  aside.4  In  the  contemplation  of  such  a  power  the 
poet's  heart  sinks.  "  What  a  pitiable  thing  is  man  after  all, 
the  most  miserable  of  all  creeping  things,  born  unto  pain, 
living  like  leaves  in  glowing  life  consuming  the  fruit  of  the 
earth,  then  sinking  unto  death."  B  In  the  last  analysis  there 
is  but  one  avail.  "  One  omen  is  best,  to  fight  for  native 
land."  6 

But  life  is  not  all  war,  even  in  heroic  times.  The  theme 
and  central  interest  of  the  Iliad  is  war,  yet  there  appear 
many  peaceful  scenes.  As  well  as  the  Charme  of  battle  the 
poet  knows  the  happiness  of  peace.  On  the  shield  of  Achil- 
les beside  the  city  at  war  there  is  another  at  peace,  happy 
with  marriages  and  dances,  women  standing  in  the  door- 
ways and  men  contending  in  the  market  place;  the  fresh- 

1  II.  xvi,  1 19-21 ;  xv,  462,  3 ;  xvi,  656,  688-90. 

2  //.  xvi,  787-793 ;  xxii,  214  et  seq. 
3 II.  vii,  99;  xvii,  514-5. 

*Il.  vi,  486-9;  xi,  329-332;  xxii,  365-6. 
b  II.  xxvii,  446-7;  xxiv,  520-6. 
6  //.  xii,  243. 


425]  the  EPIC  AGE  31 

plowed  field,  the  rich  demesne  land  of  a  king  in  reaping 
time,  the  vineyard  teeming  plenteously  with  clusters,  the 
herd  of  kine  beside  the  murmuring  river,  and  white  sheep 
and  thatched  huts  and  folds.1 

In  the  midst  of  the  strife  when  champions  appeared  and 
there  were  prospects  of  a  settlement,  the  host  rejoiced  in 
silence  in  the  dream  of  relief  from  the  contest."  Even 
doughty  Menelaus  in  the  midst  of  battle  may  wish  for  his 
fill  of  love  and  sleep  and  of  sweet  song  and  dance  delectable 
rather  than  of  war,  but  only,  it  must  be  remarked,  when  the 
fight  is  going  against  him.3  The  man  who  always  loves 
strife  and  wars  and  fighting,  Homer  considers  the  most 
hateful  of  men,  while  only  a  tribeless,  lawless,  homeless 
man  loves  bitter  civil  strife.4 

From  the  store  of  his  knowledge  of  peaceful  conditions 
and  of  nature  the  poet  drew  many  of  those  similes  5  which 
make  so  vivid  and  so  artistic  his  scenes  of  battle,  the  winds 
and  the  clouds,  the  fleet  waves,  the  birds,  the  leaves  and  the 
flowers  in  their  season,  the  flies  hovering  about  the  herds- 
man's pails,  the  wide-browed  bulls  yoked  to  tread  white 
barley.  When  in  the  midst  of  a  thrilling  description  of 
battle  he  sought  to  mark  the  noon-day  hour,  his  mind  turned 
from  the  battle  to  the  picture  of  the  woodsman  in  the  dells 
of  the  mountain  resting  and  making  ready  his  mid-day 
meal.6  The  startling  transition  presents  such  a  contrast  of 
colors  as  only  the  daring  master  may  attempt,  and  the  more 
successful  therefore. 

In  the  Odyssey,  on  the  other  hand,  the  theme  is  travel 

1 11.  xviii,  467-608.  "U.  iii,  1 1 1-2. 

3 11.  xiii,  636-9.  *Il.  ix,  63-4;  i,  176-7. 

5  It  must  be  noted  that  many  of  the  similes  may  belong  to  the  tradi- 
tional material  which  Homer  used. 
6 11.  xi,  84-90. 


32  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [426 

and  adventure.  War  and  its  glorification  no  longer  play  a 
leading  role.  The  war  is  over,  yet  its  spirit  still  broods 
over  the  lines  of  the  poem.  It  is  an  ever  present  memory 
in  the  minds  of  men.  The  great  men  of  the  time  were  those 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  war,  while  Agamemnon's  fame 
was  the  greatest  under  heaven.1  The  most  welcome  news 
that  Odysseus  could  bring  to  the  shade  of  Achilles  was  that 
Neoptolemus,  his  son,  had  distinguished  himself  in  feats  of 
arms.2  Odysseus,  too,  was  by  no  means  a  peaceful  man. 
Athena  chided  him  that  he  was  too  ready  to  fight,  for  the 
deeds  of  war  were  ever  in  his  heart.3  The  strong  man's 
pride  appears  especially  in  the  boast  of  Odysseus  when  he 
arrived  in  Ithaca  in  disguise  : 

But  then  verily  did  Ares  and  Athena  give  me  boldness  and 
courage  to  hurl  through  the  press  of  men,  whensoever  I  chose 
the  best  warriors  at  an  ambush,  sowing  the  seeds  of  evil  for 
my  foes.  No  fear  of  death  was  ever  in  my  lordly  heart,  but  I 
would  leap  out  on  the  foremost  and  slay  with  the  spear  whoso 
of  my  foes  was  less  fleet  of  foot  than  I.  Such  an  one  was  I  in 
war,  but  the  labor  of  the  field  I  loved  not,  nor  homekeeping 
thrift  that  breeds  brave  children,  but  galleys  and  wars  and  pol- 
ished shafts  and  darts,  baneful  things  whereat  others  used  to 
shudder.4 

Thus  boasted  the  warrior  home  from  the  wars  while  the 
circle  round  him  marveled.  But  men  remembered  the  pain 
as  well  as  the  glory.  Nestor  declared  that  he  would  will- 
ingly sacrifice  two-thirds  of  his  riches  to  have  with  him 
safe  those  brave  men  who  perished  of  old  in  the  wide  land 
of  Troy.5 

10d.  ix,  264.  2  Od.  xi,  513-37. 

lOd.  xii,  116-7. 

*  Od.  xix,  216-226,  trans,  by  Butcher  and  Lang  (London,  1917). 

5  Od.  iii,  103 ;  iv,  97-99. 


427]  THE  EPIC  AGE  33 

The  society  of  the  Odyssey  shows  the  warlike  state  of 
the  times.  Princes  wore  their  swords.  Spears  were  carried 
into  the  assembly  and  to  the  dining-hall,  where  they  were 
stacked.  So  familiar  a  feature  of  the  furnishings  of  the 
great  hall  were  they  that  their  absence  occasioned  comment.1 

In  dreamy  contrast  to  the  tumult  and  the  shouting,  the 
glory  and  the  suffering  of  the  Greeks  in  the  war,  the 
troubled  wanderings  and  sad  home-comings  of  the  warriors, 
the  strife  at  home  and  the  memories  of  war,  Homer  drew 
his  picture  of  those  ideal  people,  the  Phaeacians.  Far  from 
strife  and  contention,  they  enjoyed  eternal  peace  and  pros- 
perity, for  none  should  ever  be  able  to  bring  war  against 
them.2  Masts  and  oars  and  ships  engaged  their  attention 
rather  than  the  accoutrements  of  war.  Yet  the  poet  did  not 
regard  them  as  coward  weaklings  or  inglorious,  but  worthy 
of  all  praise.  The  highest  honor  among  them  was  to  be 
achieved  by  hand  and  foot  in  the  games  from  which 
the  strife  of  boxing  and  wrestling  was  excluded.  "  For 
we  are  no  perfect  boxers  nor  wrestlers,  but  speedy  runners 
and  the  best  of  seamen,  and  dear  to  us  ever  is  the  banquet 
and  the  harp  and  the  dance  and  changes  of  raiment  and  love 
and  sleep."  3  If  this  be  the  poet's  ideal  it  is  in  marked 
contrast  to  that  expressed  in  Hector's  prayer. 

Whence  came  the  rejections  of  the  more  brutal  parts  of 
the  old  tradition,  these  peaceful  sentiments,  this  realization 
of  the  horrors  of  war  and  the  joys  of  peace,  those  glorious 
similes  of  nature  in  her  sunny  as  well  as  in  her  stormy 
moods,  and  this  ideal  dream  of  a  people  at  peace?  Some 
may  be  due  to  the  northern  background  of  the  poet.  The 
treatment  of  religion  seems  almost  certainly  the  result 
of  this :  the  gods  are  of  the  heavens   and  dwell  on  the 

1  Od.  i,  99;  ii,  10;  xix,  5  et  seq.,  xxii,  74. 

2  Od.  vi,  201  et  seq. 

s  Od.  viii,  148  et  seq.,  246  et  seq. 


34  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [428 

mountain-tops,  happy  spirits  fill  all  nature,  and  before 
Destiny  all  must  bow.  The  rites  of  hospitality,  the  pro- 
tection of  the  suppliant,  the  ceremonies  connected  with 
burial  are  all  characteristic  of  the  northern  peoples.1 
Other  features  may  belong  to  the  ancient  tradition  and 
reflect  the  love  and  appreciation  of  nature  and  of  the 
arts  of  peace  so  evident  in  Minoan  art.  Most  of  them, 
doubtless,  are  the  work  of  the  genius  of  the  poet  himself 
in  interpreting  the  finest  sentiments  of  his  own  age.  The 
greatness  and  the  immortality  of  Homer  find  their  source 
in  this.  His  pictures  hold  all  men  because  they  are  so 
thoroughly  human;  they  reach  the  summit  of  human  joy 
and  they  penetrate  to  the  depths  of  human  sorrow.  As  to 
his  own  age,  the  great  days  of  the  heroes  were  over,  the 
wanderings  had  for  the  most  part  ceased.  The  aristocrats 
in  whose  courts  the  poets  sang  were  approaching  settled 
life  and  were  learning  the  advantages  of  peace.  Such  con- 
ditions were  essential  for  the  development  and  perfection 
of  so  fine  a  flower  of  literature.'  Men  still  looked  back  on 
the  more  stirring  days  of  old  with  longing,  the  old  songs 
roused  the  martial  fire  in  their  breasts  and  caused  them  to 
pray  for  the  warrior's  glory  and  often  to  seek  it,  for  they 
lived  in  no  millennium  of  peace.  But  men  were  no  longer 
as  they  had  been.  Those  noble  days  were  past.  Newer 
days  had  come  and  the  poet  saw  peace  at  hand.  When 
the  strife  at  Ithaca  was  over,  Athena  ended  it  with  her 
blessing.  "  So  may  both  sides  love  one  another  as  of  old 
and  let  peace  and  wealth  abundant  be  their  portion." 
Thus  may  the  apparent  contradiction  between  Hector  and 
the  Phaeacians  be  accounted  for.4 

1  Cf.  Schrader,  Die  Indogermanen  (Leipzig,  1911),  passim. 

2  Croiset,  Histoire  de  la  litterature  grecque  (Paris,  1887),  vol.  i,  p.  86. 

3  Od.  xxiv,  485- 

4  This  appears  to  the  writer  as  a  more  satisfactory  explanation  of  the 
so-called  expurgations  than  that  of  ascribing  them  to  later  periods,  cf. 
Murray,  op.  cit.,  ch.  v. 


429]  THE  EPIC  AGE  35 

The  poets  of  the  Epic  Cycle,  probably  more  directly  under 
the  influence  of  yEgean  survivals,  preserved  in  their  epics 
those  things  which  Homer  deleted.  Of  these  poems  there 
are  but  few  fragments.  In  Alexandrian  times  they  were  cut 
up  and  arranged  around  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  to  form 
a  complete  story.  Of  this,  a  later  writer,  Proclus,  wrote  an 
epitome  of  which  some  parts  have  survived  along  with  a 
few  snatches  of  the  poems  themselves.  With  these  and  by 
the  aid  of  the  dramatists  of  Athens  who  found  their  sub- 
jects in  the  poems,  it  is  possible  to  gain  some  conception  of 
the  ideas  of  the  poets  of  the  Epic  Cycle.1 

The  migrations  had  convinced  these  men  that  there  were 
too  many  people  on  the  earth  and  they  conceived  a  curious 
prototype  of  the  Malthusian  theory  as  an  explanation  for 
the  Trojan  war.  In  answer  to  the  appeal  of  Mother  Earth, 
who  was  made  weary  by  the  burden  of  men  wandering  over 
her  bosom,  Zeus  had  brought  on  the  war,  with  Helen  as  his 
tool,  and  thus  had  removed  a  large  number  of  Achaeans 
and  Trojans.2  The  sacrifice  of  Iphigeneia  at  Aulis,  weak- 
ened in  the  later  telling  by  the  story  of  the  substitution  of  a 
doe,  the  sacrifice  of  Polyxena  before  the  return  home,  the 
curious  wounding  of  Philoctetes,  Odysseus'  purification  of 
Achilles  from  blood-guilt  after  the  murder  of  Thersites,  the 
appearance  of  the  ghost  of  Achilles  to  warn  Agamemnon, 
are  instances  of  the  survival  of  earlier  tales  which  suggest 
Minoan  influence.  The  poets  presented  in  bloody  detail  the 
death  of  Priam  at  the  fall  of  Troy,  the  mournful  captivity 
of  Andromache,  and  the  murder  of  Astyanax  when  he  was 
hurled  from  the  tower,  with  the  heartless  comment,  "  Fool- 
ish is  he  who,  slaying  the  father,  spareth  the  children." 

Of  the  Theban  epics  with  their  tale  of  the  ill-fated  family 

^awton,  Successors  of  Homer  (London,  1898). 
2  Ibid.,  p.  16. 

8  Andrew  Lang,  World  of  Homer  (London,  1910),  chs.  xv,  xviii;  Law- 
ton,  op.  cit.,  pp.  19,  32. 


36  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [430 

of  Oedipus  and  its  long  list  of  horrible  crimes,  little  is  known 
save  through  later  treatment.  One  fragment  which  survives 
contains  the  curse  which  Oedipus  called  down  upon  his  two 
sons,  and  which  was  the  cause  of  all  their  later  woes,  that 
strife  and  battle  should  ever  continue  between  them.1  These 
pictures  but  set  in  higher  relief  the  humanity  of  Homer. 

As  Homer  and  his  fellow  bards  are  the  representatives 
of  the  princely  courts  with  their  martial  longings,  Hesiod  is 
the  voice  of  the  common  man.  With  the  return  to  settled 
conditions  and  peaceful  circumstances  the  farmer  might 
turn  himself  once  again  with  some  amount  of  security  to 
the  cultivation  of  his  land  and  the  care  of  his  buildings,  and 
might  plan  for  the  future.  The  soil  was  thin,  life  and  the 
fates  were  hard ;  in  the  farmer's  calendar  was  no  time  for 
the  wars  in  which  the  martial  desires  of  the  rulers  and  the 
ever-present  boundary  disputes  involved  him.  As  his 
spokesman,  Hesiod  protested  against  that  strife  which  ex- 
ulted in  evil  and  multiplied  wars  and  contentions  through 
the  will  of  the  immortal  gods."  The  fault  lay  in  the  wicked- 
ness of  man.  In  olden  days,  so  the  poet  sang,  there  had 
been  a  Golden  Age  when  men  lived  in  peace  and  quiet  on 
their  lands  with  all  good  things.  The  Silver  Age  had 
brought  the  beginnings  of  evil,  and  the  Bronze  Age  had 
created  a  race  of  warlike  men  terrible  and  strong  whose 
delight  was  in  the  works  of  dolorous  Ares  and  in  insolence. 
The  race  of  heroes  had  followed,  but  they  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  war  and  battle  before  Thebes  and  Troy,  and 
after  them  had  come  the  culmination  of  evil  in  the  rulers 
of  his  own  age.  He  bewails  the  fact  that  he  had  not  died 
before  or  been  born  after  the  race  of  Iron.''  In  that  race  he 
saw  all  that  was  wrong. 

1  Lawton,  op.  cit.,  pp.  9  et  seq. 

2  Hesiod,  Erga,  ed.  Rzach  (Leipzig,  1908),  trans.  Mair  (Oxford,  1908), 
14  et  seq. 

3  Ibid.,  109  et  seq. 


43 1  ]  THE  EPIC  AGE  37 

Might  shall  be  right  and  one  shall  sack  the  other's  city.  Neither 
shall  there  be  any  respect  of  the  oath-abiding  or  of  the  just  or 
of  the  good.  Rather  shall  they  ever  honor  the  doer  of  evil  and 
the  man  of  insolence.  Right  shall  lie  in  the  might  of  hand  and 
Reverence  shall  be  no  more.1 

These  are  the  causes  of  war  and  of  woe.  But  he  points  to 
the  solution,  which  is  justice.  Where  that  is  practised 
cities  flourish  and  people  prosper.  Peace,  nurse  of  children, 
is  at  hand  and  keeps  famine  away,  and  Zeus  never  decrees 
war  for  them.2  But  where  the  spirit  of  contention  prevails 
there  follow 

painful  Toil  and  Oblivion  and  tearful  Griefs  and  Wars  and 
Battles  and'  Murders  and  Manslayings  and  Quarrels  and  false 
Speeches  and  Disputes  and  Lawlessness  and  Ruin,  of  one  char- 
acter one  with  another  and  which  most  afflicteth  men  on  earth 
when  any  of  his  will  sweareth  falsely.3 

Of  like  character  are  the  gods  whom  Hesiod  represents 
as  watching  over  and  rejoicing  in  war;  Athena  Tritogeneia, 
driver  of  the  spoils,  a  dread  goddess,  wakener  of  battles 
and  leader  of  the  host,  the  unwearied  one  whose  pleasure  is 
in  din  and  war  and  battle ;  Ares,  insatiate  of  war,  sacker  of 
cities,  piercer  of  shields,  with  his  children,  Rout  and  Fear, 
who  drive  in  confusion  the  ranks  of  men.  In  contrast  to 
them  he  sings  of  those  children  of  Zeus,  and  of  bright 
Themis,  who  is  justice  personified,  Eunomia,  law,  Dike, 
justice,  and  Eirene,  peace,  who  care  for  the  works  of  mor- 
tal men,  always  companions  each  of  other.4  Happy  the 
state  in  which  they  dwell ! 

1  Hesiod,  Erga,  189  et  seq.  2  Ibid.,  22^. 

3  Id.,  Theog.  226.  ♦ 

*  Ibid.,  901  et  seq.,  924  et  seq.,  933  et  seq. ;  Erga,  225  et  seq. 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Early  Period  of  the  City-State 

The  great  basis  of  all  Hellenic  life,  thought  and  action 
in  the  classic  period  was  the  city-state.  The  necessity  for 
defense  and  the  many  political  and  social  advantages  of 
concentration  caused  the  union  of  the  small  villages  of 
tribal  days  into  the  larger  and  better  fortified  city.  To  it 
were  transferred  all  the  old  institutions  of  the  tribe — polit- 
ical and  religious.  Since  all  in  the  tribe  were  a  part  of  the 
organization  whether  they  lived  in  the  city  or  in  the  sur- 
rounding country,  while  all  political  life  centered  in  the 
city,  the  city  and  the  state  became  synonymous.  The  tribal 
deity  became  the  founder  and  protector  of  the  city.  Tribal 
feeling  was  transformed  into  local  patriotism,  which  rested 
on  loyalty  to  local  divinities,  a  great  sanctification  of  terri- 
tory and  withal  a  strong  attitude  of  independence  and  ex- 
clusiveness.  The  sacred  right  of  any  city-state,  no  matter 
how  small,  to  rule  itself  and  to  keep  itself  apart  from  all 
others  became  the  fundamental  principle  of  all  Greek  polit- 
ical life.  It  formed  the  greatest  obstacle  to  any  attempt  at 
union.1 

Nature  made  communication  by  land  difficult  and  kept 
the  Greeks  apart  in  their  little  valleys,  and  aided  in  this  dis- 
union. Diversities  of  dialect  surviving  from  tribal  days 
were  accentuated.  Local  variations  in  the  calendar,  differ- 
ences in  time  and  ritual  of  religious  festivals,  separate  sys- 

1Cf.  Zimmern,  Greek  Commonwealth  (Oxford,  191s),  2nd  ed.,  pp.  64,5. 
38  [432 


433J         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  39 

terns  of  coinage  and  weights  and  measures,  were  fertile  in 
producing  distinctions  and  mutual  distrust.  The  quarrels 
which  inevitably  followed,  the  desire  for  and  the  fear  of 
domination,  the  apparent  impossibility  of  lasting  union 
without  the  sacrifice  of  precious  freedom  of  action,  were 
prolific  causes  of  wars  and  dissensions. 

Nature  furnished  another  cause  for  war  when  it  refused 
to  the  Greeks  sufficient  supplies  of  food.  Even  in  the  days 
after  the  development  of  widespread  commerce  the  very 
life  of  the  city-state  depended  on  its  control  of  the  valleys 
whence  food  might  be  secured.  That  city  which  controlled 
them  was  in  a  position  to  dominate  all  the  neighboring  com- 
munities. Most  early  wars,  therefore,  were  fought  for  the 
possession  of  territory.  After  the  development  of  com- 
merce the  desire  for  the  control  of  trade-routes  added  an- 
other basis  for  disputes.1 

The  city-state,  however,  was  productive  of  most  that  was 
best  in  Hellenic  civilization.  Concentration  within  narrow 
limits  wrought  a  greater  intensity  of  political  life,  a  higher 
consciousness  of  political  feeling,  which  in  turn  caused  those 
manifold  experiments  in  the  art  of  government.  The  de- 
sire to  glorify  the  state  and  its  gods,  to  beautify  the  city  and 
to  secure  for  it  leadership  in  the  arts  of  peace  and  of  war 
led  to  the  production  of  the  finest  works  of  Hellenic  genius. 
The  intensity  of  the  Greek's  devotion  to  his  native  city 
cannot  be  overestimated.  Death  for  the  polls  was  far 
preferable  to  banishment.  The  happiest  man  whom  the 
statesman  knew  was  he  who,  after  a  comfortable  life  in 
Which  he  had  seen  his  children  develop,  died  in  battle  for 
his  homeland.2 

Certain  elements  of  concord  existed  to  mitigate  the  evils 

1  Zimmern,  op.  cit.,  ch.  v. 

2  Herodotus,  ed.   Stein,  H.,  2  vols.    (Berlin,   1860-71),  translated  by 
Rawlinson,  G.,  2  vols.  (New  York,  1910),  i,  30. 


40  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [434 

of  continuous  strife,  the  most  important  of  which  was  re- 
ligion. Though  local  divinities  were  jealous  and  exclusive, 
the  great  gods  were  accessible  to  all.  At  the  shrines  of  Zeus 
and  of  Apollo  all  Hellenes  met  on  a  common  footing.  It 
had  been  the  custom  for  tribes  to  send  sacred  embassies  to 
invite  neighbors  to  take  part  in  more  important  local  fes- 
tivals.1 Some  shrines  were  of  such  sanctity  that  they  were 
in  the  possession,  not  of  any  one  tribe,  but  of  all  the  tribes 
dwelling  around  them.  The  result  had  been  the  formation 
of  numerous  organizations  called  ^mphictyonies.  Among 
them  the  most  important  were  the  Delphic,  to  which  be- 
longed the  tribes  of  central  Greece  and  which  controlled  the 
shrines  of  Demeter  of  Anthela  at  Thermopylae  and  of 
Apollo  at  Delphi,  and  the  Delian,  composed  of  the  Ionians, 
which  met  at  the  shrine  of  Apollo  on  the  island  of  Delos.2 
Out  of  the  local  games  at  Olympia  there  came  the  great 
festival  of  Olympian  Zeus  in  which  all  Hellenes  took  part. 
The  earlier  [festival  truce  became  a  religious  duty  for  all 
Hellenic  cities.  Heralds  proclaimed  the  season  to  all ;  hos- 
tilities were  laid  aside ;  embassies  to  the  games  might  pass 
through  hostile  territory  in  perfect  safety  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  god.  The  greatest  disgrace,  exclusion  from  the 
games,  was  visited  as  a  punishment  upon  any  who  offended 
against  the  truce.  At  Olympia  met  the  leading  men  of 
every  state.  Views  were  exchanged,  differences  were  har- 
monized, agreements  were  consummated  and  tables  record- 
ing them  were  set  up  in  the  shrine  to  ensure  their  fulfil- 
ment.3 Matters  of  interest  to  all  Greeks  were  announced 
and  discussed.  Following  close  on  the  diplomat  came  the 
trader  with  his  wares.     Booths  were  set  up  and  goods  ex- 

^rote,  History  of  Greece  (Boston,  1851),  vol.  ii,  pp.  243  et  seq. 
2Botsford,  "Amphictyony  "  in  Encycl.  Brit.,  xL  ed.  (1910). 
sVon    Scala,    Staatsvcrtrage   des  Altertums    (Leipzig,    1898),    p.    24. 
Collitz,  Sammlung  der  Dialektinschriften  (Berlin,  1884-1911),  1150. 


435]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  41 

changed.  The  foundations  for  direct  commerce  were  laid 
here  in  the  creation  of  demand  for  products.  So  vital  a 
part  did  this  quadrennial  festival  play  in  Greek  life  that  it 
came  to  be  used  in  later  days  as  the  foundation  for  the 
dating  of  events  of  general  interest.1  The  early  king  of 
Argos,  the  legendary  Pheidon,  saw  in  it  an  opportunity  for 
the  unification  of  Greece  under  his  influence  and  endeavored 
to  secure  domination  over  it.  The  rising  power  of  Sparta 
drove  him  back,  and  never  again  was  any  man  so  presump- 
tuous." Though  Sparta  had  aspirations  of  the  same  sort, 
the  little  state  of  Elis  guarded  its  prerogatives  so  carefully 
and  fostered  the  public  opinion  of  the  Greeks  so  zealously 
that  Sparta  itself  was  not  able  to  escape  the  penalty  when  it 
violated  the  sacred  truce.8 

Of  the  amphictyonies,  the  Delphic  alone  became  of  more 
than  local  importance  and  influence.  All  of  the  important 
states  of  the  Greek  mainland  secured  representation  on  the 
council  of  the  amphictyony.  Old  tribal  rules  of  warfare 
were  adapted  to  the  new  conditions  and  the  foundations  of 
a  new  science  of  interstate  law  were  thereby  laid.  No 
member  of  the  league  might  be  cut  off  from  running  water 
or  razed  to  the  ground.  All  members  pledged  themelves  to 
wage  sacred  war  upon  those  who  violated  these  laws.4 
There  was,  however,  no  attempt  to  prevent  war  among  the 
states,  and  though  cases  were  often  referred  to  the  council 
for  settlement  there  was  no  general  agreement  for  arbitra- 
tion. Influence  was  occasionally  brought  to  bear  in  polit- 
ical matters,  but  in  general  the  religious  character  of  the 
organization  was  most  zealously  preserved  and  it  failed 
absolutely  to  bring  about  any  political  union. 

1  Holm,  History  of  Greece  (London,  1894),  vol.  i,  pp.  236  et  seq. 
2Beloch,  Gricchischc  Geschichte,  vol.  i,  1,  pp.  332  et  seq. 

sThucydides  v,  49. 

*  Aeschines,  Orationes,  ed.  Blass  (Leipzig,  1908),  ii,  115. 


42  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [436 

The  oracle,  however,  spread  its  influence  far  beyond  the 
dwellers  around  and,  except  when  it  fell  under  the  influ- 
ence of  some  powerful  state  or  party,  preserved  its  reputa- 
tion for  impartiality.  It  was  courted  by  the  wealthy  kings 
of  Lydia  and  of  Phrygia  as  well  as  sought  by  the  humblest 
Greek,  and  to  each  it  gave  its  answer.  Disputes  were 
brought  to  the  god  for  settlement  and  wars  were  averted  or 
ended.  Unfavorable  utterances  delayed  or  prevented  hos- 
tilities. Its  disfavor  was  feared.  In  these  ways  it  played 
its  part  in  the  ending  of  interstate  anarchy  among  the 
Greeks.  Its  position  was  rather  one  of  influence  than  of 
power.1 

The  work  of  union  begun  by  the  Olympic  games  was 
furthered  by  the  development  of  games  in  honor  of  the 
Pythian  god,  to  which  were  added  the  Isthmian  and  Nemean 
festivals.  To  advance  the  prosperity  of  the  festivals  and 
to  make  it  possible  for  embassies  to  travel  at  all  seasons  of 
the  year  sacred  roads  were  built  along  the  main  lines  of 
traffic.  Though  religious  in  purpose,  they  formed  good 
routes  of  communication  for  the  trader  as  well  and  aided 
in  binding  the  mainland  together.2 

The  growth  of  political  organization  in  the  city-state 
combined  with  the  development  of  trade  and  industry  to 
effect  many  changes  in  the  conditions  of  life,  which  re- 
flected themselves  in  the  field  of  interstate  relations.  Pri- 
vate war  came  to  an  end.  Criminal  justice  in  the  hands  of 
the  state  under  the  gods  took  the  place  of  the  old-time  feud. 
The  citizen  secured  protection  for  life  and  property  from 
the  magistrate  and  no  longer  went  armed  about  his  busi- 
ness. The  noble  hung  his  swords  and  spears  and  shields  on 
the  walls  of  his  armory,  whence  he  took  them  only  at  the 

1  Botsford,  op.  cit. 

2Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  5  vols.  (New  York,  1907),  vol.  ii,  p.  42. 


437]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  43 

behest  of  state  or  party.  The  very  character  of  warfare 
had  changed.  Alining  and  industry  had  cheapened  armor 
so  that  the  commoner  could  fit  himself  for  war.  The  newly 
developed  phalanx  came  to  be  more  important  in  battle  than 
magnificently  caparisoned  nobles.  Fighting  then  ceased  to 
be  the  glory  of  the  upper  classes  and  became  the  duty  of 
every  citizen.  The  state  and  not  the  individual  leader  called 
the  man  to  war.  The  individualist  adventurer  found  plenty 
of  excitement  in  the  still  unsettled  regions  of  the  new  colo- 
nies, while  men  went  to  Egypt  and  to  Babylonia  to  enlist  in 
the  armies  of  the  Oriental  kings.1 

Interstate  relations  entered  upon  a  new  epoch.  The  well- 
organized  city-state  was  better  able  to  execute  a  foreign 
policy,  to  make  and  to  keep  agreements  than  had  been  the 
shifting  tribes  of  earlier  days.  With  the  occupation  of  the 
country  migratory  movements  on  the  mainland  of  Greece 
had  ceased.  No  longer  did  men  live  by  raiding  and  piracy, 
except  when  practised  on  a  large  scale  as  by  Polycrates 
of  Samos,  ceased  to  be  an  honorable  profession.  Corinth 
took  the  place  of  ancient  Minos  and  rid  the  ^Egean  of 
these  pests.  Religion  and  custom  combined  to  regulate  the 
character  of  war.  The  Delphic  rules  were  of  local  appli- 
cation, but  there  were  more  general  laws  which  all  ob- 
served. Formal  declaration  of  war  by  heralds  took  the 
place  of  the  sudden  raid  of  the  time  of  Achilles.  Heralds 
and  envoys  were  under  the  protection  of  the  gods  and  it 
was  a  sin  to  injure  them  even  if  they  were  barbarians.2 
The  importance  of  the  fields  to  the  life  of  the  state  led  to 
the  growth  of  the  phalanx  for  their  defence,  and  this  rather 
unwieldy  formation  resulted  in  a  type  of  battle  fought 
always  according  to  well-established  practices.     The  battle 


1  Beloch,  op.  cit.,  i,  1,  pp.  281  et  seq.,  316  et  seq. 

2  Ibid..  00.  31  s  et  sea. 


'  Ibid.,  pp.  315  et  seq 


44  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [438 

over,  it  was  the  custom  for  the  side  which  had  held  the 
field  successfully  to  erect  a  trophy  composed  of  captured 
arms.  Religion  then  enjoined  a  truce  for  the  burial  of  the 
dead.  The  life  of  the  wounded  enemy  was  spared  and  pris- 
oners were  held  for  ransom  at  regular  rates.1  Jubilation 
over  the  fallen  foe  and  the  mutilation  of  his  corpse  were 
unseemly  in  a  barbarian  and  absolutely  forbidden  to  a 
Greek.2 

The  formal  declaration  of  war  brought  to  an  end  the 
period  when  a  natural  state  of  war  existed  and  led  naturally 
to  a  formal  arrangement  for  peace  in  the  drawing-up  of 
treaties.  In  these,  too,  religion  played  a  great  part.  The 
treaties  were  engraved  on  tablets  and  set  up  in  the  shrines 
of  the  gods,  who  thus  became  their  guarantors.  One  ojL_the 
earliest  treaties  provided  that  the  Olympic  authorities  should 
take  cognizance  of  the  transgression  of  oaths  and  that  any 
violator  of  the  treaty  should  be  excluded  from  the  altars.3 
Such  agreements,  however,  were  not  regarded  as  permanent 
affairs  but  were  made  for  a  definite  term  of  years  only. 

Treaties  were  also  made  to  consummate  alliances.  Many 
factors  were  tending  to  bring  the  states  into  such  close  rela- 
tionship as  to  make  a  formal  treaty  necessary  and  advan- 
tageous. Community  of  interests  bound  the  Thessalian 
nobles  together  into  a  league.  The  compulsion  of  a  power- 
ful state  added  to  the  necessity  of  defense,  and  the  rewards 
of  successful  aggression  resulted  in  the  Boeotian  and  Pelo- 
ponnesian  leagues.  The  threat  of  Lydia  and  of  Persia  kept 
the  Ionian  cities  in  close  touch  with  each  other.     Small  states 

1  Herodotus  vi,  79. 

'Herodotus  ix,  79;  Archilochus,  fr.  64.  References  to  fragments 
of  the  lyric  poets  are  made  according  to  Bergk,  Poetae  Lyrici  Graeci 
vol.  ii,  3d  ed.  (Leipzig,  1914),  vol.  iii,  2nd  ed.  (1882). 

3  von  Scala,  op.  cit.,  p.  24;  Collitz,  1150. 


439]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  45 

frequently  made  agreements  for  peace,  friendship  and 
mutual  aid  with  their  neighbors.1 

A  strong  force  in  bringing  the  states  together  was  found 
in  renewed  expansion.  Over-population  in  the  agricultural 
districts,  the  presence  of  unwelcome  elements  in  the  body 
politic  as  the  result  of  civil  strife  in  the  more  highly  de- 
veloped cities,  overabundance  of  energy  and  adventurous 
daring  which  could  find  no  outlet  at  home,  and,  finally,  the 
exigencies  of  trade  and  industry  carried  the  Hellenes  to  the 
far  shores  of  the  western  end  of  the  Mediterranean  and  to 
the  hidden  recesses  of  the  Euxine  sea.  The  mingling  of 
peoples,  since  frequently  many  states  combined  in  the  settle- 
ment of  a  colony,  the  close  social  and  religious  ties  between 
the  colony  and  the  mother  city,  could  not  help  but  react  on 
the  relations  among  the  Greeks  as  a  whole. " 

The  growth  of  political  life  in  the  individual  states  was 
another  strengthening  influence  in  unification.  Civil  strife 
itself,  though  it  caused  bloody  wars,  nevertheless  aided  the 
cause  of  interstate  peace  and  friendship.  Aristocrats,  oli- 
garchs and  democrats  alike  looked  to  men  of  their  own  class 
in  other  cities  for  support  and  sympathy  when  they  found 
themselves  in  difficulties  at  home.  Cities  tended  to  com- 
bine according  to  the  character  of  their  governments.  The 
binding  force  of  this  class  sympathy  reached  its  highest 
point  under  the  tyrants.  To  these  men,  powerful  nobles, 
wealthy  traders  or  unscrupulous  demagogues  who  had 
seized  the  citadel  and  were  compelled  to  maintain  them- 
selves by  armed  force,  the  hazards  of  war  might  prove 
dangerous.     Unless  necessity   dictated   or  the   prize   war- 

1  Phillipson,  The  International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece 
and  Rome  (London,  191 1).  vol.  ii,  p.  54;  cj.  Hicks  and  Hill,  Manual  of 
Greek  Historical  Inscriptions  (Oxford,  1901),  no.  9. 

'Phillipson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  115  et  seq.;  Curtius,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i, 
pp.  491  et  seq. 


46  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [440 

ranted  or  their  positions  were  sufficiently  secure,  the  tyrants 
tended  to  avoid  war  and  to  advance  their  own  influence  and 
the  position  of  their  cities  by  other  means.  Prominent  men 
of  other  states,  poets,  artists  and  philosophers,  were  invited 
to  come  and  add  to  the  brilliance  of  their  courts,  with  resul- 
tant cultural  interchange  and  better  mutual  understanding. 
The  commercial  horizon  of  their  cities  was  widened  by  wise 
measures.  In  advancing  their  own  power  they  affected  the 
other  states  as  well.  Thus  Periander  of  Corinth  developed 
the  Isthmian  games.  He  frequently  acted  as  arbiter  in 
disputes  between  warring  states.  Cleisthenes  of  Sicyon 
brought  his  state  into  close  relation  with  others  by  taking  a 
leading  part  in  the  first  Sacred  War  and  by  securing  a  mar- 
riage alliance  with  a  powerful  family  of  Athens.  Similar- 
ity of  position  produced  a  feeling  of  dependence  among  the 
tyrants  themselves.  They  sent  envoys  back  and  forth,  ex- 
changed ideas  and  methods  and  established  a  sort  of  entente 
between  their  cities.1 

The  greatest  work  of  the  tyrants  in  the  cause  of  Panhel- 
lenism  was  in  their  treatment  of  the  epic  tradition.  The 
legends  of  the  gods,  the  stories  of  early  wars  and  great 
heroes  furnished  to  the  Greeks  that  basis  of  common  his- 
tory, the  spirit  of  which  alone  makes  a  people  into  a  nation. 
The  Trojan  war  represented  a  national  movement,  not  the 
effort  of  any  one  city,  and  in  its  glories  the  Greek  felt  a 
thrill  of  pride  that  was  Hellenic,  not  local.  Already  these 
poems  were  so  widely  known  that  men  in  all  localities  un- 
derstood the  language  used  and  employed  it  in  their  own 
writings.2  It  was  these  tales,  possibly,  which  inspired  Phei- 
don  of  Argos  to  his  attempt. 

The  poems  were  used  as  evidence  for  the  settlement  of 

1  Beloch,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  1,  p.  356.  There  are  many  instances  of  these 
things  given  in  Herodotus. 

2  Beloch,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  1,  pp.  309  et  seq. 


441]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  47 

disputes  x  and  all  Greek  states  sought  a  place  in  the  cata- 
logue of  ships  in  the  Iliad.  Still  it  was  in  the  court  of  the 
noble  that  the  rhapsodist  sang  the  lays.  They  were  re- 
garded as  the  possession  of  the  aristocracy.  The  tyrants  in 
their  endeavor  to  break  down  the  prestige  of  the  nobles 
created  new  festivals  and  at  them  made  the  epics  the  heri- 
tage of  every  man.  Tradition  ascribes  to  Peisistratus  of 
Athens  the  writing  down  of  the  poems  that  all  might  have 
a  correct  version.2 

Language  came  to  form  an  added  bond.  Homer  appar- 
ently knew  no  difference  between  Greek  and  Trojan  in  lan- 
guage or  religion.  The  growth  of  oracle,  of  festival  to 
which  only  Greeks  were  admitted,  and  of  mart,  made  evi- 
dent a  community  of  language.  In  this  the  epic  played  a 
leading  part.  Hesiod  and  Archilochus  were  the  first  to 
apply  the  term  Hellenes  to  all  Greeks.3  However,  it  was 
when  the  Greek  came  into  contact  with  the  outside  world, 
with  people  whom  he  could  not  understand  and  to  whom  he 
therefore  applied  the  name  barbaros,  that  he  felt  most  keenly 
his  kinship  with  all  the  Greeks.  It  must  be  remembered, 
however,  that  there  is  no  evidence  for  ascribing  to  this 
period  the  contempt  expressed  by  later  philosophers  for  bar- 
barians. On  the  contrary,  it  is  evident  that  Lydians  and 
Phrygians  were  both  respected  and  courted,  and  that  the 
same  rules  of  warfare  were  enforced  by  the  gods  on  the 
relations  between  Greeks  and  barbarians  as  among  the 
Greeks  themselves.4 

The  most  important  and  ever-present  impulse  to  peace 
and  unity  after  religion  was  to  be  found  in  commerce.     Its 

lRaeder,   L' Arbitrage  international  chez   les  Hellenes    (New   York, 
1912),  p.  IQ- 
2Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte  (2nd  ed„  Gotha,  1895),  vol.  ii,  p.  373- 
3  Hesiod,  Erga  653 ;  Archilochus,  f r.  52. 
*  Herodotus  vi,  48;  vii,  136. 


48  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [442 

interests  were  served  in  the  festivals;  it  was  a  vital  factor 
in  the  cause  and  in  the  success  of  many  colonies;  it  added 
to  the  tyrant's  zeal;  it  bound  states  together  by  the  closest 
ties,  those  of  mutual  self-interest;  it  played  the  greatest 
part  in  the  development  of  interstate  relations;  but  it  was 
also  the  cause  of  bitter  wars  between  rival  states  for  the 
control  of  the  highways  of  trade  and  of  the  markets  them- 
selves. So  closely  were  the  cities  held  by  commercial  inter- 
ests that  a  quarrel  between  two'  trading  cities,  Chalcis  and 
Eretria,  over  a  little  plain  on  the  island  of  Euboea,  involved 
most  of  the  prominent  Greek  states  of  that  day  in  the  semi- 
mythical  Lelantine  war.1 

Commercial  necessity  compelled  a  partial  abandonment  of 
the  rigid  exclusiveness  which  religion  enjoined  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  foreign  trader  in  the  city  markets.  To  satisfy 
the  religious  exigencies  of  the  situation,  the  old  and  time- 
honored  family  custom  of  guest- friendship  was  developed 
into  a  form  of  consulship.  States  secured  guest-friends, 
proxenoi,  from  among  the  prominent  citizens  of  other  states. 
It  was  the  duty  of  such  men  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the 
state  they  befriended,  to  take  care  of  its  citizens  when  they 
arrived,  to  see  that  they  were  justly  treated,  to  represent 
them  in  the  courts  and  to  aid  them  in  the  transaction  of 
their  business.  Save  in  Sparta,  where  strangers  were  un- 
welcome and  were  frequently  invited  by  the  ephors  to  de- 
part, and  where  accordingly  the  appointment  of  proxenoi 
was  kept  in  the  hands  of  local  authorities,  the  state  to  be 
represented  chose  its  own  guest-friend.  The  right  thus  be- 
stowed became  hereditary  and  usually  one  of  the  most 
prized  possessions  of  the  family.  Proxenia  became  a  well- 
established  institution  in  the  sixth  century,  the  recognized 
right  of  a  citizen  and  a  part  of  the  machinery  used  to  secure 
the  enforcement  of  treaties.     It  created  in  the  state  a  party 

1  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  456- 


443]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  4g 

favorable  to  the  foreign  state,  which  acted  frequently  as  a 
deterrent  to  war  and  an  aid  to  alliances.1 

The  existence  of  a  large  number  of  evenly-balanced 
states  produced  a  sort  of  equilibrium  in  the  Hellenic  world. 
It  was  difficult  for  one  state  to  secure  a  decision  over  an- 
other in  war.  The  consequent  length  of  the  struggles  and 
the  uncertainty  of  success  led  to  the  use  of  other  means  to 
settle  disputes.2  Champions  were  chosen  to  defend  the 
cause  of  their  cities  and  prevent  useless  shedding  of  blood, 
as  in  the  famous  war  between  Argos  and  Sparta  over  the 
Thyreatis  when  three  hundred  Argives  fought  an  equal 
number  of  Spartans.3  Herodotus  tells  a  curious  tale  of  a 
strife  in  the  Chersonesus  which  was  settled  by  a  fight  be- 
tween two  men,  two  horses  and  two  dogs.4  This  method 
did  not  avail.  Indeed,  in  the  case  of  the  Thyreatic  war  it 
was  followed  by  another  battle  between  the  armies  of  the 
opposing  states.  Recourse  was  therefore  had  to  arbitra- 
tion. Later  Greeks  ascribed  the  origin  of  this  institution  to 
the  gods.  The  earliest  cases  reported  among  men  are 
purely  legendary.  The  first  historical  case  was  in  a  quarrel 
between  Chalcis  and  Andros  over  the  village  of  Acanthus 
in  the  Chalcidice,  which  was  settled  in  favor  of  Andros  by 
the  Samians,  Parians,  and  Erythreans.5  Five  Spartans  de- 
cided the  question  between  Megara  and  Athens  over  the 
possession  of  Salamis  in  favor  of  Athens  after  a  long  and 
disastrous  war  had  failed  to  accomplish  a  decision.6  Peri- 
ander  arbitrated  the  war  between  Athens  and  Mytilene 
over  the  control  of  the  Hellespont  on  a  basis  of  status  quo, 

1  Phillipson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  147  et  seq. 

2  Raeder,  op.  cit.,  p.  145. 

3  Herodotus,  i,  82. 

4  Id.,  v,  1. 

5  Raeder,  op.  cit.,  pp.  16,  et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  17,  et  seq. 


50  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [444 

a  virtual  victory  for  Mytilene,3  and  he  used  his  good  offices 
to  bring  to  an  end  a  profitless  struggle  between  Miletus  and 
the  Lydians.2  The  boundaries  of  Elis  and  Arcadia  were 
fixed  by  an  Olympic  victor,  Pyttalus,3  and  the  Corinthians 
settled  a  quarrel  between  Athens  and  Thebes  over  Platea.4 
All  of  these  cases  concerned  matters  vital  to  the  interests 
of  the  states  involved,  but  in  all  except  the  last  the  decision 
of  the  arbiters  was  accepted  as  final.  There  were  doubtless 
many  other  instance  of  disputes  ended  by  this  means  be- 
sides these  few  which  have  survived.  By  the  end  of  the 
sixth  century  it  had  become  so  well  recognized  that  after 
the  Ionian  revolt  the  Persians  ordered  the  states  under 
their  control  to  settle  all  their  arguments  in  this  way.5  It 
was  employed  more,  however,  judging  from  the  evidence 
at  hand,  to  end  than  to  prevent  wars. 

In  spite  of  all  these  movements  in  the  direction  of  peace, 
wars  were  regular  and  continuous.  The  aggressive  char- 
acter of  the  Greek,  the  preference  which  he  showed  for 
settling  arguments  by  a  fight  rather  than  by  a  compromise 
involved  him  in  broils  with  his  neighbors,  both  Hellenic 
and  barbarian.  War  remained  a  customary  part  of  the 
citizen's  existence. 

The  same  influences  which  were  affecting  the  relations 
of  the  Greeks  with  each  other,  religion,  politics  and  com- 
merce, reflected  themselves  in  the  aesthetic  life  of  the  people. 
Wealth,  luxury  and  refinement,  contact  through  trade  with 
the  older  civilizations  of  the  Orient,  the  desire  to  glorify 
the  city,  its  gods  and  its  victorious  athletes,   to  sing  the 

1  Raeder,  op.  cit.,  pp.  20,  et  seq. 

2  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  466. 

3  Raeder,  op.  cit.,  pp.  22  et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  23. 

5  Herodotus,  vi,  42;  cf.  Westermann,  "International  Arbitration  in 
Antiquity"  in  Classical  Journal,  ii  (1906-7),  pp.  197,  et  seq. 


445]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  ^ 

praise  of  leader  and  of  party,  all  led  to  the  outburst  of  a 
new  period  of  art  and  literature.  In  the  great  epics  of  old, 
men  found  inspiration  and  delight.  But  for  themselves 
they  sought  different  fields.  They  made  mock  of  the  stately 
hexameter  by  writing  such  comic  epics  as  the  Batracho- 
myomachia,  the  Battle  between  the  Frogs  and  the  Mice. 
Then  in  varying  meters  they  sang  songs  of  party  strife,  of 
love  and  wine  and  nature,  or  rallied  their  countrymen  to 
the  defense  of  native  land  against  present  enemies.  Their 
artistic  sense  expressed  itself  in  temples,  in  statues  and  in 
beautifully  painted  vases.  Discovering  themselves  as  indi- 
viduals in  a  great  universe,  they  began  to  ask  the  questions 
of  how  and  why,  and  the  new  science  of  philosophy  devel- 
oped. The  expression  of  their  age,  these  artists,  poets  and 
philosophers  filled  a  mutual  need ;  wherever  they  went  they 
found  a  ready  welcome;  in  many  quarters  their  presence 
was  earnestly  solicited ;  they  spoke  the  language  of  art 
which  all  could  understand,  and  they  became,  no  less  than 
the  great  poets  of  the  epic  age,  the  common  property  of  all 
Greeks  and  an  added  bond  of  union.  In  the  endeavor  to 
find  out  something  of  what  they  thought,  it  is  necessary  to 
remember  that  we  have  but  the  barest  fragments  of  their 
works  and  conclusions  must  be  drawn  sparingly.  All  that 
is  possible  is  to  notice  the  general  trend  of  their  opinions 
as  indicated  in  what  evidence  there  is  at  hand. 

The  leaders  in  this  fresh  life  were  to  be  found  in  the 
great  and  wealthy  trading  cities  along  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor.  It  was  a  stirring  age,  "  a  period  of  courts  and 
tyrannies,  of  colonial  prosperity,  of  political  animation,  of 
social  intrigues,  of  intellectual  development,  of  religious 
transformation,  of  change  and  uncertainty  in  every  depart- 
ment." 1  Wars  there  were  aplenty,  between  neighboring 
states,  with  the  threatening  powers  of  Lydia  and  Phrygia, 

1  Symonds,  Studies  of  the  Greek  Poets  (London,  1893),  vol.  i,  p.  239. 


52  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [446 

with  the  invading  Cimmerians,  later  with  the  overwhelming 
power  of  Persia,  with  the  aggressive  cities  of  the  western 
side  of  the  /Egean,  in  addition  to  civil  strife  at  home.  Yet 
there  were  adventurers  who  looked  farther  afield.  They 
thronged  into  the  colonies,  they  filled  the  armies  of  the 
Saite  kings  with  mercenaries ;  1  and  the  brother  of  the  poet 
Alcaeus  won  great  renown  by  fighting  a  giant  in  far-off 
Babylon.2  To  these  same  cities  came  all  the  products  of  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Orient.  Tradition  ascribed  to  them 
the  foundation  of  new  industries.  They  became  a  synonym 
for  luxury  and  refinement  and  elegance.3 

All  of  these  things  are  reflected  in  the  literature  of  the 
age.  Of  the  oldest  of  the  poets,  Callinus  of  Ephesus,  who 
lived  about  seven  hundred  B.  C,  there  remains  but  one 
elegy.  The  Cimmerians  had  swept  over  Lydia,  destroyed 
Magnesia  and  were  threatening  Ephesus.  Callinus  called 
his  people  to  battle  in  a  stirring  poem,  the  main  thought  of 
which  is : 

The  enemy  are  wasting  the  land.  Do  you  think  you  are  at 
peace  then  ?  Cease  to  slumber,  but  arise  and  fight !  When  the 
fates  will,  man  must  die,  and  there  is  no  escape.  He  who  dies 
in  war  is  mourned  by  all,  while  he  who  wins  and  lives  is  held 
as  almost  divine.4 

Language  and  idea  are  Homeric.  When  it  is  remembered 
that  the  city  was  successful  in  its  defence,  this  poem  seems 
to  be  hardly  sufficient  evidence  on  which  to  build  the  as- 
sumption that  the  Ephesians  were  effete  and  peace-loving.0 
Closely  akin  to  Callinus  in  thought,  more  vigorous  in 

1  Collitz,  5261 ;  cf.  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  479. 

2  Alcaeus,  fr.  33. 

3Botsford  and  Sihler,  Hellenic  Civilisation  (New  York,  1915),  P-  2©3- 

*  Callinus,  fr.  1. 

6  Cf.  Busolt,  op.  cit,  vol.  ii,  p.  464- 


447]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  53 

personality,  and  certainly  the  product  of  no  slothful  age 
stands  his  younger  contemporary  Archilochus.1  Born  in 
Paros,  colonizer  of  Thasos  with  the  willing  consent  of  his 
native  city,  restless  warrior  depending  on  his  lance  for  his 
livelihood,  he  is  the  personification  of  Greek  aggressiveness. 
The  range  of  his  interests  and  the  vigorous  force  of  his 
personality  which  he  expressed  in  his  poems  differentiate 
him  from  the  writers  of  the  epopee.  He  wrote  religious 
poems,  fables  as  satires,  and  a  long  series  of  personal  poems 
on  topics  varying  from  wine  to  shipwreck.  The  literary 
importance  of  his  work  rests  on  the  fact  that  he  is  the  first 
Greek  to  use  the  poetic  medium  to  express  himself  as  an 
individual,  and  in  so  doing  broke  the  bonds  of  the  older 
meters  and  created  new  standards.  He  described  himself 
as  a  soldier  and  a  poet.  "  I  am  the  servant  of  the  lord 
Enyalios  and  I  am  skilled  in  the  lovely  gift  of  the  Muses."  2 
He  is  as  keen  for  a  fight  as  a  thirsty  man  for  a  drink.3  His 
philosophy  is  that  of  a  soldier  of  fortune.  "  Hearten  the 
young  warriors  but  trust  to  the  gods  for  victory."  4  All 
things  are  in  the  hands  of  the  gods.  They  set  men  up  and 
knock  them  down.  The  only  remedy  that  he  finds  is  en- 
durance and  moderation. 

Endure,  endure  my  soul,  disquieted  by  griefs  beyond  remedy 
and  setting  thy  breast  against  the  foe,  hold  thy  ground,  taking 
thy  stand  firm  and  close  amid  the  spears  of  the  enemy.  If 
thou  conquerest,  exult  not  openly,  and  if  thou  art  conquered, 
lie  not  down  in  thy  house  and  mourn.  Rejoice  in  that  which  is 
meet  for  rejoicing  and  grieve  not  overmuch  at  calamities,  but 
learn  what  condition  prevails  among  men.3 

He  laughs  at  the  loss  of  his  shield,  that  greatest  of  dis- 

1  Hauvette,  A.,  Un  pocte  ionien  du  VIIe  siccle,  Archilogue;  sa  vie  et 
ses  poesies  (Paris,  1905). 

2  Archilochus,  fr.  1.  *  Id.,  fr.  68. 
4  Id.,  fr.  55-                                                     5   Id->  fr-6- 


54  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [448 

graces,  thereby  creating  a  precedent  for  later  lyric  poets.1 
His  sense  of  the  eternal  fitness  of  things  warns  him  that  "  it 
is  not  noble  to  make  mock  of  the  dead  among  men."  a  His 
ideal  man  is  the  true  warrior,  not  the  prancing  swash- 
buckler with  his  curls  and  disdainful  looks,  but  the  little 
man,  bow-legged,  who  stands  firmly  on  his  feet,  with  heart 
full  of  courage.3  He  excelled  most  as  a  poet  when  he  turned 
the  inspiration  of  the  Muses  to  the  service  of  Ares. 

Of  the  peaceful  side  of  life  in  the  seventh  century,  Se- 
monides  of  Amorgos  and  Mimnermus  of  Colophon  are 
representative.  The  former  is  best  known  for  his  satire  on 
women.  His  chief  philosophy  was  the  avoidance  of  troubles, 
of  which  war  was  one.4  Mimnermus,  on  the  other  hand, 
wrote  a  war  poem  with  wonderful  richness  of  language, 
praising  the  martial  virtues  of  Ionian  heroes.  His  greatest 
theme,  however,  was  not  war,  but  love  and  youth. 

His  name  has  passed  into  a  proverb  for  luxurious  verse,  sad- 
dened by  reflections  on  the  fleeting  joys  of  youth  and  the  sure 
and  steady  progress  of  old  age  and  death.  They  (his  poems) 
breathe  the  air  of  sunny  gardens  and  cool  banquet  rooms  in 
which  we  picture  the  poet  lingering  out  a  pensive  life,  endeav- 
oring to  crowd  his  hours  with  pleasures  of  all  kinds,  yet  ever 
haunted  and  made  fretful  among  his  roses  by  the  thought  of 
wrinkles  and  death.5 

These  men  are  the  earliest  signs  of  the  transformation  from 
Homeric  days. 

Of  the  era  of  adventure  and  political  strife  which  ushered 
in  the  sixth  century  the  best  proponent  is  the  Lesbian  Al- 

1  Arch.,  fr.  66.  2  Id.,  fr.  7. 

"Id.,  fr.  58. 

4  Croiset,  Histoire  de  la  litterature  grecque  (Paris,  1891),  vol.  ii, 
pp.  192  et  seq. 

5  Symonds,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  227  et  seq. 


449]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  55 

caeus.  A  noble,  a  politician,  a  soldier,  a  traveler,  a  bon 
vivant,  he  is  the  product  of  Mytilene  at  the  height  of  its 
greatest  splendor.  Pittacus,  law-giver  and  one  of  the  seven 
sages,  ranks  with  the  best  of  the  period  in  the  field  of  polit- 
ical thought.  But  Alcaeus  represents  all  sides  of  the  vigor- 
ous life  of  the  time.  He  took  part  in  the  war  with  Athens 
over  Sigeium  where,  like  Archilochus,  he  lost  his  shield 
after  an  honorable  defeat.  After  this  episode  he  was  driven 
into  exile  by  the  success  of  the  democratic  tyrants.  Travels 
in  Egypt  followed,  till  he  was  pardoned  and  returned  to 
home  and  a  settled  life.1  His  poems  of  love  and  wine  are 
best  known,  but  they  show  only  one  side  of  his  character. 
He  was  possessed  by  an  ardent  love  for  his  country  and  a 
desire  to  fight  for  her  even  though  men  he  regarded  as 
fools  had  thrown  her  into  confusion.2  He  believed  fully  in 
the  righteousness  of  his  party's  cause,  and  his  songs  of 
party  strife  with  which  he  rallied  his  comrades  are  full  of 
martial  fire.  His  halls  flashed  with  the  bronze  of  the  hel- 
mets, corselets,  greaves,  shields  and  swords  of  Chalcis, 
which  he  held  ready  for  the  day  of  their  use.3  War  he  re- 
garded as  the  allotted  task  of  grown  men,  an  affair  befitting 
their  estate.4  On  the  youths  who  assumed  a  task  not  theirs 
and  rushed  into  the  first  rank  when  danger  threatened, 
recking  little  of  themselves,  he  bestowed  the  highest  honors 
that  he  might.  For  himself,  Athena  was  polemadokos, 
giver  of  war.5  "  For  it  is  glorious  to  die  in  service  to 
Ares."  6    Yet  the  same  man  called  friends  out  to  sail  on  the 

1  Easby-Smith,  Songs  of  Alcaeus  (Washington,  1901). 

2  Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  194. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  194. 

4  Edmonds,  J.  M.  in  Classical  Review,  vol.  xxx  (1916),  p.  100. 

5  Alcaeus  in  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  f r.  9. 

6  Id.,  f  r.  30. 


56  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [450 

bay  in  the  morning  or  to  join  in  a  pleasant  drinking  bout 
and  wrote  beautiful  poems  of  spring.1  The  outlook  of  men 
was  ever  widening. 

Sappho,  contemporary  of  Alcaeus,  was  more  a  product 
of  the  happy  freedom  and  wealth  of  the  social  life  of  Myti- 
lene.     She  stands  supreme  among  the  poetesses  of  love. 

The  fairest  thing  in  all  the  world  some  say  is  a  host  of  horse- 
men, and  some  a  host  of  foot,  and  some  again  a  navy  of  ships. 
but  to  me  'tis  the  heart's  beloved — one  of  whom  I  would  rather 
the  sweet  sound  of  her  footfall  and  the  sight  of  the  brightness 
of  her  beaming  face  than  all  the  chariots  and  armoured  foot- 
men of  Lydia.2 

Erotic  poetry  reached  its  culmination  for  this  century  in 
Anacreon  of  Teos.3  His  life  was  typical  of  the  age.  Driven 
from  Teos  by  local  disturbances  he  settled  at  Abdera  in 
Thrace,  where  he  took  part  in  wars  with  the  native  Thra- 
cians.  After  his  poetry  became  famous  he  spent  many 
years  in  the  court  of  that  piratical  despot  and  adventurer, 
Polycrates  of  Samos.  From  there  he  went  to  the  court  of 
Hippias  at  Athens.  Amid  scenes  of  splendor  and  glory  he 
clung  to  the  golden  mean,  envied  not  pomp  and  power  and 
wealth,  but  desired  tranquility  and  happiness  above  all.4 
Eros  and  Dionysos  were  his  most  loved  divinities.  In  an 
epigram  he  described  war  as  an  evil,  for  it  took  away  the 
bravest  of  the  city's  youth  and  left  the  coward  in  his  place.5 
He  did  not  care  for  the  old-style  poet  with  his  tales  of  war. 
'  "  I  do  not  love  the  man  who,  drinking  from  a  full  cup,  tells 
of  strife  and  grievous  war,  but  he  who  remembers  to  mingle 

1  Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  195. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  197. 

3  Wright,  History  of  Greek  Literature   (New  York,   1907),  pp.   102, 
et  seq. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  104. 

'Bergk,  op.  cit.,  Anacreon,  fr.  101. 


4- I  ]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  57 

the  glorious  gifts  of  the  Muses  and  of  Aphrodite  with  their 
lovely  cheer."  -  -  In  his  own  military  experience  he  followed 
the  precedent  of  Archilochus  and  Alcaeus  by  throwing  away 
his  shield."  He  was  willing  to  leave  war  to  those  who 
wished  to  fight.3 

The  broadening  and  deepening  of  the  currents  of  intel- 
lectual life  produced  at  the  same  time  a  Thales.  This  man, 
who  was  merchant,  traveler,  statesman,  engineer,  mathema- 
tician, astronomer  and  physical  philosopher,  was  the  em- 
bodiment of  the  best  sides  of  Ionian  life.  He  drew  inspira- 
tion from  every  source,  Egypt,  Babylon,  Lydia,  and  Miletus 
with  its  widespread  commerce.  What  he  learned  he  turned 
to  the  advantage  of  his  fellow-countrymen  and  himself  for 
their  success  in  trade  and  in  war.  He  apparently  took  an 
active  part  in  the  defence  of  his  country  against  Lydia  and 
Persia,  and  urged  upon  the  Ionians  the  advantages  of  union 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  freedom.  His  work  as 
the  founder  of  physical  science  is  well  known.  It  was, 
however,  but  a  small  part  of  his  activities.4  His  successors, 
Anaximander  and  Anaximenes,  confined  themselves  rather 
to  the  pursuit  of  philosophy,  though  Anaximander  produced 
a  map  which  embodied  all  the  knowledge  of  the  many  trav- 
elers of  Miletus.5 

The  intellectual  and  social  pleasures  of  prosperity  did  not, 
however,  detract  from  the  patriotism  or  fighting  zeal  of  the 
Ionians.  Lack  of  union,  not  lack  of  bravery,  drew  them 
under  the  subjection  of  the  Lydians,  a  people  whom  Herod- 
otus  called   the  bravest   and   most   warlike  of   all   Asia.6 

1  Anacreon,  f r.  94.  2  Id.,  fr.  28. 

3  Id.,  f  r.  92. 

4  Marshall,  A  Short  History  of  Greek  Philosophy  (London,  1898),  p.  2. 

5  Herodotus,  i,  74,  75,  170. 

6  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  7  ct  seq. 
'Herodotus,  i,  79. 


58  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [452 

Lydian  commercial  interests  demanded  control  of  the  coast 
cities.  For  the  magnificent  chariots  and  horsemen  of  the 
inland  kingdom  the  small  city-states  were,  no  match.  Still 
each  successive  king  of  Lydia  found  himself  compelled  to 
reduce  the  Greeks  again,  city  by  city.  Miletus,  by  a  long 
resistance  to  Alyattes,  preserved  for  itself  independence 
and  an  alliance  on  favorable  terms.1  A  commercial  league 
which  seems  to  have  been  formed  under  the  leadership  of 
Phocaea  was  apparently  of  no  avail  in  military  matters." 
The  culmination  of  Lydian  control  came  after  Croesus  had 
made  war  upon  the  cities  singly  and  subdued  again  all  but 
Miletus.  He  followed  his  conquest  up  by  making  treaties 
of  alliance  with  the  islanders  and  by  showering  favors  upon 
such  centers  of  Greek  influence  as  the  Delphic  oracle.  As 
a  result  of  his  desires  to  win  Greek  friendship  the  burden 
of  his  rule  was  so  light  that  the  cities  refused  to  revolt  at 
the  request  of  Cyrus  of  Persia.  After  the  overthrow  of 
Croesus,  Cyrus  accordingly  refused  to  allow  them  to  retain 
their  former  arrangements  with  the  Lydian  kingdom,  ex- 
cept for  Miletus,  which  was  granted  its  old  terms.  In  spite 
of  the  fact  that  these  cities  were  by  far  the  feeblest  of  all  the 
Greek  states,  with  no  great  cities  save  Miletus,  whose  support 
they  lacked,  they  determined  to  resist.  They  fortified  their 
towns,  held  meetings  to  secure  united  action  and  sent  abroad 
to  Sparta  for  aid.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  Thales  ad- 
vised the  union  of  the  Ionians  into  a  single  state  with  Teos 
as  its  center,  the  cities  retaining  their  local  autonomy.  Help 
was  not  forthcoming  and  unity  was  impossible.3  Harpagus, 
general  of  Cyrus,  attacked  and  took  the  cities  one  by  one. 
Though  they  resisted  bravely  and  with  many  feats  of  arms, 
they  were  no  match  for  the  might  of  Persia.     Their  war- 

1  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  19. 

2 Hill,  Historical  Greek  Coins  (New  York,  1906),  pp.  8,  ct  seq. 

■'■  Herodotus  i,  170. 


453]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  59 

riors  were  forced  into  the  armies  of  Persia  and  their  cities 
were  placed  under  the  control  of  native  tyrants. 

During  the  period  of  Persian  control  of  the  mainland 
Polycrates  endeavored  to  secure  domination  of  the  islands, 
and  thence  of  the  mainland  itself.  "  Polycrates,"  said 
Herodotus,  "  was  the  first  of  mere  human  birth  who  con- 
ceived the  design  of  gaining  the  empire  of  the  sea  and 
aspired  to  rule  over  Ionia  and  the  islands."  J  Treachery 
put  an  end  to  himself  and  to  his  attempt. 

One  more  effort  was  made  by  the  Asiatic  Greeks  to 
secure  their  freedom  in  the  famous  Ionian  revolt,  led  by 
Aristagoras  of  Miletus.2  Against  the  advice  of  Hecataeus, 
the  historian,  who  thought  Miletus  too  weak  and  Persia  too 
strong,3  they  secured  unity  of  action  among  themselves  and 
were  successful  in  getting  aid  from  Athens  after  Sparta 
had  refused.  The  burning  of  Sardis  was  followed  by  a  de- 
feat near  Ephesus,  after  which  they  dispersed  to  their  own 
cities.  Athens  withdrew,  tribe  after  tribe  and  city  after 
city  were  taken,  and  Miletus  itself  was  besieged.  Not  even 
the  promise  of  favorable  treatment  won  the  Greeks  from' 
their  union.  Discipline  in  the  fleet,  however,  could  not  be 
secured  and  they  were  badly  defeated  at  Lade.  Miletus  fell 
and  its  inhabitants  were  sold  into  slavery.  Though  the 
cities  were  restored  to  democratic  government  and  arbitra- 
tion was  enjoined  upon  them  for  the  settlement  of  their 
disputes,  the  Ionians  had  fallen  forever  from  their  high 
estate.  As  the  result  of  this  subjection,  the  name  Ionian 
became  a  reproach  and  the  cultural  leadership  of  Hellas 
followed  all  spirited  Ionians  who  were  left,  to  the  West. 

With  Ionia  in  the  development  of  art  and  literature,  in 
wealth  and  luxury  in  early  times  ranked  Sparta.     Agricul- 

1  Herodotus  in,  122. 

2  Busolt,  op.  cit,  ii.  pp.  54©  et  seq. 

3  Herodotus  v,  15. 


60  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [454 

ture  in  the  fertile  valley  of  the  Eurotas  and  probably  a  flour- 
ishing pottery  manufacture  brought  in  wealth.1  According 
to  the  tradition,  artists  were  imported  from  Crete.-  and 
literary  men  from  Crete  and  Ionia,3  and  local  men  of  talent 
were  probably  developed.  Terpander,  who  came  thither  in 
the  early  seventh  century  from  Lesbos,  described  it  as  the 
city  where  "  the  spear  of  the  warrior  has  power  and  the 
clear-voiced  Muse  and  justice,  seated  in  the  broad  streets, 
upholder  of  righteous  deeds."  4  Alcman,5  contemporary  of 
the  fiery  Archilochus,  wrote  for  the  Spartan  maidens  his 
choral  lyrics,  "  of  sleeping  nature,  dancing,  ceryl  birds  and 
fair  athletic  girls,"  6  the  same  themes  of  love,  pleasure  and 
peace  which  appear  in  Ionian  poetry  in  the  next  century. 
"He  is  happy  who  cheerily  weaves  the  webs  of  his  days 
unweeping."  7  In  the  same  period  desire  for  wealth  was 
threatening  weakness  to  Sparta.8 

The  narrowness  of  its  own  valley,  the  desire  for  room 
for  expansion  led  to  the  first  step  in  the  militarization  of 
Sparta.  Messenia,  "  good  to  plow  and  good  to  plant," 
was  invaded  about  the  opening  of  the  seventh  century  and, 
after  a  twenty  years'  war,  was  finally  captured  and  its  in- 
habitants reduced  to  serfdom.10     Some  three  generations 

1  Fowler  and  Wheeler,  A  Handbook  of  Greek  Archaeology  (New 
York,  1909),  p.  468  n. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  209. 

3  Wright,  op.  cit.,  p.  106. 

*  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  Terpander  f  r.  6. 

5  On  the  birthplace  of  Alcman  and  Tyrtaeus,  cf.  Botsf ord  and  Sihler, 
op.  cit.,  p.  12;  Christ,  Gcschichte  der  griechischen  Littcratur,  revised 
by  Schmid  (5th  ed.  Munich,  1908-1913),  vol.  i,  pp.  VjO,  207. 

'Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  13. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  186,  Alcman,  f r.  4. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  185,  Tyrtaeus,  f r.  3. 

9  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  ii,  Tyrtaeus,  f r.  5  ;  Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  185. 
10  Busolt,  op.  cit,  vol.  i,  pp.  588,  et  seq. 


455]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  6 1 

thereafter  a  revolt  broke  out  which  the  Spartans  were  unable 
to  crush.  They  were  driven  back  with  great  loss.  In  this 
juncture  appeared  the  warrior,  statesman  and  poet,  Tyr- 
taeus.  With  a  martial  poem  whose  fervor  is  magnificent 
he  urged  the  Spartans  into  the  fight  for  native  land.1  Under 
his  leadership  they  rallied  and  resubdued  the  Messenians. 
Local  disorder,  which  followed  as  a  result  of  the  hardships 
of  the  war,  he  quelled  by  his  poem  Eunomia.'-  His  phil- 
osophy was  military.  Martial  courage  he  regarded  as  the 
greatest  virtue  a  man  could  possess.3  The  most  fitting  and 
beautiful  sight  in  his  eyes  was  the  body  of  a  youth  who  had 
fallen  in  battle  that  his  country  might  live.4 

The  conquest  of  Messenia  marked  the  beginning  of  the 
downfall  of  Spartan  culture.  The  necessity  of  keeping  in 
durance  the  large  number  of  serfs  and  the  growing  alarm 
of  surrounding  states  forced  Sparta  into  that  rigid  military 
system  which  was  the  marvel  of  later  ages.  Literature  and 
art  gave  way  before  the  stern  subjection  of  the  individual 
to  the  military  service  of  the  state.  Foreign  poets  and 
artists  no  longer  found  a  welcome  beside  the  Eurotas.  Ex- 
pansion followed.  The  power  of  Argos  was  broken  and 
Cynuria  taken  from  it.  Failure  of  conquest  in  Arcadia  led 
to  the  formation  of  alliances  and  the  development  of  the 
Peloponnesian  league.  This  famous  organization  was 
purely  military  in  its  character  and  was  under  the  leadership 
of  Sparta.  All  the  states  of  the  Peloponnesus  save  Argos 
and  the  little  cities  of  Achaea  on  the  north  joined  for  the 
defence  of  the  land.  Congresses  were  held  in  Corinth  or 
Sparta  to  settle  questions  of  war  or  peace.  All  states  were 
represented  and  had  equal  rights  of  discussion  with  major- 

1  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  Tyrtaeus,  fr.  10. 

2Tyrtaeus,  fragments,  1-7.     Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  184. 

5  Plato,  Laws  629. 

*  Tyrtaeus,  fr.  10. 


62  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [456 

ity  rule.  There  was  no  tribute  and  complete  independence 
was  the  lot  of  all,  save  that  all  furnished  troops  to  the  army, 
which  was  under  the  command  of  the  Spartan  kings.  This 
loosely-knit  body  was  the  military  backbone  of  Greece, 
courted  by  all  who  desired  aid.  But  culture  had  been  sacri- 
ficed to  military  prowess.1 

Elsewhere  on  the  mainland  culture  was  developing.  A 
school  of  athletic  sculpture  under  the  spell  of  the  games  had 
developed,  and  the  careful  study  of  the  body  paved  the  way 
for  later  heights  of  art.  Poets  and  poetesses  flourished  in 
Argos,  in  Megara  and  even  in  Boeotia.  Of  these,  Theognis 
is  the  best  known  and  most  significant.  A  talented  noble  of 
wealth  and  position,  he  began  his  life  under  the  most  favor- 
able conditions,  which  he  prayed  Zeus  and  Apollo  to  main- 
tain free  from  evil.2  Music,  poetry,  wine  and  amours  were 
his  delight,  knowledge  his  quest.3  He  lamented  the  grow- 
ing power  of  money  which  made  it  possible  for  the  wealthy 
but  baser  element  to  intermarry  with  the  well-born.4  To 
the  strife  between  the  nobility  and  the  commercial  class  he 
endeavored  to  maintain  an  intellectual  superiority.  But 
when  the  blow  came  and  the  aristocrats  were  overthrown 
he  was  forced  into  flight,  his  property  was  seized  and  he 
fell  into  the  direst  poverty.  He  endeavored  to  reconcile 
himself  to  the  loss  by  recourse  to  his  Muse,  though  he  won- 
dered at  the  plan  of  Zeus  which  upheld  the  wicked  and  cast 
down  the  righteous.5  The  time  of  his  exile  was  spent  first 
in  Thebes  and  Euboea.  Then  he  followed  the  footsteps  of 
many  exiled  litterateurs  to  Sicily.  There  he  regained  for- 
tune, took  part  in  a  war  for  the  defence  of  Syracuse,  secured 

1  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  610. 

2  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  Theognis  1-10. 
'Ibid.,  531-4- 

4  Ibid.,  183-192. 

5  Ibid.,  373,  et  scq. 


457]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  63 

pardon  and  a  return  to  his  native  land,  and  possibly  lived  to 
see  the  Persian  menace  sweep  down  upon  the  country.  The 
widespread  popularity  of  his  poems  and  the  readiness  with 
which  he  was  welcomed  in  his  wanderings  is  evidence  of 
how  strong  a  bond  of  union  these  new  poets  had  become. 
The  man  he  honored  most  was  not  the  warrior  of  Tyrtaeus 
or  Archilochus,  but  him  who  remained  faithful  and  firm, 
bound  by  honor,  steadfast  through  good  and  ill,  impreg- 
nable alike  to  danger  and  to  gain.1  War,  save  in  defence 
of  native  land,  seemed  to  him  utterly  useless.  He  went  into 
it  shamed  by  the  call  of  the  herald  rather  than  from  any 
martial  longings. 

May  peace  and  wealth  possess  the  state,  that  I  may  revel  with 
others,  for  evil  war  I  do  not  love.  Give  not  thine  ear  too  much 
when  the  herald  shouts  loud  and  far.  For  we  do  not  join  battle 
for  our  fatherland.  Yet  is  it  disgraceful  when  one  is  present 
and  mounted  on  a  swift-footed  steed  not  to  look  upon  tearful 
war.2 

When  the  threat  of  Persian  advance  was  hanging  over 
Greece  he  prayed  to  the  gods  that  he  might  be  inspired  to 
charm  the  people  into  fearlessness  of  the  danger.  To  Apollo 
he  prayed  to  save  his  city  from  the  arrogant  army  of  the 
Medes  in  spite  of  the  disunion  of  the  Greeks,  which  he 
feared.3 

The  last  great  state  to  enter  upon  the  new  life  was  Athens, 
though  Thucydides  states  that  Attica  suffered  least  from 
the  recurrent  invasions,  and  the  Athenians  were  therefore 
the  first  to  lay  aside  their  arms  and  attain  conditions  of 
peace.4  At  a  very  early  period  the  whole  district  was 
united  into  the  city-state  of  Athens,  partly  by  peaceful  per- 

^heognis,   77-86.  2  Ibid.,  885-890. 

8  Ibid.,  756-768,  J73-7&-  *  Thuc.  i,  6. 


64  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [458 

suasion  and  partly  by  force.1  Mountain  barriers  discour- 
aged such  expansion  as  Sparta  was  undertaking  and  the 
Athenian  nobility  turned  themselves  to  securing  control  of 
the  best  lands  of  Attica  itself.  The  ever-present  necessity 
for  more  food  than  Attica  produced  led  inevitably  to  com- 
mercial growth.  For  this  an  essential  element  was  the  pos- 
session of  the  island  of  Salamis  which  commanded  the  port 
of  Athens  and  was  in  the  control  of  their  flourishing  indus- 
trial and  commercial  neighbor,  Megara.  An  attempt  to  take 
it  resulted  in  a  long-drawn-out  guerilla  warfare,  in  which 
the  Athenians  were  so  badly  defeated  that  the  ruling  class, 
who  were  more  interested  in  agriculture,  forbade  any  one 
suggesting  another  effort  to  secure  the  island.  The  result 
was  a  shattering  of  Athenian  commercial  interests,  which 
doubtless  became  a  factor  in  the  crisis  which  led  to  the  laws 
of  Draco  and  the  reforms  of  Solon.  The  latter  statesman 
saw  the  necessity  and  the  possibilities  of  Athenian  com- 
merce and  felt  the  disgrace  of  the  cowardice  thus  displayed. 
With  his  warlike  elegies  which  he  sang  in  the  market-place 
he  stirred  the  people  up  to  the  recapture  of  Salamis.2  This 
success  encouraged  the  Athenians  to  further  ventures  over- 
seas. A  desire  for  a  share  in  the  rich  trade  with  the  Euxine 
Sea  and  the  advantages  there  to  be  gained  in  the  way  of 
food-supply,  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  garrison  at  Sige- 
ium  in  the  northwest  corner  of  the  Troad  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Hellespont.  It  was  not  a  colony  but  a  fort  for  the  pro- 
tection of  trade.  At  the  same  time  it  broke  the  connection 
between  Megara  and  her  colonies  in  the  Pontus.3  This  un- 
dertaking, in  which  Athens  had  the  support  of  her  sister 
city,  Miletus,  led  to  that  war  between  Athens  and  Mytilene 
which  was  settled  by  the  arbitration  of  Periander.     Civil 

1  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  90-93. 

2  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  voL  ii ;  Solon,  f  r.  1 ;  cf.  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  247. 

3  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  249-254. 


459]         THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  CITY-STATE  65 

troubles  put  an  end  temporarily  to  this  movement.    Salamis 
and  the  footing  on  the  Hellespont  were  both  lost.1 

The  administration  of  Solon  laid  the  foundation  for  later 
Athenian  industry  and  commerce.  He  attracted  to  Athens 
foreign  artisans  and  organized  the  Athenian  coinage  system 
on  the  Euboic  standard,  thereby  cutting  off  the  dependence 
of  Athens  on  the  Megarians  and  the  /Eginetans  and  starting 
a  feud  with  iEgina  which  was  to  last  until  the  fifth  century.2 
Peisistratus  built  on  these  foundations.  He  established  the 
peasant  farmer  in  security  and  gave  to  Athens  the  backbone 
of  the  state.  Under  his  guidance  Athenian  vase  manufac- 
ture and  trade  expanded  to  wide  proportions.  He  invited 
to  his  court  artist  and  writer  and  prepared  the  way  for 
Athenian  leadership  in  thought.  A  new  war  with  Mytilene 
gave  him  full  control  over  Sigeium,  and  the  foundation  of 
Sestos  made  Athenian  control  over  the  Hellespont  secure. 
His  relations  with  the  Thracian  coast  became  later  Athenian 
policy.  He  was  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Thessalians  and 
the  Lacedaemonians,  and  endeavored  to  secure  for  Athens 
leadership  among  the  Ionians  through  relations  with  the 
shrine  of  Delos.3 

At  the  end  of  the  century  the  Athenians  took  part  in  the 
Ionian  revolt  and  waged  successful  war  against  the  Thebans 
for  the  control  of  Plataea  and  with  the  Chalcidians  for  the 
ownership  of  the  Lelantine  plain.4  The  people  were  strong, 
vigorous  and  warlike,  looking  abroad  for  new  fields  to  con- 
quer, and  the  great  days  of  Athens  lay  just  ahead. 

The  Greek  colonies  of  Sicily  and  Italy  had  expanded  and 
become  wealthy  and  powerful.  Here  Ionians  who  felt  the 
lack  of  freedom  under  Lydian  or  Persian  rule  found  that 

1  Bury,  History  of  Greece  (London,  1913),  p.  196. 

2  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  307. 

3  Ibid.,  §  17. 

4  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  441,  et  sea. 


56  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [46o 

which  they  desired ;  here  exiles  were  welcomed  from  what- 
ever party,  and  Magna  Graecia  became  the  second  home  of 
many  poets  and  philosophers.  The  wealthiest  and  most 
luxurious  of  the  cities  was  Sybaris,  which  controlled  the 
overland  trade  with  western  Italy.  The  effeminate  ease  and 
luxury  of  her  citizens  became  a  byword  among  the  Greeks 
in  later  days.1  Hard  by  was  the  smaller  city  of  Croton,  re- 
nowned for  the  simplicity  of  its  life,  the  strictness  of  its 
discipline  and  the  success  of  its  athletes.  In  the  year  510 
B.  C.  war  broke  out  between  them.  Though  Sybaris  put 
into  the  field,  according  to  tradition,  an  army  of  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  the  Crotoniates,  led  by  their  famous 
athlete,  Milo,  were  successful.  In  seventy  days  Sybaris  had 
fallen  and  been  destroyed.  Its  inhabitants  were  killed,  sold 
into  slavery  or  scattered  into  exile.2  Truphc  kai  hybris  had 
wrought  its  ruin,  love  of  luxury  and  arrogance.3  It  was 
the  classic  example  of  a  city  overthrown  because  of  loss  of 
warlike  vigor.  Its  fate  brought  a  shock  to  the  entire  Hel- 
lenic world.  When  the  fall  of  Miletus  followed,  the  Greeks 
had  learned  too  well  the  fate  of  a  captured  city.  A  great 
object  lesson  was  to  teach  them  all  the  evils  which  followed 
in  the  train  of  war. 

1  Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  pp.  205,  el  scq. 
*  Grote,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  413. 

3Diodorus  Siculus  ed.  Vogel-Fischer  (Leipzig,  1S88-1906),  xi,  90,  xii, 
9,  10;  Strabo,  ed.  Meineke  (Leipzig,  1904-9),  vi,  263. 


CHAPTER  III 

I 

The  Persian  War  and  Hellenic  Peace 

The  movements  toward  union  and  peace  which  appeared 
in  the  sixth  century  were  to  be  developed  into  a  measure 
of  success  by  the  war  with  Persia  in  the  first  half  of  the 
fifth  century.  Foreign  danger  was  to  unite  the  Greeks  for 
a  time.  Politician  and  writer  were  to  preach  the  doctrine 
of  peace  among  the  Hellenes  and  war  upon  the  barbarian. 
The  experiences  of  the  war  were  to  teach  man  most  clearly 
the  blessings  of  peace  and  the  cruelty  of  war. 

The  advance  of  the  Persians  found  the  Greeks  divided 
as  usual.  Athens  had  just  finished  wars  with  Thebes  and 
Chalcis  and  was  quarreling  with  /Egina.  Sparta,  under  the 
leadership  of  Cleomenes,  had  interfered  in  /Egina  and  had 
defeated  Argos  again.  The  one  element  of  strength  was 
the  Peloponnesian  League,  which  had  been  brought  to  the 
height  of  its  power  by  the  addition  of  Athens  after  the  over- 
throw of  the  tyrants.  On  the  ground  of  her  membership  in 
this  League,  Athens  appealed  to  Sparta  for  aid  when  the 
forces  of  Darius  were  threatening.  The  story  of  Mara- 
thon needs  no  retelling.  Athens  used  the  period  following 
for  party  strife,  for  aggression  against  the  islanders  and  for 
a  renewal  of  the  war  with  JEgina.  Not  until  the  army  of 
Xerxes  was  assembling  were  steps  taken  for  defensive 
measures.  In  the  autumn  of  481  there  assembled  on  the 
isthmus  of  Corinth  a  congress  of  deputies  of  all  the 
patriotic  states.  This  assembly  formed  an  Hellenic  League, 
461]  67 


68  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [462 

which  was   virtually  an  extension  of   the   Peloponnesian. 
The  armies  of  the  new  organization  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  Sparta.    Athens  yielded  her  claims  to  the  command 
of  the  fleet  in  the  interests  of  harmony.     Many  states  re- 
mained   outside  —  Thebes,    out    of    jealousy    for    Athens; 
Argos,  because  of  her  hatred  of  Sparta;  those  of  Thessaly 
out  of  necessity,  because  of  their  exposed  position.     The 
western  Greeks  were  in  difficulties  of  their  own.    It  was  this 
alliance,  however,  which  fought  Salamis  and  Plataea  and 
began  the  movements  of  retaliation  on  the  other  side  of  the 
^Egean.    To  it  were  admitted  the  larger  Asiatic  and  island 
cities.     It  remained  nominally  in  force  until  the  breach  be- 
tween Athens  and  Sparta  in  461.    Sparta  had  been  the  back- 
bone of  Hellas  in  the  defence  against  Persia.    As  the  leader 
of  an  organization  which  should  unite  all  Hellenes  in  the 
/Egean  and  free  the  cities  of  Asia  Minor,  however,  Sparta 
was  a  failure.     Conservatism  and  the  menace  of  the  helots 
dictated  a  narrow  Peloponnesian  policy.    The  Lacedaemon- 
ians endeavored  to  keep  extra- Peloponnesian  states  defence- 
less.   They  were  not  interested  in  the  affairs  of  distant  Hel- 
lenes.    Nor  were  Spartan  leaders  a  success  when  they  were 
not  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  officials  of  the  state. 
They  therefore  willingly  surrendered  to  Athens  the  com- 
mand of  the  overseas  forces  when  the  Ionians,  already  in 
separate  alliance  with  Athens,  objected  to  the  leadership  of 
Pausanias.    As  long  as  Athens  remained  a  friend  and  an  ally 
and  busied  herself  in  Asiatic  affairs  Sparta  had  nothing  to 
fear.     The  result  was  the  formation  of  the  Delian  Confed- 
eracy.    Projected  by  Themistocles,  it  was  organized  by  the 
wisdom  of  Aristides.    It  consisted  of  the  perpetual  union  of 
a  number  of  states,  all  of  which  were  to  be  equal  and  inde- 
pendent, for  the  defence  of  the  iEgean  against  Persia.   There 
was  to  be  a  general  congress  of  the  members  at  Delos  under 
the  presidency  of  Athens,  in  which  all  members  had  an  equal 


463]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  69 

vote,  to  decide  questions  of  peace  and  war.  The  treasury 
was  established  at  Delos  and  was  administered  by  twelve 
Athenian  Hellenotamiae.  The  larger  states  furnished  ships 
to  the  fleet;  the  smaller  paid  contributions  according  to  their 
resources.  The  task  of  determining  the  duty  of  each  state 
was  entrusted  to  Aristides,  who  fulfilled  it  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  all.  Under  the  generalship  of  Cimon  the  work  of 
the  confederacy  was  carried  on  until  after  the  battle  of 
Eurymedon  in  468,  when  the  Persians  were  excluded  from 
the  yEgean.1 

From  the  very  beginning  the  confederacy  was  dominated 
by  Athens.  The  Athenians  were  able  to  control  a  sufficient 
number  of  the  small  states  to  secure  a  majority  in  the  con- 
gress. Athenians  served  as  treasurers  and  managed  the 
finances,  collecting  the  payments  of  the  members.  In  addi- 
tion, Athens  made  separate  commercial  treaties  with  the  in- 
dividual states  which  bound  them  close  to  her.  The  first 
real  step  in  the  development  of  an  Athenian  empire  came 
when  Naxos,  convinced  that  the  danger  from  Persia  was 
past  and  tired  of  making  contributions,  tried  to  secede  from 
the  alliance.  Cimon  put  down  this  attempt  and  reduced 
Naxos  to  the  condition  of  a  subject  state.  The  culmination 
of  this  movement  was  reached  in  the  next  period. 

As  long  as  Cimon  was  in  power  the  policy  of  the  Hellenic 
league  was  followed :  namely,  war  abroad  and  peace  at 
home.  To  this  the  democratic  party  at  Athens  was  op- 
posed. The  failure  and  mistreatment  by  the  Spartans  of 
an  Athenian  expedition  sent  at  the  request  of  Sparta  and 
supported  by  Cimon  at  the  time  of  the  helot  revolt  led  to 
the  overthrow  of  Cimon  and  a  breach  between  Athens  and 
Sparta.  Thus  the  period  of  Hellenic  peace  came  to  an  end. 
The  Greeks  of  Sicily  had  been  united  before  this  time, 

1  On  the  history  of  this  period  cf.  Busolt,  op.  cit.%  vol.  ii,  pp.  5$7, 
et  seq.;  vol.  iii,  pp.  1.  et  seq. 


j0  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [464 

for  the  most  part  by  the  might  of  the  two  great  tyrants, 
Theron  of  Akragas  and  Gelon  of  Syracuse.  These  able 
men  had  mastered  their  own  cities,  had  brought  under  their 
control  the  neighboring  cities,  had  bound  themselves  to- 
gether by  marriage  alliances,  and  had  accomplished  by  force 
that  union  of  Hellenes  which  the  threat  of  Persia  was  to 
bring  about  in  the  y£gean.  Together  they  stopped  the 
armies  of  Carthage  at  Himera  and  secured  favorable  trea- 
ties of  peace.  Hieron.  successor  of  Gelon,  followed  this 
success  with  the  defeat  of  the  Etruscans  at  Cumae  in  474. 
The  courts  of  the  Sicilian  tyrants  were  the  most  brilliant 
of  the  period.  Poet  and  dramatist  and  artist  found  there 
all  the  freedom  and  appreciation  which  could  be  desired. 
The  overthrow  of  the  tyrannies  was  followed  by  such  con- 
fusion that  in  461  a  congress  was  held  of  all  the  Sicilian 
states  to  compose  matters  and  to  re-establish  the  independ- 
ence of  all  the  cities.1 

The  great  deeds  of  the  foreign  wars  in  Greece  and  Sicily 
resulted  in  a  wave  of  religious  devotion,  an  increase  in  Hel- 
lenic self-confidence,  which  stimulated  all  activities  but 
found  its  best  expression  in  literature  and  art.  The  writers 
of  the  period  reflect  the  spirit  of  their  age,  the  glory  of  the 
deeds  of  the  heroes,  the  value  of  Hellenic  unity,  and  withal 
the  horrors  of  war  itself. 

Pindar  (522-442), 2  the  greatest  of  lyric  poets,  was  a 
native  of  Thebes.  Though  his  city  Medized,  he  himself 
was  thoroughly  patriotic.  Much  of  his  life  was  spent  in  the 
courts  of  the  Sicilian  tyrants.  He  was  an  aristocrat  to  the 
core  and  delighted  chiefly  in  the  noble  achievements  of 
young  aristocrats  in  the  service  of  their  states,  in  the  games 
and  in  war.     His  extant  poems,  ranging  in  date  from  502 

1  Grote,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  236,  et  seq. 

2  Wright,  op.  cit..  pp.  119,  et  seq.)  Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
32,  et  seq. 


465]       THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AXD  HELLENIC  PEACE  ji 

to  452  B.  C,  are  in  praise  of  the  victors  in  the  great  games. 
He  praised  the  victors  by  glorifying  their  heroic  ancestor- 
and  recounting  the  ancient  legends  of  their  cities. 

Bacchylides  (ca.  507-428),  nephew  of  Simonides,  suc- 
ceeded to  the  older  poet's  position.  He,  too,  sang  of  the 
glories  of  Hieron.  His  subjects  are  in  general  the  same  as 
Pindar's,  but  they  lack  the  deep  feeling  and  originality  of 
the  master  poet,  graceful  and  delightful  though  they  are. 
He  is  the  last  of  the  classical  lyric  poets.  Drama  was  there- 
after to  occupy  the  center  of  the  literary  stage.1 

Contemporary  with  these  men  was  /Eschylus,  the  pre- 
cursor of  the  new  age.  Native  of  Eleusis,  of  an  old  Eupa- 
trid  family,  educated  as  befitted  a  noble,  in  athletics,  music 
and  Homer,  he  was  a  follower  of  Cimon  in  his  conservatism 
at  home  and  Panhellenism  abroad.  He  took  part  in  the 
great  battles  of  Marathon  and  Salamis,  and  his  military 
experiences  are  reflected  in  his  writings.  Like  the  lyricists, 
he  visited  Sicily.  His  epitaph,  which  he  is  said  to  have 
written  himself,  indicated  that  he  valued  more  highly  his 
service  to  his  state  in  war  than  the  renown  of  his  great  con- 
tributions to  the  literary  world. 

Here  Aeschylus  lies  in  Gela's  land  of  corn. 

Euphorion's  son,  in  far-off  Athens  born ; 

That  he  was  valiant  Marathon  could  show. 

And  long-haired  Medes  could  tell  it,  for  they  know.2 

^Eschylus,  who  termed  his  own  dramas  morsels  from 
Homer,  followed  his  master  in  stirring  pictures  of  war. 
The  Seven  against  Thebes  was  filled,  said  the  ancients,  with 
the  fire  of  mailed  Ares.3     The  heroes  are  pictured  as  men 

^ebb,  Bacchylides  (Cambridge,  1905),  Introduction. 
2  Glover,  From  Pericles  to  Philip  (New  York,  1017  '• 
s  Aristophanes  ed.  Hall  (Ox 


7* 


HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [466 


of  might  and  valor  whose  delight  is  in  battle.  Through  the 
song  of  the  chorus  one  may  still  hear  the  thunder  of  the 
chariots,  the  shriek  of  the  whirling  wheels,  the  moans  of  the 
spear-shaken  air  and  the  rattle  of  the  stone  against  the 
battlements.  No  less  thrilling  is  the  description  of  Salamis 
in  the  Persae,  the  preparations  of  the  Persians,  the  high- 
spirited  paeans  of  the  Greeks,  the  advance,  the  struggle,  the 
confused  crashing  of  ships,  the  victory  of  the  Greeks  and 
the  wailing  of  the  Persians  till  night  put  an  end  to  the 
battle.1 

Yet  there  is  little  of  the  glory  of  war  in  the  tragedies. 
Warrior  himself,  a  participant  in  the  sufferings  and  the 
triumphs  of  the  Persian  War,  /Eschylus  knew  full  well 
the  attendant  hardships  both  to  victor  and  to  vanquished. 
The  Agamemnon  and  the  Pcrsac  present  the  results  of  war, 
the  one  to  a  people  whose  king  is  returning  victorious,  the 
other  to  a  nation  which  suffers  under  ruinous  defeat.  Even 
when  allowances  have  been  made  for  the  rhetorical  or  dra- 
matic values,  enough  remains  to  make  one  feel  the  terrible 
side  of  war. 

The  Agamemnon  opens  before  the  return  of  the  host 
while  the  king  and  his  followers  are  still  winning  glory 
at  Troy.  The  chorus,  with  an  air  of  foreboding  evil,  set 
forth  their  sufferings.  They  think  of  those  terrible  grap- 
ples of  the  battlefield  where  men's  strength  fails  and  war- 
riors are  crushed  in  the  dust  as  the  war-spears  clash.2 
Then  there  comes  to  yearning  hearts  in  place  of  the  brave 
man  who  went  forth  but  an  urn  of  cold  pyre-ashes.3  Cly- 
temnestra  pictures  the  calamity  of  the  wife,  who  is  com- 
pelled to  sit  alone  in  the  house  apart  from  her  lord  and  is 

1  Aeschylus,  Tragocdiac.  ed.  Sidgwick  (Oxford,  1899)  Seven 
Thebes,  152  et  scq.,  203  et  seq. ;  353  et  sea. 

2  Id.,  Agamemnon,  63-65. 

3  Ibid.,  437-44. 


467]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  73 

driven  many  times  by  heart-shaking  rumors  to  the  verge 
of  suicide.1  In  their  grief  the  people  of  the  outraged  nation 
execrate  their  rulers  for  the  woe  they  have  brought  upon 
them. 

The  war-god  who  exchangeth 

Men's  lives  for  gold, 
And  where  the  mad  spear  rangeth 

The  scales  doth  hold, 
Sends  back  to  hearts  that  yearn 
For  a  brave  man's  return, 
Filling  one  small  sad  urn 

Pyre  ashes  cold. 

With  sighs  love  tells  their  story : — 

In  battle  bold 
Was  one :  one  fell  with  glory 

With  garments  rolled 
In  blood : — and  each  man  died 
All  for  another's  bride  ! 
In  whispered  pain  and  pride 

Is  the  tale  told. 

While  here  grief's  hushed  defiance 

Chides  bitter-souled 
Atreus'  avenging  scions, 

There  lapped  in  mould, 
They,  round  the  embattled  steep, 
In  death  yet  comely  sleep ; 
The  land  they  won — and  keep — 

Doth  them   enfold.2 

Amid  these  plaints  there  comes  the  herald  of  the  return- 
ing army.  He,  too,  has  his  tale  of  the  hardships  of  a  sol- 
dier's life,  the  more  vivid  when  one  remembers  that  it  is  a 
soldier  who  writes  them. 

1  Aeschylus,  Agamemnon,  859-865. 

2 Ibid.,  437-455.     Way,  Aeschylus  in  English  Verse  (London,  1908). 


74  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [46S 

Of  travail  might  I  tell,  bleak  bivouac, 

Of  iron-bound  coasts,  hard-lying,  groans  on  groans — 

Who  knows  how  many? — through  the  straitened  days. 

Then  came  new  ills  on  land  to  vex  us  more : 

Hard  by  our  foes'  walls  through  the  night  we  lay; 

And  dews  from  heaven  and  reek  from  the  marshy  mead 

Down-drizzled,  clammy-cleaving,  rotting  vest, 

And  making  man's  hair  like  the  wild  beast's  fell. 

But  O  to  tell  of  winters  that  slew  birds, 

By  snows  of  Ida  made  intolerable. 

Or  heat,  when  on  his  noon-day  couch,  the  sea 

Unrippled  sank  and  slept,  and  no  breath  stirred. 

Yet  is  his  attitude  that  of  the  victor.  His  joy  at  his  return 
home  overcomes  all  other  thoughts. 

What  boots  to  grieve  o'er  these?     Our  toils  are  past. 
Why  of  those  wasted  lives  take  nice  accounts? 

The  Argive  host  is  victorious,  the  gain  outweighs  the  loss. 
At  his  tale  of  victory  the  people,  too,  lay  aside  their  mis- 
givings.1 

This  comfort  comes  not  to  the  vanquished.    The  poet  de- 
scribes the  scene  when 

With  clouded  brow  a  herald  brings 
Hideous  disaster  from  a  field  of  rout, 
And  speaks  a  nation  stricken  with  one  wound, 
Speaks  many  a  light  of  many  a  home  doom-banned 
By  Ares'  twy-lashed  scourge  of  fire  and  steel, 
Twin  slaughter-curse,  blood-boultered  chariot  pair.2 

To  the  Persian  wives  and  mothers  who  have  been  sighing 
and  counting  the  days  till  their  spearmen  shall  return,  there 
comes  the  messenger  of  Xerxes  with  his  tale  of  defeat  and 
death,  and  grief  overwhelms  the  land.3  The  land  cries  out 
for  her  young  sons  killed  and  the  pall  of   death   covers 

*Way,  op.  cit.,  Agamemnon  555-584. 

2  Ibid.,  638-643. 

3  Aeschylus,  Persae  44.  61-64,  532-547. 


469]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  ye 

it.1  No  word  of  victory  lightens  the  gloom  but  each  suc- 
cessive report  tells  of  new  losses  and  brings  fresh  sorrows.2 

A  worse  fate  than  this  of  the  Persians  ^Eschylus  ascribes 
to  the  Trojans  in  the  Agamemnon,3  and  threatens  for  the 
Thebans,  should  the  Seven  take  the  city,  the  plundering  of 
wealth,  the  destruction  of  earth's  precious  gifts,  the  ruin  of 
an  ancient  city,  the  death  of  warriors,  the  murder  of  help- 
less babes  and  the  slavery,  the  terrible  fate  of  the  captive 
matrons  and  the  maids.4  In  this  all  too  vivid  picture  of  a 
scene  which  Homer  himself  deplored  has  not  the  poet  in 
mind  the  destruction  of  Miletus  and  of  Sybaris,  and  may  he 
not  be  protesting  against  such  a  survival  of  barbarism? 

Though  the  dramatist  regards  the  dead  hero  as  still 
comely  and  despises  the  cowardly,  skulking  stay-at-home, 
yEgisthus  womanlike  in  heart.5  yet  he  realizes  the  other 
side  of  the  picture,  the  danger  to  the  state  in  the  loss  of 
the  flower  of  its  manhood.  As  long  as  its  men  remain, 
he  writes,  its  bulwark  is  sure,  but  when  they  are  gone  its 
strength  is  brought  low.6  So  the  Suppliant  Maidens  pray 
for  Argos  that  Ares,  bane  of  humankind,  may  never  pluck 
the  flower  of  her  youth  and  consume  the  choicest  of  her 
men.7 

War  in  defence  of  native  land,  ./Eschylus  regards  as  jus- 
tified; war  on  behalf  of  suppliants  as  ordered  by  divine 
law.8  His  own  part  in  the  defence  of  Hellas  he  esteemel 
as  the  greatest  act  of  his  life.9    Of  wars  in  good  cause,  wars 

1  Aeschylus,  Persae  710,  640,  673.  !  Ibid.,  909  et  sea. 

3  Id.,  Agamemnon  326-9. 

4  Id.,  Seven  against  Thebes  321  et  seq. 

5  Id.,  Agamemnon  122.1-5.  Choephoroi,  ; 

6  Id.,  Persae  103-5,  349- 
"Id.,  Suppliants  661-5. 

8  Id.,  Suppliants, 

9  Vide  supra,  p.  71. 


76  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [470 

with  foreign  foes,  tharaioi,  Athena  in  her  wonderful  speech 
in  the  Eumenides  promised  the  Athenians  enough  to  satisfy 
those  in  whom  fierce  love  of  glory  burned,  and  assured 
them  that  in  the  glorious  strife  of  wars  she  would  not  allow 
the  city  to  be  uncrowned  amid  the  peoples.1  Useless  wars 
the  poet  would  seem  to  condemn ;  such  wars  as  the  Trojan, 
fought  for  a  woman;  the  Persian,  whose  foundation  was 
arrogance  of  conquest;  the  Theban,  caused  by  brothers' 
quarrels;  above  all,  civil  strife  brought  on  by  passion.  Of 
these  disputes  Ares,  who  sells  men's  lives  for  gold,  is  a 
bitter  arbitrator.2  No  witnesses  or  payments  of  money 
does  he  accept,  but  by  the  death  of  warriors  he  decides  the 
cause.3 

In  the  path  of  justice  and  moderation  ^schylus  finds  the 
solution  of  the  problem.  By  righteous  dealings  at  home 
and  with  aliens  the  government  which  seeks  the  common 
weal  may  keep  the  state  without  calamity  in  peace.4 

Fame  above  measure  given 

Brings  man  but  woe : 
Full  in  his  eyes  Zeus'  levin 

Flasheth  its  glow. 
Let  mine  unenvied  weal 
Xor  crush  with  armed  heel 
Cities,  nor  conquest  feel 

Nor  thralldom  know.5 

Bacchylides  and  Pindar  represent  the  culmination  of  the 
lyric  Muse  in  their  attitude  toward  war  as  well  as  in  liter- 
ature. The  few  odes  and  fragments  of  Bacchylides  which 
survive  are  eloquent  in  praise  of  peace.     He  disliked  to  sing 

1  Aeschylus,  Eumenides  858-869,  cf.  Way,  op.  cit. 

2  Id.,   Agamemnon   448,   Persae,  passim,   Seven    against    Thebes   934 
et  seq.;  Eumenides  858,  et  seq. 

3 Id.,  Seven  against  Thebes  934,  Agamemnon  437.  Suppliants,  933-7. 

4  Id.,  Suppliants  698-703. 

'Way,  op.  cit.,  Agamemnon  467-474. 


471]       THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  ?? 

of  war;  for  "the  voice  of  the  lyre,  the  clear  strains  of 
choral  song  accord  not  with  the  grievous  stress  of  battle  as 
the  clash  of  arms  hath  no  place  amid  festivity."  J  He 
wrote,  too,  of  the  uncertainty  of  war,  which  discerns  no 
kinsmen  in  the  fight  but  sends  the  death-dealing  missiles 
blindly  against  the  foe."  In  a  lyric  treatment  of  the  em- 
bassy of  Menelaus  and  Odysseus  to  Troy  he  represented  the 
Trojans  as  lifting  their  hands  to  the  gods  in  prayer  for  rest 
from  their  woes.  Menelaus  showed  to  them  the  path  of 
safety  from  war  in  the  pursuit  of  unswerving  Justice,  at- 
tendant to  Eunomia  (good  laws  well  obeyed)  and  prudent 
Themis.  "  Happy  the  land  whose  sons  take  her  to  dwell 
with  them."  3  In  one  of  the  most  beautiful  of  his  poems  he 
sets  forth  the  manifold  blessings  of  peace. 

Mighty  Peace  brings  forth  wealth  for  mortals  and  the  full 
bloom  of  lioney-tongued  song;  her  gift  it  is  that  the  fleshy 
thighs  of  oxen  are  burned  to  the  gods  in  the  yellow  flame  on 
the  carven  altars  and  the  youths  delight  themselves  with  athletic 
feats  and  flutes  and  revels.  Upon  the  iron-bound  handles  of 
the  shields  the  spiders  weave  their  webs  and  ru3t  destroys  the 
spears  and  the  two-edged  swords.  No  blast  of  brazen  trumpet 
is  heard  nor  is  sleep  of  gentle  spirit  which  comforteth  the 
heart  at  dawn  stolen  from  the  eyelids.  The  streets  are  filled 
with  joyous  feasting  and  songs  in  praise  of  youths  flame  forth.4 

Pindar,  though  his  praise  of  victors  in  the  games  led  him 
often  to  recitals  of  the  glorious  deeds  of  their  ancestors  in 
ancient  wars  and  of  the  martial  valor  of  the  Sicilian  princes 
themselves,  nevertheless  rejoiced  in  the  fact  that  at  the 
sound  of  the  lyre  even  violent  Ares  left  aside  his  sharp- 

1  Jebb,  Bacchylides  xiii,  12-16. 
2 Ibid.,  v,  127-35. 

3  Ibid.,  xiv,  40-56. 

4  Ibid.,  fr.  I. 


yg  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [472 

pointed  spears  and  warmed  his  heart  at  the  shrine  of  the 
Muses.1  He  proclaimed  himself  as  one  not  fond  of  strife 
or  contention,-  and  his  Muse  would  seem  to  object  to  ex- 
travagant praise  of  warriors.3  A  citizen  of  Thebes,  which 
had  Medized,  he  had  not  the  background  of  that  personal 
service  in  the  Persian  war  which  had  fired  /Eschylus.  The 
end  of  the  war  meant  to  him  the  removal  of  the  Tantalus- 
stone  which  had  hung  over  Hellas.4  "  War  may  indeed  be 
sweet  to  those  who  know  it  not,"  he  said,  "  but  once  ex- 
perienced it  becomes  a  source  of  dread."  5  On  the  other 
hand,  he  gloried  in  the  praise  of  peace.  [^  O,  Kindly  Peace, 
Daughter  of  Righteousness,  who  makest  a  nation  great, 
holding  the  supreme  keys  of  councils  and  of  wars — thou 
knowest  alike  how  to  give  and  to  withhold  gentleness  in  due 
season."  6  Any  citizen,  he  proclaimed,  who  desired  pros- 
perity for  his  state  must  seek  the  radiant  light  of  high- 
minded  Peace.7  Corinth  and  iEgina  he  praised  especially 
because  in  those  cities  were  found  the  secure  base  on  which 
cities  rest — Justice  and  Peace,  dispensers  of  wealth  to  men.8 
He  prayed  for  the  men  of  JEtna  as  being  above  the  desire 
for  gain,  that  Zeus  should  shield  them  from  wars  and  grant 
them  glory  in  good  laws  and  in  the  festivals.9 

The  poet  stood  by  no  means  for  peace  at  any  price. 
Rather  Peace  herself  roused  to  relentless  wrath,  he  thought, 
had  crushed  the  might  of  the  Persians  at  Salamis  and  of 

1  Pindar,  ed.  Schroeder  in  Bergk,  op.  cit.,  i,  Pythian,  i,  10-13. 

2  Id.,  01.  vi,  19. 

3  Id.,  01.  vi,  21. 

4  Id.,  Isthmian  vii,  5  et  seq. 
r'  Id.,  f  r.  1 10. 

6  Id.,  Pythian  viii,  1  et  seq. 

7  Id.,  fr.  109. 

BId.,  01.  xiii,  6-7;  viii,  1,  22. 
fl  Id.,  Nemean  ix,  28-33. 


473]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  yg 

the  Etruscans  at  Cumae.1  He  rejoiced  in  the  deeds  of 
Athens  and  /Egina  and  of  the  Sicilians  in  their  struggles 
against  the  foreign  foe.  In  later  life  he  praised  the  deeds 
and  mourned  the  death  of  Thebans  who  had  fought  against 
the  aggressive  force  of  Athens.2  To  those  who  had  died 
fighting  for  native  land,  he  accorded  the  highest  honors  that 
were  in  his  power  to  bestow. 

Yet  there  remaineth  renown  for  valiant  men.  For  let  who- 
soever in  the  great  cloud  of  war  keep  from  his  beloved  country 
the  shower  of  blood  bringing  destruction  upon  the  enemy's  host 
know  of  a  surety  that  he  increaseth  the  renown  of  the  race  of 
his  fellow-citizens  greatly  both  living  and  dead.3 

To  those  who  survive  such  deeds  of  righteousness  in  youth 
he  promised  in  old  age  a  day  of  calm.4 

The  Ionian  Revolt  and  the  Persian  Wars  produced  a 
very  different  reaction  in  Heraclitus,  the  recluse  philos- 
opher of  Ephesus.5  He  had  seen  the  downfall  of  Ionian 
freedom  and  character  and  the  growth  of  power  of  the  suc- 
cessful leaders  of  the  European  Greeks.  This  transforma- 
tion seemed  to  him  the  result  of  war.  The  warrior,  he  de- 
clared, received  the  highest  honors.6  Gods  and  men  united 
to  glorify  him.  He  became  god  while  the  weakling  re- 
mained man,  preserved  his  freedom  while  the  rest  became 
slaves.7  The  philosopher  attacked  the  people  of  his  own 
city  bitterly  as  utterly  base  and  worthless  seekers  of  self- 
interest  alone.s     "  It  is  clear  from  the  drift  of  Heraclitus* 

1  Pindar,  01.  xiii,  8-12.. 

2  Id.,  fr.  76,  77;  Pythian  i,  72-74;  Isthmian  vi,  31  et  scq. 

3  Id.,  fr.  78;  Isthmian  v,  26-30. 

4  Id.,  Ncm.  ix,  44. 

5  Gomperz,  Greek  Thinkers,  4  vols.  (London,  1906),  vol.  i,  p.  59  et  scq. 
•Diels,  Die  Fragmente  der  Vorsokratiker  (3d  ed.  Berlin,  19x2),  fr.  24. 
''Ibid.,  fr.  53.  'Ibid.,  fr.  121. 


80  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [474 

argument  that  he  conceived  war  as  testing  and  preserving 
the  qualities  of  mankind,  as  making  a  distinction  between 
the  competent  and  the  incompetent,  as  founding  the  state 
and  organizing  society."  1  These  ideas  he  carried  into  his 
explanation  of  the  universe  and  he  enunciated  the  natural 
law  of  strife.  "  We  must  recognize/'  he  said,  "  that  I  war  is 
common  to  all  things,  justice  is  strife,  and  all  things  come 
through  strife  and  necessity."  2  j 

II 

The  Age  of  Pericles 

The  breach  between  Athens  and  Sparta  in  461  resulted 
in  the  division  of  eastern  Hellas  into  two  opposing  camps, 
between  which  strife  followed  for  hegemony.  Athens 
under  the  leadership  of  Pericles,  the  head  of  the  im- 
perialistic democratic  party,  started  forthwith  on  a  career 
of  aggrandizement.  The  Athenians,  to  secure  control  of 
the  lucrative  trade  with  the  west,  took  charge  of  the  helots 
who  escaped  as  a  result  of  the  revolt 3  and  settled  them  in 
Naupactus,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf.  An  alli- 
ance with  the  democrats  of  Megara  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Corinth  was  then  secured.  To  secure  an  outpost  against 
Sparta  she  allied  herself  with  Argos.  Her  own  position  in 
the  ^Egean  was  assured  by  the  conquest  of  /Egina  and  by 
the  building  of  the  Long  Walls.  Sparta  had  countered  by 
aiding  the  Thebans  in  the  re-establishment  of  the  Boeotian 
League.  Athens  answered  that  manceuvre  by  the  defeat  of 
the  Thebans  and  the  formation  of  a  continental  federation 
consisting  of  the  cities  of  Boeotia,  of  Phocis  and  eastern 
Locris  and  the  Achaean  towns  on  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  with 
close  affiliation  with  Thessaly.    Athens  was  well  on  her  way 

1  Gomperz,  op.  cit.,  p.  72. 
2Heraclitus,  frs.  S3,  80. 
3  Vide  supra,  p.  69. 


475]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AXD  HELLENIC  PEACE  8 1 

to  a  control  of  all  Hellas.  At  this  juncture  came  an  oppor- 
tunity to  add  to  her  spheres  of  influence  the  third  of  the 
great  sources  of  food  supply  for  Greece,  Egypt.  The  other 
two,  the  Euxine  region  and  Sicily,  were  already  under  her 
control.  Egypt  had  revolted  against  Persia  and  to  the  rebels 
Athens  sent  aid.  It  proved  to  be  too  great  an  undertaking 
for  the  Egyptians  and  too  much  of  a  strain  on  the  resources 
of  Athens.  The  revolt  failed  and  two  Athenian  fleets  were 
destroyed.  In  the  meantime  efforts  of  Pericles  in  the  Corin- 
thian Gulf  had  not  been  altogether  successful;  Argos  had 
made  peace  with  Sparta,  which  left  that  city  a  free  hand 
against  Athens.  Persia,  too,  was  in  a  position  to  cause  more 
trouble.  The  outcome  was  that  Athens  recalled  Cimon 
from  exile,  obtained  through  his  influence  a  five  years'  truce 
with  Sparta,  and  sent  him  off  on  a  final  expedition  against 
the  Persians.  Oh  the  island  of  Cyprus  the  Athenians  won 
a  victory  over  the  Persians  but  Cimon  died  of  disease  dur- 
ing the  campaign.  Athens  had  exhausted  her  energies  in 
these  distant  struggles ;  her  forces  were  needed  at  home. 
There  followed,  then,  as  a  natural  result,  negotiations  with 
Persia.  While  no  formal  treaty  was  procurable,  a  verbal 
agreement  was  reached  for  the  cessation  of  strife.  This 
worked  to  the  advantage  of  both  parties  in  the  trade  that 
developed  under  the  Athenians. 

The  forces  which  Athens  had  at  her  disposal  were  not 
equal  to  the  task  of  unifying  Hellas  by  force.  Pericles 
tried  to  attain  his  goal,  then,  by  peaceful  means.  He  pro- 
posed a  conference  to  meet  at  Athens,  to  consider  measure- 
for  the  rebuilding  of  the  shrines  destroyed  by  the  Persians, 
the  paying  of  the  vows  due  to  the  gods,  and  "  concerning 
the  sea,  that  all  might  sail  it  fearlessly  and  keep  the  peace." 
This  attempt  to  put  Hellas  on  a  sound  footing  of  religious 

1  Plutarch,  trans,  by  Clough  (New  York.  T910),  Pericles  17. 


82  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [476 

and  commercial  unity  under  the  leadership  of  Athens  was 
blocked  by  the  watchful  jealousy  of  Sparta.  In  447  a 
crisis  suddenly  developed.  A  defeat  of  a  small  Athenian 
force  at  Coronea  was  followed  by  the  revolt  of  all  Boeotia 
and  the  continental  federation  collapsed.  The  next  year 
a  Spartan  force  invaded  Attica  and  at  the  same  time 
Megara  and  Euboea  rebelled.  Pericles  managed  to  save 
the  day ;  the  Spartans  withdrew  and  the  Euboean  revolt  was 
suppressed,  but  Megara  was  lost.  Athens,  exhausted,  was 
compelled  to  make  peace  on  terms  which  restored  in  gen- 
eral the  conditions  existing  prior  to  461.  Peace  was  made 
for  thirty  years,  extending  to  the  allies  of  both  parties  on 
the  basis  of  the  status  quo.  Athens  thus  abandoned  all 
claim  to  her  continental  possessions  except  to  Naupactus 
and  Plataea.  Her  maritime  empire,  however,  was  acknowl- 
edged. Neither  party  was  to  interfere  with  the  allies  of  the 
other  but  each  might  seek  allies  among  neutrals.  Hellas 
was  thus  divided  into  two  fairly  well-balanced  parts.  To 
keep  the  peace  between  them  it  was  agreed  that  trade  should 
be  free  to  all,  and  furthermore  that  all  disputes  should  be 
settled  by  arbitration,  which  by  this  time  was  regarded  as 
an  ancient  custom.  No  provision  was  made,  unfortunately, 
as  to  the  means  or  methods  to  be  employed  in  arranging  for 
this  judicial  proceeding.  It  was  left  to  the  honor  of  the 
states  concerned.  Though  the  situation  thus  contained 
seeds  of  future  strife,  it  appeared  that  for  a  time  at  least 
the  problems  of  Hellas  had  been  settled.  In  place  of  the 
domination  of  one  power  a  balance  had  been  established 
with  measures  intended  to  prevent  its  upset. 

Pericles  made  use  of  the  period  of  peace  which  followed 
to  consolidate  the  Athenian  Empire.  Gradually  her  allies  in 
the  Delian  Confederacy  had  been  reduced  to  subjection 
until  finally  only  Samos,  Chios  and  Lesbos  were  left  in  a 
position  of   independence.      The   treasury   was  moved   to 


477]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  83 

Athens  after  the  disaster  in  Egypt;  Athena  became  the 
protectress  of  the  organization  in  place  of  Apollo;  the 
Delian  Congress  fell  into  disuse,  and  the  Athenian  assembly 
settled  measures  relating  to  the  empire.  The  empire  was 
divided  into  tribute  districts  and  quadrennial  assessments 
were  established,  with  provision  for  appeal  to  Athens. 
Legal  cases  of  major  importance  were  required  to  be  sent 
to  Athens  for  trial.  Self-interest  was  the  binding  force 
which  held  the  empire  together.  Freedom  from  foreign 
and  domestic  strife  aided  the  development  of  trade  and  in- 
dustry and  produced  prosperity.  Athenian  administration 
of  legal  matters  assured  justice  to  all  and  tended  to  legal 
assimilation.  The  Athenian  policy  of  settling  Athenian 
citizens  at  various  places  within  the  empire,  while  a  source 
of  grievance  to  the  allies,  was  nevertheless  a  potent  Atticiz- 
ing  force.  The  strongest  element  of  union,  however,  was 
the  maintenance  of  democracy  in  all  the  subject  cities. 
The  empire  was  an  organization  for  the  perpetuation  of 
democracy. 

With  all  its  excellent  purposes,  however,  this  system  con- 
tained fatal  weaknesses.  The  exclusion  of  the  allies  from 
representation  in  the  government  produced  a  tendency  to 
revolt.  It  violated  the  most  precious  principle  of  Hellenic 
political  philosophy  —  the  right  of  every  state,  no  matter 
how  small,  to  cleutheria  kai  autonomia,  freedom  and  self- 
government.  Oligarchs  everywhere  opposed  the  empire 
and  sought  its  overthrow.  In  440  a  revolt  broke  out  in 
Samos  which  was  put  down  after  considerable  difficulty 
with  a  great  deal  of  cruelty.  Athens  was  still  the  master 
of  the  situation.  The  leader  of  the  anti-imperialistic 
party  in  Athens  itself  had  been  ostracized  shortly  be- 
fore. Corinth  had  prevented  Peloponnesian  interference 
in  the  Samian  revolt  for  commercial  reasons.  No  one 
seemed  strong  enough  or  willing  to  break  down  Athenian 


84  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [478 

power  in  the  .rEgean,  and  Pericles  was  able  to  devote  time 
and  money  to  the  beautification  and  glorification  of  his 
city,  to  make  it  the  cultural  leader  of  Hellas.1 

The  only  writers  of  this  golden  age  of  Hellas  who  ex- 
press any  opinions  on  the  subject  of  peace  and  war  are  the 
dramatist  Sophocles  (496-406  B.  C.)  and  the  historian 
Herodotus  (ca.  484-425  B.  C).  The  former  in  his  long 
life  spanned  the  period  of  the  rise  and  the  fall  of  the  power 
of  his  city.  As  a  boy  he  took  part  in  the  celebrations  over 
the  victory  of  Salamis.  The  son  of  a  wealthy  manufac- 
turer of  munitions,  he  was  able  to  devote  himself  to  the 
pursuit  of  letters  and  to  the  service  of  the  state,  whose 
praises  he  sang  so  eloquently.  Though  of  no  great  ability 
in  public  affairs,  he  was  chosen  as  one  of  the  generals  in  the 
Samian  War,  served  a  term  as  a  treasurer  of  the  empire, 
and  in  his  old  age  acted  as  a  commissioner  to  reorganize 
the  empire  after  the  defeat  of  the  Sicilian  expedition.  He 
gained  his  highest  glory  as  a  finished  master  of  the  dramatic 
art.  In  enjoyment  of  a  less  troubled  life  and  of  a  gentler 
spirit  than  his  predecessor  iEschylus,  he  was  less  inclined 
to  solve  the  great  problems  of  the  life  of  man.  In  his  more 
reasoned  attitude  towards  the  world,  and  above  all  in  his 
devotion  to  the  service  of  the  state  and  its  gods,  he  was 
closer  to  the  people,  a  true  interpreter  of  his  period.2 

To  this  ea'sy-going,  eukolos,  as  Aristophanes  called  him, 
gentleman  of  Athens,  who  received  his  support  from  the 
manufacture  of  arms,  the  problem  of  peace  and  war  did 
not  appeal;  he  offered  no  solution.  Only  occasionally  do 
references  to  war  appear  in  his  dramas.  When  the  subject 
did  arise,  however,  he  was  vehement  in  his  opposition.  He 
condemned  Ares,  a  blind  monster  who  stirred  up  all  evil 

^his  survey  of  the  history  of  the  period  is  based  on  Botsford's 
Hellenic  History  in  manuscript,  cf.  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii. 

2  Wright,  op.  cit.,  pp.  216,  et  seq.     Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  34- 


479]        THE  PERSIAN  WAR  AND  HELLENIC  PEACE  85 

things.1  On  several  occasions  he  pointed  out  the  evil  effects 
for  the  state,  since  war  took  the  best  of  the  young  men  and 
left  the  weaklings.  :'  The  well-born  and  the  good  Ares 
loves  to  snatch,  while  he  who  is  bold  in  tongue,  fleeing  from 
danger,  is  free  from  harm,  for  Ares  careth  not  for  the 
coward."  2  The  chorus  of  warriors  in  the  Ajax,  longing 
for  the  end  of  the  long  years  of  woe  around  Troy,  recount 
their  hardships  and  deprivations  and  curse  the  man  who  by 
his  toils  first  taught  the  Greeks  to  league  themselves  for 
war  in  hateful  arms.  "  Yea,  he  it  was  who  wrought  the 
ruin  of  men."  3  In  the  Trachiniae,  Deianeira  expresses 
deep  pity  for  those  helpless  and  innocent  sufferers,  the 
women  captives,  so  brutally  treated  and  carried  off  into 
slavery,  "  ill-fated  exiles,  homeless  and  fatherless  in  a  for- 
eign land."  4  Far  better  thought  the  poet  that  all  wars 
should  cease.  He  counseled  prudence  in  the  choice  of  war. 
To  those  who  made  war  on  behalf  of  suppliants,  Zeus  would 
give  the  victory,  for  it  was  an  honorable  thing,  but  useless 
war  must  be  avoided.5  He  pictured  the  joy  at  Thebes, 
the  night-long  dance  and  song,  when  the  end  of  the  trial  of 
war  had  come  and  Thebes  was  safe  from  destruction.6  Yet 
this  same  dramatist  was  one  of  the  generals  who  brought 
about  the  subjection  and  punishment  of  the  revolting 
Samians. 

Herodotus,  born  in  Halicarnassus,  exiled  from  his  native 
city,  a  great  traveler,  was  possessed  of  broad  Panhellenic 

^ebb-Pearson,    The  Fragments  of  Sophocles,   3   vols.    (Cambridge, 
1917). 

2  Sophocles  Tragoediae,  ed.  Dindorf-Mekler   (Leipzig,  1912),  Philoc- 
tctes  435-6;  fr.  554,  fr.  724. 

3  Id.,  Ajax  1185-1210. 

4  Id.,  Trachiniae  298-302. 

5  Id.,  Oedipus  Coloncus  380,  1045-1098. 

6  Ibid.,  1 19-126. 


86  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [480 

sympathies,  somewhat  colored  by  a  predilection  for  Athens.1 
The  historian  of  the  Persian  Wars  and  recorder  of  so  many 
of  the  early  wars  of  Hellas,  he  seldom  expressed  an  opinion 
on  the  general  subject  of  war.  The  Trojan  war  he  re- 
garded as  without  sufficient  cause.  Yet  he  felt  that  it  lay 
at  the  beginning  of  all  the  later  strife  between  Europe  and 
Asia.2  To  war  among  the  Greeks  he  objected.  He  praised 
the  Athenians  for  yielding  their  right  to  command  the  fleet 
at  the  great  congress  at  Corinth  in  order  to  avoid  inter- 
necine struggle.  "  Herein  they  judged  rightly.  For  in- 
ternal strife  is  a  thing  as  much  worse  than  war  carried  on 
by  a  united  people  as  war  itself  is  worse  than  peace."  In 
one  short  sentence  he  delivered  a  terrible  condemnation  of 
war.  "(Since  in  war  fathers  bury  their  sons,  while  in  peace 
sons  bury  their  father  no  one  is  so  senseless  as  to  choose 
war  in  place  of  peace/'jM, 

1  Botsford  and  Sihier,  op.  cit.,  pp.  21,  et  seq. 

2  Herodotus  i,  3/4. 
s  Id.,  viii,  3. 


CHAPTER  IV 
The  Peloponnesian  War 

The  Thirty  Years'  Peace  put  an  end  to  open  hostilities 
between  Athens  and  Sparta,  but  it  failed  to  settle  the  fun- 
damental and  vexing  questions  of  rivalry  and  to  remove 
the  mutual  bad  feeling  and  distrust.  The  balance  was  ; 
delicate.  To  avoid  giving  Sparta  any  occasion  for  opposi- 
tion, Pericles  departed  from  his  earlier  aggressive  policy  t  - 
one  of  conservation  and  consolidation.  The  first  step  in 
the  direction  of  aggrandizement  was  certain  to  be  chal- 
lenged. Events  and  the  exigencies  of  Athenian  trade  and 
industry  forced  the  leaders  of  Athens  into  such  a  step  and 
trouble  followed. 

The  Megarian  decrees  formed  the  first  piece  of  renewed 
aggression  on  the  part  of  Athens.  A  small,  over-populated 
state,  once  of  great  commercial  importance,  Megara  had 
sunk  to  the  position  of  a  second-rate  industrial  city.  How- 
ever, her  farmers  furnished  vegetables  and  meat  to  the 
Athenian  markets,  and  her  wares,  which  were  good,  made 
her  merchants  strong  competitors  of  the  Athenian  manu- 
facturers and  tradesmen.  In  response  to  local  demands  i  r 
protection  the  Athenian  assembly  passed  a  decree  excluding 
the  Megarians  from  the  markets  of  the  empire.  The  Athe- 
nians had  resented  the  withdrawal  of  Megara  from  their 
federation  and  probably  hoped  to  force  the  Megarians  in1 
subjection  that  they  might  regain  the  favorable  position  on 
the  Gulf  of  Corinth.  This  decree  meant  financial  ruin  and 
starvation  to  the  Megarians  and, served  as  a  warning  to  any 
481]  87 


88  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [482 

other  state  of  the  Spartan  alliance  which  might  block  the 
Athenians.  It  aroused  much  apprehension  on  the  part  of 
other  commercial  states,  particularly  of  Corinth.1 

The  Corcyraean  episode  added  another  element  to  Corin- 
thian unrest  at  the  increasing  power  of  Athens.  Corcyra, 
a  colony  of  Corinth,  but  one  of  the  few  remaining  inde- 
pendent naval  powers,  rinding  herself  at  war  with  Corinth, 
appealed  to  Athens  for  aid.  They  had  cogent  arguments — 
their  navy,  which  would  be  a  valuable  addition  to  the  Athe- 
nian fleet,  and  the  control  which  they  were  able  to  exercise 
over  the  trade  route  to  Sicily.  In  vain  did  the  Corinthians 
argue  that  the  true  path  of  expediency  is  the  path  of  right. 
Athenian  refusal  of  the  Corey rean  offer  meant  the  strength- 
ening of  the  only  important  naval  rival  of  Athens  and  a 
loss  of  prestige  to  Athens  itself  if  it  yielded  to  the  desires 
of  Corinth.  To  avoid  any  infraction  of  the  peace  the  Athe- 
nians concluded  a  defensive  alliance  with  Corcyra.  In  the 
resulting  war  the  Corinthians  were  worsted.2  The  enmity 
thus  aroused  between  Athens  and  Corinth  was  increased  by 
a  minor  difficulty  at  Potidaea.3 

The  crisis  in  Hellenic  affairs  and  the  test  of  the  Thirty 
Years'  Peace  came  when  the  Corinthians,  fully  aroused,  in- 
vited the  envoys  of  the  Peloponnesian  League  to  meet  at 
Sparta  to  consider  the  situation.4  The  grievances  were 
submitted  to  the  Spartan  assembly.  Thucydides  made  use 
of  the  situation  to  draw  a  comparison  between  the  Spartans, 
conservative,  reluctant  to  assume  the  aggressive  and  willing 
to  take  defensive  action  only  when  absolutely  necessary, 

Aristophanes,  Achamians,  515  et  seq.,  cf.  Grundy,  Thucydides  and 
the  History  of  his  Age  (London,  ion),  ch.  iii.  Meyer,  Gesch'xchte  des 
Alter ihums,  vol.  iv  (Berlin,  1901),  pp.  288  ct  seq. 

2  Thucydides,  i,  33  et  seq.     Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  282. 

s  Thucydides,  i,  56. 

* 
4  Grundy,  op.  cit.,  ch.  xv. 


483]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  89 

and  the  Athenians,  revolutionary,  always  on  the  alert  to 
seize  the  advantage,  ready  to  risk  all  to  gain  their  ends. 
They  were  born,  said  the  Corinthian  ambassadors,  neither 
to  have  peace  themselves  nor  to  allow  it  to  other  men.1 
The  Corinthians  made  the  veiled  threat  that  if  their  plea 
met  with  no  success  they  would  turn  elsewhere  for  aid. 
Sparta  was  in  this  way  forced  into  action.  Athenians  pres- 
ent endeavored  to  prevent  such  a  result.  They  recounted  the 
glorious  deeds  of  Athens  in  the  past.  They  explained  the 
establishment  of  their  empire  and  justified  it  on  the  ground 
of  necessity.  They  pointed  out  the  risks  involved  in  war 
and  called  upon  the  Spartans  to  submit  the  disputes  to  arbi- 
tration according  to  the  treaty.2 

Archidamus,  the  conservative  king  of  Sparta,  counseled 
delay.  He  supported  the  Athenian  demand  for  arbitration, 
pointing  out  the  absence  of  a  real  cause,  the  superiority  of 
the  Athenians  in  the  materials  of  war  and  in  money,  and 
the  uncertainty  of  the  issue.3  The  war  party,  however,  was 
the  stronger.  They  realized  that  the  basic  issue  was  not 
the  immediate  charges  against  Athens  but  the  existence  of 
the  Athenian  empire  itself,  which  was  not  a  debatable  ques- 
tion. "  Let  no  one  tell  us  that  we  should  take  time  to  think 
when  we  are  suffering  injustice,"  said  the  Ephor.  "  Lace- 
daemonians, prepare  for  war,  as  the  honor  of  Sparta  de- 
mands." 4  It  was  voted,  then,  that  the  Athenians  were 
guilty  of  an  infraction  of  the  treaty.5 

At  the  assembly  of  the  league  which  followed  at  Sparta 
the  keynote  of  the  war  was  sounded.    Athens  was  a  menace 

1  Thucydides  i,  68  et  seq. 

2  Id.,  i,  73  et  seq. 

3  Id.,  i,  80  et  seq. 

4  Id.,  i,  86. 

5  Id.,  i.  87. 


9q  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [4S4 

to  all.  Some  states  she  already  ruled.  If  from  a  love  of 
peace  and  ease  the  Peloponnesians  failed  to  make  war  upon 
her,  she  would  soon  dominate  the  rest.  It  was  a  war  to 
assure  peace  to  all  Hellenes.  "  We  are  fighting  for  the  lib- 
erty of  Hellas.  On  every  ground  we  are  right  in  going  to 
war."  1  The  argument  was  unassailable.  The  league  voted 
for  war.  A  series  of  minor  demands  were  made  upon 
Athens,  followed  by  a  peremptory  order  for  the  dissolution 
of  the  empire.2 

The  Athenians  refused  to  yield.  The  least  concession 
would  be  a  confession  of  wrong-doing  or  of  weakness. 
Pericles  regarded  the  war  as  inevitable  and  felt  that  Athens 
was  ready.  Acting  on  his  advice  they  made  counter-propo- 
sitions to  Sparta,  put  the  onus  of  blame  for  the  beginning 
of  the  war  upon  that  city  by  offering  arbitration  "  upon  fair 
terms  according  to  the  treaty,  well  aware  that  war  was  at 
hand,  anxious  for  peace,  but  ready  and  willing  to  defend 
themselves."  3 

Arbitration  had  failed  in  its  crucial  test  as  a  means  for 
the  settling  of  disputes.  Had  there  been  provision  for  a 
proper  tribunal  and  regular  procedure  in  the  treaty  the 
quarrel  might  not  have  been  brought  to  a  head.  Such  a 
body  would  have  been  difficult  to  secure.  There  was  no 
state  powerful  enough  to  enforce  its  decisions  on  either 
party  and  at  the  same  time  sufficiently  without  prejudice  to 
act  as  arbiter.  The  Delphic  Amphictyony  was  too  much  in 
the  control  of  the  Peloponnesians  to  be  impartial.  Further- 
more, public  opinion  did  not  support  the  appeal  to  a  judicial 
decision.  The  enforcement  of  the  agreement  to  arbitrate 
was  left  by  the  treaty  to  the  honor  and  the  religious  scruples 

1  Thucydicles  i,  119  et  seq.,  123. 

2  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv.  pp.  294  et  seq. 

3  Thucydides  i.  140  et  seq. 


485]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  IV  AR  91 

of.  the  contracting  parties  themselves.  When  the  issue  came 
it  was  found  to  be  unarbitrable.  The  existence  of  the  Athe- 
nian empire  was  not  a  debatable  question.  Spartan  fear 
and  Corinthian  jealousy  of  Athenian  expansion  could  not 
be  submitted  to  a  tribunal.  Considerations  of  individual 
expediency  founded  on  fear  or  ambition  were  more  power- 
ful than  the  most  binding  of  sacred  oaths. 

All  Hellas  was  excited  by  the  coming  conflict.  Prodigies 
and  prophecies  abounded.1  Enthusiasm  was  manifest  on 
both  sides.  Outside  of  the  Athenian  empire  the  war  was 
extremely  popular  and  the  Spartans  were  hailed  as  the 
liberators  of  Hellas.  The  Spartan  youth  were  eager  for  the 
excitement  of  war."  Nor  was  this  feeling  confined  to 
Sparta.  The  Athenian  young  men  gladly  exchanged  soft 
cloaks  and  snow-white  slippers,  flowing  ringlets,  baths  and 
oil,  for  the  breastplate  and  the  greaves,  and  dropped  the 
games  of  the  banquet  for  the  greater  game  of  war,  to  fight 
for  gods  and  country  as  their  fathers  had  fought  before 
them.3  In  the  defence  of  the  city  all  parties  were  united. 
In  the  Children  of  Heracles,  written  in  430,  Euripides 
warned  the  hated  Peloponnesian  invaders  that  Athens  would 
not  brook  dictation. 

For  in  brave  men's  eyes 
The  honor  that  fears  shame  is  more  than  life.4 

He  warned  them  of  the  power  of  Athens. 

1  Thucydides  ii,  8. 

2  Ibid. 

3Hermippus  fr.  2,  ed.  Meineke,  Fragmenta  Comicorum   Gra& 
(Berlin,  1839-1857).     Aristophanes,  Knights  576  et  seq. 

*Way,  Tragedies  of  Euripides  (London,  1912),  Children  of  Heracles, 
199  et  seq.,  cf.  Decharne,  Euripides  and  the  Spirit  of  his  Dramas  trans, 
by  Loeb  (London,  1005),  p.  128  et  seq. 


90  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [486 

Peace  love  I  well  but  I  warn  thee, 

O  tyrant,  treacherous-souled, 

Though  thou  march  to  the  gates  of  our  hold, 

Not  the  crown  of  thy  hopes  shall  adorn  thee. 

Not  for  thine  hand  the  war  spear  alone 

Nor  the  brass  on  the  buckler  hath  shone! 

O  thou  that  in  battle  delightest, 

Trouble  not,  trouble  not  with  thy  spear 

The  one  that  the  Graces  make  brightest 

Of  cities : — but  dread  thou  and  forbear.1 

In  the  spring  of  431  the  Spartan  king  Archidamus  pre- 
pared his  forces  for  an  invasion  of  Attica.  Pericles  coun- 
tered by  bringing  all  the  Athenians  within  the  Long  Walls 
and  thus  avoided  a  decisive  battle  on  land,  while  the  fleet  was 
ravaging  the  Peloponnesian  coasts.  The  suffering  among 
the  Athenians,  most  of  whom  were  small  farmers  unused 
to  city  life,  was  great,  and  their  enmity  toward  Sparta  was 
increased  by  the  destruction  of  their  crops  and  their  olive 
orchards.  The  plague  which  ravaged  Athens  added  to  the 
general  discomfort  and  brought  the  peace  party  temporarily 
into  power.  Pericles  triumphed  over  their  attacks,  but  the 
following  year  himself  died  of  the  disease.  His  place  as 
leader  of  the  people  was  taken  by  a  new  type  of  men,  prod- 
ucts of  the  people,  like  Cleon,  the  tanner,  and  Hyperbolus, 
the  lamp-maker.2 

The  invasion  of  Attica  in  the  year  427  Thucydides  re- 
garded as  unusually  severe.3  As  a  result  the  peace  party 
gained  new  courage.  The  wealthier  noble  class  had  suf- 
fered particularly.  They  had  lost  their  fair  estates  in  the 
country,  with  all  their  houses  and  rich  furniture;  their 
pleasures  were  restricted  in  the  city ;  4  the  exigencies   of 

1  Way,  op.  cit.,  Children  of  Heracles,  371-380. 

2  Grundy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  333  et  seq.     Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  307  et  seq. 

3  Thucydides  iii,  26. 

4  Id.,  ii,  65. 


487]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  93 

war  had  led  to  the  imposition  of  a  property  tax,  which  fell 
upon  them  with  heavy  weight ;  x  and  they  were  bitterly  op- 
posed to  the  new  developments  of  the  democracy.  The 
center  of  their  opposition  was  in  the  oligarchic  clubs."  The 
small  farmer,  though  his  hatred  of  Sparta  was  so  strong 
that  he  refused  to  support  any  movement  for  peace  and 
demanded  revenge  for  the  destruction  of  his  vineyards  and 
orchards,3  had  grown  weary  of  the  cramped  and  confused 
life  in  the  city  and  was  longing  for  the  end  of  the  war.4 
Of  these  people,  the  comic  poets,  in  particular  Aristophanes,  | 
were  the  spokesmen.  In  the  Achamians,  Aristophanes  made 
a  bitter  attack  on  the  war  party.  He  treated  the  causes  of 
the  war  as  trivial,5  admitted  and  joined  in  the  common  ; 
hatred  of  the  Spartans,  but  claimed  that  they  were  not  to 
blame  for  the  beginning  of  the  war.6  He  felt  apparently 
that  the  basic  issues  could  best  be  settled  by  an  honorable 
and  lasting  peace.  He  held  up  to  ridicule  the  professional 
warrior,  whom  he  accused  of  prolonging  the  war  that  he 
might  be  chosen  for  commands  and  thus  secure  full  pay.7 
The  disastrous  effects  of  war  on  the  Athenian  farms,  the 
evil  results  of  the  interference  with  trade,  both  for  the 
Athenians,  who  were  deprived  of  the  many  products  of 
Boeotia  and  of  Megara,  and  for  the  Megarians  and  Boeo- 
tians, whom  he  represented  as  in  a  condition  of  starvation, 
he  contrasted  with  the  manifold  advantages  of  peaceful 
cultivation  and  commerce.8     In  a  most  delightful  way  he 

1  Glover,  op.  cit.,  p.  no.  a  Ibid.,  p.  ill. 

3  Arist.  Acharn.  182  et  seq.,  228  et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  32  et  seq. 

5  Ibid.,  524  et  seq.,  509  et  seq. 

6  Ibid.,  513  et  seq. 

7  Ibid.,  572  et  seq.,  597.     Croiset,  Aristophanes  and  the  Political  Parties 
at  Athens,  trans,  by  Loeb  (London,  1909),  pp.  58  et  seq. 

8  Arist.  Acharn.  623  et  seq. 


94  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [488 

opposed  to  the  pictures  of  the  hardships  of  the  soldier's  life 
the  picture  of  the  man  who  has  secured  peace  and  may  de- 
vote himself  to  the  couch  and  soft  cloaks,  eat  thrushes  and 
choice  meats,  drink  his  wine  and  enjoy  his  pleasures.1 

Off  to  your  duties  my  heroes  bold, 

Different  truly  the  paths  ye  tread ; 

One  to  drink  with  wreaths  on  his  head; 

One  to  watch  and  shiver  with  cold, 

Lonely  the  while  his  antagonist  passes 

The  sweetest  of  hours  with  the  sweetest  of  lasses.2 

The  man  of  peace  returns  from  the  banquet  with  head  dizzy 
from  wine  and  a  song  on  his  lips.  The  warrior  comes  back 
from  his  vigil  wounded,  dizzy-headed  from  a  fall  on  the 
rocks,  murmuring  a  prayer  to  the  Healer.3  The  play  was 
an  appeal  to  the  farmers  to  support  the  movement  for  peace. 
All  of  Hellas  was  in  confusion  as  a  result  of  the  war. 
In  most  of  the  cities,  factions  had  arisen.  The  democratic 
leaders  were  endeavoring  to  establish  or  to  assure  their 
power  by  appealing  to  the  Athenians,  and  the  leaders  of  the 
oligarchs  to  the  Lacedaemonians.  Party  strife  brought 
many  terrible  calamities;  anarchy  and  violence,  crime  and 
perfidy  were  rife ;  religion  and  oaths  were  forgotten.4  The 
practices  of  war  were  hardened  by  the  intensity  of  feeling. 
Sailors  who  fell  into  Spartan  hands  were  killed  forthwith 
and  the  Athenians  retaliated  in  kind.  When  Plataea  fell  the 
Spartans  put  to  death  all  the  men  who  remained  and  sold  the 
women  and  children  into  slavery  with  no  softening  of  the 
ancient  custom.5  After  the  defeat  of  the  oligarchic  revolt 
in  Mytilene  the  Athenians,  on  the  motion  of  Cleon,  voted  to 

1  Arist.  Acham.  1083  et  seq. 

2  Rogers,  Aristophanes,  Acharnians  (London,  1910),  1143  et  seq. 

3  Ibid.,  1 190  et  seq. 
4Thucydides  iii,  82. 

5  Ibid.,  ii,  67;  iii,  68;  cf.  Glover,  op.  cit,  p.  134- 


4g9]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  95 

put  all  male  citizens  to  death.  They  reconsidered  this  action, 
and  on  the  ground  of  better  policy  killed  only  the  most 
guilty.1  Against  the  general  policy  of  Cleon  towards  the 
allies  as  exemplified  in  this  affair,  and  in  a  later  increase  of 
the  tribute,  the  comic  poets  protested,  Aristophanes  in  the 
Babylonians,  for  which  he  was  unsuccessfully  prosecuted," 
and  Eupolis  in  the  Polcis  in  which  he  represented  the  cities 
as  appearing  in  person  and  begging  for  relief.3 

The  capture  of  the  Spartans  at  Pylos  in  425  furnished  an 
opportunity  for  peace.  The  Spartans  offered  peace,  alli- 
ance and  friendly  relations.  "  Let  us  be  reconciled  and, 
choosing  peace  instead  of  war  ourselves,  let  us  give  relief 
and  rest  to  all  the  Hellenes."  The  credit  for  the  peace 
would  go  to  Athens.4  The  peace  party  were  hopeful,  but 
the  imperialistic  element  among  the  democracy,  led  by 
Cleon,  had  gained  new  hopes  and  the  Spartan  offer  was  re- 
jected. The  great  disappointment  was  voiced  by  Euripides 
in  a  beautiful  plaint : 

Ah,  Peace,  exceeding  rich  and  of  the  blessed  gods  most  beauti- 
ful, how  long  dost  thou  delay.  I  fear  that  old  age  will  over- 
whelm me  with  its  burdens  ere  I  see  thee,  graceful  one,  appear- 
ing with  the  beautifully  dancing  choruses  and  thy  garland- 
loving  festal  processions.  Come  to  the  city,  august  Queen,  and 
drive  fearful  tumult  from  our  dwellings  and  strife  that  rages 
and  makes  merry  with  the  sharpened  steel.5 

le  following  year  Aristophanes,  in  his  Georgoi,  mimicked 
this  plea,  but  in  so  doing  expressed  the  longings  of  the  Attic 
farmers. 


O  Peace,  exceeding  rich  and  ye  O  yoked  oxen !     When  shall  it 
be  granted  me  to  cease  from  war,  to  dig  the  ditch  and  then  to 

1  Thucydides  iii,  36  et  scq. ;  cf.  Busolt,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  1030. 

-  Croiset,  op.  cit.,  pp.  40  ct  scq. 

3  Meineke,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  140. 

4  Thucydides  iv,  20,  21. 

5  Euripides,  ed.  Nauck,  3  vols.  (Leipzig,  1892-5^,  fr.  462. 


96  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [490 

rest  and  to  drink  new  wine  and  consume  the  oily  bread  and 
cabbage.1 

Cleon  was  the  subject  of  many  sharp  attacks.  Thucy- 
dides  charged  that  he  favored  war  because  in  quiet  times 
his  rogueries  would  be  more  transparent  and  his  slanders 
less  credible."  Aristophanes,  in  the  Knights,  accused  him 
of  preventing  the  peace,  not  that  Athens  might  gain  fresh 
glory  but  that  while  he  kept  the  people  crowded  in  the  city 
he  might  hold  them  in  dependence  on  him,  that  while  the 
haze  and  the  dust  of  war  was  obscuring  his  actions  from 
view  he  might  plunder  the  cities  at  will.3 

Athenian  forces  were  defeated  in  the  following  years  at 
Delium  and  by  Brasidas,  the  ablest  of  the  Spartan  generals, 
in  the  Chalcidice.  The  Athenians  then  attempted  to  secure 
peace,  but  without  success.  In  the  final  battle  at  Amphipoiis 
both  Cleon  and  Brasidas  were  killed.  The  two  chief  ob- 
stacles to  the  making  of  terms  were  thus  removed.  The 
conservatives  on  both  sides  came  into  control  and  peace  was 
agreed  upon.  The  Spartan  allies  were  dissatisfied,  but  they 
were  overruled.  The  treaty,  which  is  known  as  the  Peace 
of  Nicias,  after  the  Athenian  commander,  provided  for 
mutual  restorations  and  peace  for  fifty  years.4 

Aristophanes  burst  forth  into  jubilations  in  a  play  called 
the  Peace.5  He  represented  the  farmers  as  rejoicing  in  the 
advent  of  peace.  One  Trygaeus  has  scaled  Olympus  to  find 
the  goddess  Peace,  only  to  be  told  by  Hermes  that  the  gods, 
disgusted  with  Hellas  because  of  its  failure  to  end  the 
war,  had  buried  Peace  and  determined  to  grind  the  cities  to 
pieces  in  a  huge  mortar.     With  the  death  of  Cleon  and  of 

1  Aristophanes,  f r.  109. 

2Thucydides  v,  16. 

3Arist.,  Knights  750  et  szq. 

4  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  411  et  seq.     Thucydides  v,  16,  17. 

5Croiset,  op.  cit.,  pp.  no  et  seq. 


491]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  97 

Brasidas  their  pestles  had  been  lost,1  however.     Trygaeus 
hails  this  as  a  glorious  opportunity  and  calls  upon  all  Hel- 
lenes,    farmers,    merchants,    artisans,    craftsmen,     ali< 
islanders  and  all,  to  unite  with  him  in  the  task  of  di"-<\ 
up  Peace.    The  whole  Hellenic  nation  throws  away  its  ranks 
and  squadrons  to  engage  in  the  task,  midst  laughter  and 
dancing.     Only  the   Megarians,   the  dissatisfied  ones,   the 
Argives  who  have  been  gaining  from  both  sides,  the  profes- 
sional soldier  who  desires  a  commission,  and  the  merclr 
who  sells  spears  and  shields,  stand  aside."    Hermes  must  be 
bribed  to  keep  silent.    After  an  effort  Peace  is  brought  i: 
view.     The  cities  are  reconciled.     The  crest-maker  and  the 
sword-cutler  and  the  spear-burnisher  may  despair,  but 
pitchfork-maker  and  the  manufacturer  of  sickles  rejoice. 
The  farmers  lay  aside  their  arms  and  return  to  their  fig 
trees  and  their  farms.    Peace  smells  of  "  harvests,  banquets, 
festivals,   flutes,    thrushes,   plays,   the   odes   of   Sophocles, 
Euripidean  wordlets  .  .  .  the  bleating  lambs,  the  ivy-leaf, 
the  vat,  full-bosomed  matrons    .    .    .    the  tipsy  maid,  the 
drained  and  empty  flask,  and  many  another  blessing."  :: 

Think  of  all  the  thousand  pleasures, 

Comrades,  which  to  Peace  we  owe, 

All  the  life  of  ease  and  comfort 

Which  she  gave  us  long  ago : 

Figs  and  olives,  wines  and  myrtles, 

Luscious  fruits,  preserved  and  dried, 

Banks  of  fragrant  violets,  blowing 

By  the  crystal  fountain-side ; 

Scenes  for  which  our  hearts  are  yearning, 

Joys  that  we  have  missed  so  long, 

Comrades,  here  is  Peace  returning 

Greet  her  back  with  dance  and  song.4 

1  Arist,  Peace  204  et  seq. 

2  Ibid.,  301  et  seq.,  441  et  seq. 

3  Ibid.,  434  et  seq.,  529  et  seq..  545  et  seq.,  1210  et  seq.,  trans,  by 
(London,  1913). 

4  Ibid.,  571  et  seq. 


og  HELLENIC  COXCEPTIOXS  OF  PEACE  [492 

The  peace  proved  to  be  thoroughly  unstable.  The  treaty 
could  never  be  carried  out  in  entirety  without  the  consent 
of  the  Spartan  allies  who  had  refused  to  acquiesce  in  it. 
There  were  infractions  on  both  sides.  To  minimize  these 
the  two  cities  concluded  a  defensive  alliance,  which  how- 
ever had  no  good  feeling  in  its  support.  The  war  party  led 
by  the  young  and  reckless  Alcibiades  came  back  into  power 
at  Athens.  An  alliance  was  made  with  Argos  which  in- 
volved Athens  in  a  war  in  the  Peloponnesus.  The  battle  of 
Mantinea  which  followed  caused  the  prestige  of  Sparta  to 
rise  and  Athens  was  again  isolated.3 

In  416  came  the  famous  Melian  episode.    The  little  island 

f  Melos,  a  Dorian  settlement  which  was  in  an  advantag- 
eous position  for  trade  with  Egypt,  had  refused  to  join  the 
Athenian  Empire.  The  Athenians  decided  to  compel  it  to 
submit.  Military  expediency  alone  controlled  the  situation- 
Justice  and  honor  involved  danger  in  practice.  The  Melians 
refused  to  surrender,  but  were  overwhelmed.  All  who 
were  of  military  age  were  put  to  death  and  the  rest  sold 
into  slavery.2  It  was  the  greatest  blot  on  the  name  of 
Athens,  one  which  Athenian  orators  in  the  next  century 
endeavored  in  vain  to  explain  away.  It  is  thought  by  some 
that  Euripides'  powerful  play,  the  Troades,  was  written  as 
a  protest  against  this  action.3 

The  restless  imperialistic  leaders  soon  involved  the  city  in 
the  Sicilian  expedition  which  resulted  so  disastrously  and 
brought  a  renewal  of  the  war  in  Greece.     From  that  time 

n  the  war  dragged  along  with  varying  success,  with  many 
useless  attempts  to  secure  peace  by  both  sides.  The  oli- 
garchs made  their  effort  to  secure  control  of  Athens  and 

1  Meyer,  op.  tit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  465  et  seq. 

2  Thucydides  v,  85  et  seq.,  cf.  Grundy,  op.  cit.,  p.  356. 

3  Glover,  op.  cit.,  pp.  157  et  seq. 


493]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  gg 

peace  with  Sparta,  but  were  overthrown.  Finally,  after 
Persia  had  been  drawn  into  the  struggle,  Lysander,  the  new 
Spartan  leader,  won  the  battle  of  ^Egospotami.  Athens  fell, 
the  Long  Walls  were  pulled  down  to  the  music  of  flutes, 
and  Hellas  was  free.1 

Throughout  the  period  Aristophanes  was  the  great  pro- 
ponent of  peace.  He  did  not  agree  with  the  man  who  de- 
clared that  the  gods  had  willed  that  wars  should  never 
cease  until  the  wolf  and  the  lamb  were  united,2  but  he 
worked  through  his  plays  to  secure  perpetual  peace  for 
Hellas.  In  the  Acharnians  he  compared  the  hardships  and 
the  alarms  of  war  with  the  happiness  of  peace.  The  Peace 
was  full  of  the  jubilation  of  the  farmers  when  they  were 
allowed  to  return  to  their  country  homes  without  fear  of 
the  invaders.  In  the  Lysistrata,  a  later  play,  he  wrote  of 
the  sufferings  of  the  women  whose  husbands  and  sons  were 
always  away  at  the  wars  and  of  the  unmarried  girl  whose 
chances  for  happiness  were  thus  destroyed.3 

The  responsibility  for  the  war  the  poet  laid  upon  the 
leaders.  He  recognized  the  righteous  wrath  of  the  farmers 
at  the  destruction  of  their  fields  and  admitted  equal  hatred 
of  Sparta.  But  he  declared  that  the  Spartan  people  were 
not  to  blame  and  should  not  be  compelled  to  suffer  for  the 
evil  machinations  of  the  rulers.4  He  accused  as  perpetua- 
tors  of  war  the  demagogues  who  were  seeking  position, 
power  and  graft,  the  professional  soldier,  the  manufac- 
turers of  munitions,  all  who  pretended  that  they  were  seek- 
ing the  best  interests  of  the  state  while  they  were  actually 
pursuing  personal  gain.5     In  the  final  analysis  the  cause  of 

1  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  550  et  seq. 

2  Arist.,  Peace  1075,  6. 

1  Arist,  Lysistrata,  99  et  seq.,  585  et  seq. 
4  Vide  supra,  p.  93;  Peace  627  et  seq. 

3  Vide  supra,  p.  93;  cf.  Croiset,  op.  cit.,  pp.  54  et  seq. 


IOO  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [494 

war  was  the  desire  for  money.  In  the  Lysistrata,  the 
women  of  all  the  states  who  had  combined  to  establish 
peace,  seized  the  treasury,  thus  to  remove  the  possibility  of 
gain  and  to  compel  the  men  to  make  peace.1 

In  his  general  attitude  Aristophanes  was  thoroughly  Pan- 
hellenic.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  speak  his  mind  for  the 
hated  Spartans.  All  ins  efforts  were  for  Hellas  rather  than 
for  Athens  alone.2  fSo  Lysistrata,  in  her  endeavors  to 
secure  peace  and  friendship  on  the  basis  of  the  common 
sisterhood  of  all  women,  rebuked  the  Athenians  and  the 
Spartans  for  their  fighting  and  bickering,3  and  called  them 
to  unity  in  the  name  of  religion  and  brotherhood. 

And  now,  dear  friends,  I  wish  to  chide  you  both, 
That  ye,  all  of  one  blood,  all  brethren  sprinkling 
The  selfsame  altars  from  the  selfsame  laver, 
At  Pylae,  Pytho,  and  Olympia,  ay 
And  many  others  which  'twere  long  to  name, 
That  ye,   Hellenes— with  barbarian   foes 
Armed,  looking  on — fight  and  destroy  Hellenes !  4 

In  the  poet's  dream  of  peace  the  reconciled  cities  greet 
and  blend  in  peaceful  intercourse  and  laugh  for  joy.5 

Thucydides,  the  Athenian,  wrote  the  history  of  the  war. 
He  began  to  write  at  its  very  beginning,  because  he  felt  that 
it  was  going  to  be  great  and  memorable  above  all  other 
wars.6  His  own  part  in  the  war  ended  with  his  exile  after 
a  defeat  in  Thrace  for  which  as  general  he  was  held  respon- 
sible, and  he  was  able  to  devote  himself  to  the  gathering  of 
his  materials.  Though  he  had  been  himself  a  general,  was 
the  historian  of  a  war  and  wrote  his  history  as  a  text-book 

1  Arist,  Lysis.  487  et  seq.  2Arist,  Peace  302  et  al. 

zId.,  Lysis.  1159  et  seq. 

4  Ibid.,  1 128  et  seq. 

5  Id.,  Peace  538  et  seq. 

6  Thucydides  i,  1. 


495]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  IOi 

for  later  statesmen  and  generals,  he  was  by  no  means  a 
supporter  of  war.  He  regarded  this  war  as  inevitable. 
But  he  pointed  out  the  many  calamities  which  it  had  brought 
to  Hellas :  the  capture  and  depopulation  of  cities,  the  exiles 
and  the  slaughter,  and  especially  the  debasement  of  char- 
acter, both  of  cities  and  of  men. 

In  peace  and  prosperity  both  states  and  individuals  are  actuated 
by  higher  motives,  because  they  do  not  fall  under  the  dominion 
of  imperious  necessities ;  but  war  which  takes  away  the  com- 
fortable provision  of  daily  life  is  a  hard  master  and  tends  to 
assimilate  men's  character  to  their  conditions.1 

He  knew,  too,  how  to  draw  a  picture  of  the  hardships  of 
war  when  he  wrote  of  the  sufferings  of  the  Athenians  after 
the  plague  and  of  the  terrors  of  the  retreat  from  Syracuse. 

Besides  the  reasoning  which  showed  that  the  conflict  be- 
tween Athens  and  Sparta  was  necessary  and  inevitable, 
many  arguments  against  war  in  general  appear  in  the 
speeches  which  Thucydides  composed  to  represent  the  posi- 
tions of  the  various  parties.  Again  and  again  was  empha- 
sized the  fact  that  war  was  a  matter  of  chance,  hazardous 
to  both  sides,  that  men  began  with  blows  and  then  when 
defeated  had  recourse  to  words,  though  the  exercise  of  pru- 
dence would  have  restrained  them  in  the  beginning.2  The 
sufferings  of  the  state  in  the  loss  of  its  men  was  held  to  be 
greater  than  in  the  loss  of  property.  "  Mourn  not  for 
houses  and  for  lands,"  said  Pericles,  "  but  for  men.  For 
houses  and  lands  men  may  gain,  but  they  will  not  gain 
men."  3  Upon  the  men  so  lost,  the  state  and  its  leaders  be- 
stowed the  highest  honors.4 

The  clearest  statement  of  the  whole  problem  of  peace  and 

1  Thuc.  iii,  82.  2  Id.,  i,  81 ;  iv,  20,  62. 

s  Id.,  i,  143.  4  Id.,  ii,  46. 


102  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [496 

war  was  in  the  speech  ascribed  to  Hermocrates  the  Syra- 
cusan.  The  Sicilians  held  a  congress  in  424  B.  C.  to  en- 
deavor to  secure  peace  among  themselves.  Hermocrates, 
who  had  brought  about  the  meeting,  presented  in  no  minc- 
ing words  the  situation  in  Sicily. 

You  well  know  and  therefore  I  shall  not  rehearse  to  you  at 
length,  all  the  misery  of  war.  Nobody  is  compelled  to  go  to 
war  by  ignorance  and  no  one  who  thinks  that  he  will  gain  any- 
thing from  it  is  deterred  by  fear.  The  truth  is  that  the  aggres- 
sor deems  the  advantage  greater  than  the  suffering ;  and  the  side 
which  is  attacked  would  sooner  run  any  risk  than  suffer  the 
smallest  immediate  loss.  But  when  such  feelings  on  the  part 
of  either  operate  unseasonably  the  time  for  offering  counsel 
of  peace  has  arrived,  and  such  counsels  if  we  will  only  listen 
to  them  will  be  at  this  moment  invaluable  to  us.  Why  did  we 
go  to  war?  Simply  from  a  consideration  of  our  own  individual 
interests,  and  with  a  view  to  our  interests  we  are  now  trying 
by  means  of  discussion  to  obtain  peace ;  and  if,  after  all,  we  do 
not  before  we  separate  succeed  in  getting  our  respective  rights, 
we  shall  go  to  war  again. 

He  pointed  out  the  threatening  danger  of  Athenian  domi- 
nation. "  The  ambition  and  craft  of  the  Athenians  are 
pardonable  enough.  I  do  not  blame  those  who  wish  to  rule, 
but  those  who  are  willing  to  serve."  The  justice  of  a  cause, 
he  held  to  be  no  sufficient  guarantee  of  success. 

The  revenge  of  a  wrong  is  not  always  successful  merely  because 
it  is  just ;  nor  is  strength  most  assured  of  victory  when  it  is  most 
full  of  hope.  The  inscrutable  future  is  the  controller  of  events 
and  being  the  most  treacherous  of  all  things  is  the  most  bene- 
ficent, for  where  there  is  mutual  fear,  men  think  twice  before 
they  make  aggressions  upon  one  another. 

Then  he  appealed  for  peace, 


497]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  IV AR  103 

And  why  if  peace  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  be  the  great 
of  blessings,  should  we  not  make  peace  among  ourselves  ? 
Whatever  of  good  or  evil  is  the  portion  of  any  of  us,  is  not 
peace  more  likely  than  war  to  preserve  the  one  and  to  alleviate 
the  other?  And  has  not  peace  honors  and  glories  of  her  own 
unattended  by  the  dangers  of  war?  (But  it  is  unnecessary  to 
dilate  on  the  blessings  of  peace  any  more  than  on  the  miseries 
of  war.)  Consider  what  I  am  saying,  and  instead  of  despising 
my  words,  may  every  man  seek  his  safety  in  them.1 

Euripides,  born  in  the  year  of  Salamis,  educated  during 
the  days  when  Athens  was  becoming  the  prytaneum  of 
Greek  wisdom  as  well  as  the  leader  of  Greek  politics,  had 
reached  the  prime  of  his  manhood  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war.  He  was  intensely  interested  in  things 
human,  in  the  solution  of  the  problems  of  human  relations, 
by  contrast  with  his  predecessors  who  dealt  with  the  great 
problems  of  the  universe.  Sophocles  had  treated  peace  and 
war  as  an  academic  question.  To  Euripides  they  appealed 
as  vital  elements  in  the  relationships  of  men.2 

He  was  essentially  a  lover  of  peace,  whom  he  hailed  as 
the  richest  and  most  beautiful  of  the  goddesses,  nurse  of 
fair  children  and  the  giver  of  happiness  and  wealth.3  Yet 
he  was  carried  away  by  hatred  of  Sparta  into  advocacy  of 
the  war.  The  Andromache,  which  concerned  the  mistreat- 
ment of  the  Trojan  princess  by  Menelaus  and  Hermione, 
consisted  chiefly  of  a  bitter  attack  on  that  city.  He  called 
the  Spartans  princes  of  lies,  weavers  of  webs  of  guile,  covet- 
ous murderers,  the  vilest  of  men,  the  most  immoral  of 
women,  and,  except  for  their  martial  fame,  the  meanest  of 

1  Jowett,  Thucydides  (London,  1883),  iv,  59  et  sea. 

2  Cf.  Decharne,  op.  cit.,  pp.  128  et  scq. ;  Botsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit, 

P-  34- 
'Euripides,  Suppliants,  489-491 1   Bacchantes,  419-420;   Orestes,   1682 

et  seq. 


I04  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [498 

mankind.1  In  an  argument  concerning  the  causes  of  the 
Trojan  war  in  the  same  play,  he  put  into  the  mouth  of  the 
braggart  captain,  Menelaus,  one  of  the  chief  arguments  for 
war.  Menelaus  claimed  that,  if  Helen  were  responsible  for 
the  war,  she  had  nevertheless  wrought  a  great  boon  for 
Hellas :  "  For  those  who  were  ignorant  of  arms  and  battles 
turned  them  to  manly  deeds.  Fellowship  in  the  fight  is  the 
great  teacher  of  all  things  to  men."  2 

The  poet  reproached  the  gods  for  their  part  in  bringing 
on  the  strife.  He  repeated  the  old  epic  argument  that  Zeus 
had  caused  the  war  to  relieve  mother  earth  of  her  troublous 
throng  of  men,  to  bring  glory  to  the  mightiest  son  of  Hel- 
las, to  ruin  Troy  and  punish  Greece.3 

In  his  other  writings  Euripides  made  it  clear  that  he  was 
never  for  peace  at  any  price.  He  felt  the  danger  in  the  use 
of  intelligence  without  courage  as  in  boldness  mixed  with 
folly,  though  the  former  might  bring  peace  and  the  latter 
keep  off  foes.4  He  despised  the  youth  who  hated  to  play 
the  man  in  war.5  Those  who  had  died  with  honor,  a  crown 
of  glory  to  their  city,  he  regarded  as  more  alive  than  they 
who  lived  with  dishonor.6  Some  of  his  finest  characters 
were  among  those  like  Ivlenoeceus,  son  of  Creon,  and  Iphi- 
geneia,  who  were  willing  to  give  up  their  lives  that  the 
fatherland  might  live.7  Praxithea,  wife  of  Erechtheus, 
prayed  that  her  sons  might  be  such  as  would  win  renown 
among  men  in  war,  not  by  vain  outward  show  within  the 
walls.8     The  poet's  ideal  citizen  was  like  Parthenopaeus, 

1  Euripides,  Andromache  445  et  seq.;  724  et  seq. 
2 Id.,  Andromache  681-4. 
5  Id.,  Helen  38-41;  fr.  icS  7. 

4  Id.,  fr.  556. 

5  Id.,  fr.  1039. 

6  Id.,  Troades  400  et  seq. ;  f  r.  363. 

''Id.,  Phoenissae  995  et  seq.;  Iphigeneia  in  Aulis  1378  et  seq. 
•  Id.,  f r.  364. 


499]  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  I05 

who  though  Arcadian,  stood  midst  the  spears  of  the  Argive 
host  like  an  Argive  born,  fought  for  the  land,  rejuiced 
when  the  city  prospered  and  grieved  when  things  went  ill.1 
Nevertheless,  he  inveighed  against  useless  war  and  coun- 
seled prudence,  the  choice  of  discretion  as  the  better  part  of 
valor.2  He  praised  the  wise  man  who  by  justice  and  by 
good  advice  took  away  battles  and  civil  uprisings  from 
Greece.3  He  attacked  the  young  men  who  to  win  praise  or 
to  obtain  power  or  gold  for  themselves  drove  the  leaders 
of  the  state  on  to  war  and  considered  not  the  sufferings  of 
the  people  thus  misused.4  For  warrior  glory  of  itself  he 
had  no  liking.  Thousands  of  humble  lives  were  sacrificed, 
he  felt,  that  a  general  might  erect  a  trophy.5  He  regarded 
ambition  as  the  greatest  curse  of  men.6  Every  man  real- 
ized how  much  better  peace  was  for  mankind  than  war. 
Yet  with  ambition  before  their  eyes  they  .had  chosen  war. 
and  had  strained  the  bow  to  shoot  beyond  the  mark.7  In 
its  train  followed  injustice,  man  had  enslaved  man  and  city 
had  overthrown  city.  In  the  end  men  had  yielded  to  stern 
facts. s 

Madmen,  all  ye  who  seek  advantages  in  war,  fighting  with 
mighty  spears,  seeking  senselessly  to  lay  aside  the  burdens  of 
life.  If  struggles  of  blood  be  ever  judge  of  peace,  then  never 
shall  strife  withdraw  from  the  cities  of  men.9 

1  Euripides,  Suppliants  896-8. 

2  Id.,  Suppliants  506-510,  161-2. 

3  Id.,  fr.  284,23-28. 

4  Id.,  Suppliants  229-37,  160. 

5  Id.,  Andromache  694  et  seq. 

6  Id.,  Plwenissae  531-4,  812. 

7  Id.,  Suppliants  479  et  seq.,  743  et  seq. 

8  Ibid.,  493  et  seq. 

9  Id.,  Helen  H5I-7- 


I06  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [500 

If  men  considered  death  for  themselves  when  they  voted 
for  war,  then  never  would  they  cast  their  vote  and  Hellas 
would  not  be  dashed  to  ruin.1  Reason  could  accomplish  all 
that  the  sword  could  bring  to  pass,  and  this  Euripides  pro- 
posed as  the  solution  of  the  problem."  He  drew  a  remark- 
able picture  of  self-restraint  in  the  Suppliants.  Here  The- 
seus is  represented  as  having  gone  to  Thebes  to  compel  the 
burial  of  the  dead  chieftains.  This  done,  he  refused  to  pur- 
sue the  conquest  further  and  returned  home.3 

In  the  scenes  of  battle  the  poet  was  not  impressed  by  the 
glorious  martial  strife,  the  thunder  and  ring  of  mailed  Ares. 
but  saw  only  destruction,  ruin  and  sorrow.  Above  the  clash 
of  shields  he  heard  the  groan  and  shriek  of  the  dying  and 
saw  on  the  field  the  shattered  chariots,  the  rivers  of  gore 
and  the  heaps  of  corpses.4 

On  many  occasions,  especially  in  the  Hecuba  and  the 
Troades,  Euripides  wrote  of  the  sufferings  occasioned  by 
war,  the  grief  of  the  grey-haired  women  and  aged  men 
both  among  the  victorious  Hellenes  and  the  conquered 
Trojans,  who  were  deprived  of  their  sons,  and  the  terrible 
lot  of  the  younger  women  of  Troy,  many  of  whom  saw 
their  husbands  slain,  their  children  torn  from  their  arms 
and  dashed  to  death  upon  the  ground  and  who  were  them- 
selves dragged  into  slavery  to  suffer  fresh  outrages  at  the 
hands  of  the  Greeks.5 

Euripides  echoed  the  thought  of  Sophocles  and  made  the 
application  more  direct,  when  he  declared  that  war  took 

1  Euripides,  Suppliants  481-5. 

2  Id.,  Phoenissac  515  et  seq.     Suppliants  747  et  seq. 
3 Id.,  Suppliants  724  et  seq. 

4  Id.,  Children  of  Heracles  832  et  seq.  Phoenissac  1192  et  seq. 
Suppliants  684  et  seq. 

5  Id.,  Troades  37:  et  scq.,  562  ct  seq..  et  al.;  Hecuba  473  et  seq.,  154 
et  seq.,  et  al.;  Andromache  106  et  seq.,  ct  al. 


501  ]  THE  PELOPONNEStAN  WAR  i0y 

the  most  excellent  men,  the  valiant  youths,  and  left  the 
coward.  To  the  city  this  is  a  calamity  for  the  noblest  to 
die ;  1  and  a  loss,  he  said,  that  can  never  be  replaced.  "  For 
the  one  loss  that  mortal  may  never  make  good  again  is  this, 
the  life  of  man,  though  wealth  may  be  revvon."  "  Surely, 
he  who  would  bring  war  upon  the  state  will  hesitate  when 
he  considers  the  sorrow  and  desolation  which  will  follow. 
So  Euripides  exhorted  his  countrymen. 

0  miserable  mortals,  why  do  yet  get  yourselves  spears  and 
deal  out  death  upon  each  other  ?  Stop  and  withdraw  from  these 
toils.  Peaceful,  'mid  the  peaceful,  guard  your  towns.  Short 
is  your  span  of  life.  Best  then  to  pass  through  it  as  gently  as 
may  be,  not  worn  by  burdens.4 

Thus  the  difficulties  of  the  fifth  century,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  advancing  ease  and  luxury  and  culture  of  life  on 
the  other,  had  led  the  writers  of  the  period  to  condemn 
war  and  to  cry  for  peace.  Among  the  people  who  had 
suffered  so  many  hardships  there  had  come,  too,  a  realiza- 
tion of  the  advantages  of  peace  and  a  longing  for  it.  Arbi- 
tration had  failed  to  accomplish  it.  But  the  end  of  the 
century  saw  the  downfall  of  the  tyrant  city  that  had  threat- 
ened all  Hellas.  Surely  the  people  might  look  forward  to  a 
long  period  of  happy  independence. 

1  Euripides,  fr.  728. 
-Id.,  Suppliants  745- 

s  Id.,  Children  of  Heracles  161  et  seq.;  Suppliants  591. 
4  Id.,  Suppliants  949-954- 


CHAPTER  V 
The  Fourth  Century 

The  opening  events  of  the  fourth  century  proved  that 
the  Peloponnesian  war,  which  was  to  accomplish  so  much 
for  the  peace  of  Hellas,  had  actually  settled  nothing. 
Sparta  feared  too  much  the  growing  power  of  Thebes  as 
well  as  the  condemnation  of  all  Hellenes  to  allow  Athens  to 
be  destroyed.  Athens  was  crippled  but  not  beyond  repair. 
Ere  long,  with  Persian  help,  she  rose  afresh,  became  once 
more  a  rival  of  Sparta,  and  even  hoped  for  a  renewal  of  her 
former  greatness  and  empire.  The  tyranny  of  the  Thirty 
was  overthrown  and  there  was  no  further  hope  of  estab- 
lishing an  oligarchy  in  Athens.  She  remained  a  democracy 
and  the  rallying  point  for  all  democratic  cities  and  for  all 
democratic  parties  in  cities  against  oligarchic  Sparta.  No 
real  attempt  had  been  made  to  lessen  the  differences  which 
held  them  apart.  Nor  had  their  hatred  and  distrust  of  each 
other  grown  any  the  less.1 

To  complicate  matters  a  new  power  had  arisen.  Thebes 
had  grown  strong  en  the  misfortunes  of  Athens.  Her 
population  had  been  increased  by  refugees,  her  wealth  had 
been  magnified  greatly  by  plunder  and  her  control  over  the 
Boeotian  League  had  been  strengthened.2  On  the  outside 
stood  the  Persian  king  and  his  satraps.  They  were  inter- 
ested in  keeping  any  Hellenic  power  from  becoming  too 

1  Meyer,  op.  cit,,  vol.  v,  pp.  I,  et  seq. 

2  Oxyrhyncus  Hellenica,  xii,  in  Bctsford  and  Sihler,  op.  cit.,  p.  386. 

108  [S02 


503]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  109 

strong  and  in  regaining  control  over  the  Asiatic  cities.  Once 
this  were  accomplished,  it  would  be  to  the  interest  of  Per- 
sian trade  to  have  peace  in  the  /Egean.  The  wealth  of  the 
Persian  Empire,  for  which  both  sides  among  the  warring- 
Hellenes  bargained,  gave  it  a  dominating  influence  in  Hel- 
lenic affairs. 

The  gift  of  freedom  to  Hellas  by  the  Spartans  proved  to 
be  a  delusion.  The  small  states  had  but  exchanged  masters. 
Spartan  military  hegemony  interposed  its  iron  hand  in  placi 
of  Athenian  control.  Lysander,  anxious  to  secure  power 
and  glory  for  himself  as  well  as  for  Sparta,  saw  to  it  that 
Spartan  influence  was  established  among  the  former  allies 
of  Athens.  The  democratic  leaders  who  were  favorable  t  1 
Athens  were  driven  out  and  boards  of  ten  men  were  put 
into  control  of  the  states.  With  such  bodies  Sparta  knew 
how  to  deal.  To  keep  them  in  power  Lacedaemonian  gar- 
risons under  harmosts  were  placed  in  the  cities.  The  re- 
sult was  "  plunder,  oppression  and  murder."  Spartan 
power  was  based  on  military  force,  and  therefore  required 
military  force  to  maintain  it.  It  would  endure  only  so  long 
as  Sparta  was  supreme  on  land  and  sea.  Meanwhile  her 
enemies  were  increasing.  Everywhere  the  exiles  were 
planning  revenge  and  the  populace  was  becoming  restive. 
With  the  decline  of  the  power  of  Lysander  the  decarchies 
fell,  but  the  hatred  and  fear  of  Sparta  did  not  decrease. 
Thebes  and  Corinth,  who  had  borne  their  share  of  the  war 
against  Athens,  felt  that  they  had  been  deprived  of  their 
share  of  the  rewards.  Spartan  ambition  frightened  them 
and  they  refused  to  follow  Sparta's  lead.1 

The  war  with  Persia  which  followed  the  march  of  the 
Ten  Thousand  gave  to  Sparta  an  opportunity  to  unite  the 
Greeks  in  a  great  Panhellenic  movement.    Allies  in  Thessaly 

1  Botsford,  Hellenic  History,  ch.  xxi. 


II0  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [504 

had  already  been  secured  in  the  formation  of  an  Hellenic 
league.  Agesilaus  planned  to  follow  in  the  steps  of  Aga- 
memnon and  led  his  forces  to  Aulis  for  a  sacrifice.  He 
misused  his  powers  and  alienated  his  allies  by  the  gift  of 
appointments  to  his  friends.  Other  Greeks  refused  to  join 
and  Thebes  was  openly  hostile.  Theban  cavalry  scattered 
his  men  at  the  sacrifice.  Though  all  chance  of  a  Panhel- 
lenic  army  was  gone,  Agesilaus  proceeded  to  Asia  Minor, 
and  there  was  making  considerable  headway  against  Persia 
when  events  in  Greece  called  him  home.1 

The  enemies  of  Sparta  had  found  common  cause  and 
had  united  to  wage  war  once  again  for  the  freedom  of  Hel- 
las. Athens,  Thebes,  Corinth,  Argos  and  many  of  the 
islands  formed  a  league,  and  in  395  the  Corinthian  war 
began.  Though  it  seemed  to  put  an  end  to  all  Panhellenic 
hopes,  Gorgias  2  and  Lysias,3  the  orators,  urged  the  Greeks 
to  lay  aside  these  local  differences  and  unite  for  a  great  war 
with  Persia.  One  event  made  this  impossible.  In  393 
Conon,  an  Athenian,  admiral  of  the  Persian  fleet,  won  a 
victory  off  Cnidus  which  destroyed  Spartan  naval  suprem- 
acy, and  then  with  Persian  money  aided  in  the  rebuilding 
of  the  Long  Walls  of  Athens.  Persia  knew  well  how  to  pre- 
vent united  action  among  the  Greeks.  Athens,  once  again 
able  to  lift  her  head  and  hope  for  a  renewal  of  wealth  and 
empire,  began  the  formation  of  a  new  league  among  the 
islanders  and  refused  to  follow  the  lead  of  Sparta.4 

In  spite  of  her  naval  defeat  Sparta  was  still  supreme  on 
land.    The  Boeotians  were  discouraged  and  an  attempt  was 

1  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  204  et  seq.;  Xenophon,  ed.  Marchant 
3  vols.  (Oxford,  1900),  Hellenica  vii,  1,  3,  4. 

2  Philostratus,  Vita  Sophistarum  ed.  Kayser  (Leipzig,  1870-1),  9.  2. 

3  Lysias,  ed.  Heide,  Oxford  1913  Olympiakos;  cf.  Jebb,  Attic  Orators 
from  Antiphon  to  Isaeus  (2nd  ed.,  London,  1893),  vol.  i,  p.  155. 

4  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  238  et  seq. 


505]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  j  ,  j 

made  in  the  winter  of  392-1  to  secure  peace.  Sparta  an- 
nounced that  she  was  willing  to  grant  freedom  to  all  the 
Greeks,  common  use  of  the  seas,  and  to  allow  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Athenian  fleet  and  walls.1  But  the  old  Athe- 
nian war  party  was  in  control.  They  talked  of  the  dang* 
to  the  democracy  if  peace  were  made  before  Sparta 
crushed,  of  the  losses  that  might  follow,  and  they  held  out 
hopes  of  the  recovery  of  the  lost  lands  and  property  on  the 
Chersonese  in  the  event  of  victory.  Anducides,  the  oral  r, 
endeavored  to  break  down  the  opposition  to  peace.  He 
pointed  out  that  neither  their  allies  nor  the  Great  King 
would  allow  the  fruition  of  the  dreams  of  regained  power. 
He  reminded  them  that  the  democracy  had  been  disturbed 
only  when  Athens  was  crushed ;  that  Athens  had  prospered 
and  gained  her  power  during  the  intervals  of  peace  with 
Sparta,  and  had  suffered  and  lost  in  every  war  that  she  had 
waged  with  that  city.  For  the  crushing  of  Sparta  he  held 
that  Athens  had  neither  the  men  nor  the  arms  nor  the 
money.  "  That  to  enter  upon  a  just  and  fair  peace  is  much 
wiser  than  to  carry  on  war  you  all  seem  to  understand 
clearly,  Athenians."  2  Peace  could  not  be  secured,  however. 
The  following  year  the  Athenian  general  Iphicrates  won  a 
victory  on  land.  The  tide  began  to  turn  against  Sparta  and 
she  appealed  to  Persia.  To  have  Sparta  crushed  was  not  to 
the  interest  of  the  Great  King.  In  addition,  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  willing  to  pay  his  price  for  support.  Once 
his  financial  aid  was  withdrawn  from  Athens  and  her  allies, 
they  could  do  naught  but  accept  his  terms.  A  conference 
met  at  Sardis,  of  which  this  proclamation  was  the  outcome : 

King  Artaxerxes  deems  it  right  that  the  cities  of  Asia  with 
the  islands  of  Clazomenae  and  Cyprus  should  belong  to  himself. 

1  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  pp.  251,  2. 

'Andocides  ed.  Blass  (Leipzig,  1506),  On  the  Peace. 


H2  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [506 

The  remaining  cities,  small  and  great,  he  wishes  to  leave  inde- 
pendent, with  the  exception  of  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Scyros, 
which  three  as  formerly  are  to  belong  to  Athens.  Should  any 
of  the  parties  concerned  not  accept  this  peace,  I,  Artaxerxes, 
together  with  those  who  share  my  views,  will  wage  war  against 
him  or  them  by  land  and  sea,  with  ships  and  with  money.1 

To  the  familiar  terms  of  elentheria  kai  autonomia,  a  new 
principle  had  been  added — the  armed  enforcement  of  peace. 
With  the  exception  of  the  shameful  surrender  of  the  Asiatic 
cities,  the  peace  seemed  eminently  fair  and  just.  In  fact,  it 
brought  untold  confusion.  The  Athenian  maritime  alli- 
ance was  broken  up  and  the  naval  power  of  Athens  was  so 
shattered  that  pirates  once  more  ruled  the  seas.  The  Boeo- 
tian League  was  disbanded  and  with  it  went  the  hopes  of 
Thebes.  Only  Sparta  remained  the  gainer.  The  principles 
of  armed  force  for  which  she  stood  had  been  vindicated  in 
fact  if  net  in  word.  It  was  generally  understood  that  she 
was  to  enforce  the  peace  with  Persian  backing.2  Her  power 
in  the  Peloponnesus  was  not  injured  and  there  were  none 
that  might  gainsay  her,  none  to  protect  the  weaker  states  nor 
the  peace  itself  against  her.  Autonomy  was  easily  trans- 
lated to  mean  the  rule  of  the  friends  of  Sparta/'  Decarchies 
were  once  again  set  up  and  there  followed  a  new  series  of 
revolutions.  Exiles  again  wandered  in  armed  mercenary 
bands  and  menaced  life  and  property  throughout  the  land. 
More  cities  were  taken  during  the  period  of  the  peace  than 
before  it  had  been  concluded.4 

Sparta  herself  broke  the  peace.     To  punish  Mantinea  for 

1  Xenophon,  Hellenica  v,   1,  31 ;  cf.  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  267 
el  seq. 

2  Botsf ord,  Hellenic  History,  ch.  xxi. 
3Cf.  Glover,  op.  cit.,  p.  108. 

4Isocrates,  ed.  Blass,  2  vols.  (Leipzig.  1885),  Peace. 


507]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  ug 

disaffection  she  crushed  and  destroyed  that  city.1  Then  a 
Spartan  commander  without  justification  seized  the  citadel 
of  Thebes.  When  he  was  tried  at  Sparta  for  his  infraction 
of  the  peace,  Agesilaus  defended  him  on  the  ground  that 
he  had  acted  for  the  best  interests  of  the  state  and  he  escaped 
with  a  fine.     The  citadel  was  kept.2 

To  the  north  a  group  of  states  were  offering  a  new  solu- 
tion to  the  problem  of  peace  and  unity.  Olynthus  in  the 
Chalcidice  had  become  the  center  of  a  federal  union.  Citi- 
zens in  each  state  of  the  league  were  given  full  rights 
citizenship  in  every  other  state  and  thus  were  held  together 
by  a  common  interest.  Even  those  who  had  been  fori 
into  the  organization  soon  lost  their  local  interests  in  the 
welfare  of  the  whole.  Its  growing  power  was  regarded  as  a 
menace  by  its  neighbors  and  by  the  Spartans.  Federalism 
had  no  place  in  a  world  ruled  by  Sparta.  When  the  Olyn- 
thian  union  had  been  destroyed  by  a  short  war.  Spartan 
power  had  reached  its  climax.  Agesilaus  had  attained  the 
goal  of  his  desires. 

The  man  who  led  his  city  to  these  achievements  was  Agesilaio. 
the  embodiment  of  the  Lacedaemonian  spirit,  patriotic,  ambi- 
tious and  efficient,  but  with  stunted  ideals,  unprogressive  alike 
in  military  art,  in  statesmanship  and  in  humanism — a  man  who 
tested  the  right  or  wrong  of  every  action  by  the  sole  advant- 
age of  Sparta,  whose  vision,  limited  to  brute  power,  took  no 
account  of  the  moral  forces  roused  through  Hellas  by  his  policy 
of  blood  and  iron.3 

The  armed  forces  of  Athens  and  Thebes,  supported  by 
these  moral  forces  of  disappointment  and  indignation,  were 
preparing  to  crush  the  power  of  Sparta,  to  punish  her  f  w 

1  Diodorus  Siculus  xv,  I. 

2  Xenophon,  Hellenica,  v,  2,  25  et  seq. 

3  Botsford,  Hellenic  History,  ch.  xxi. 


II4  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [508 

her  breach  of  the  peace  and  to  compel  her  to  allow  the  Hel- 
lenes to  live  in  peace,  free  and  secure.  Athens  had  been 
busy  in  the  formation  of  a  new  confederacy.  Alliances  with 
Chios,  Byzantium  and  Chalcis  were  secured,  and  in  377  the 
second  Athenian  Confederacy  was  launched,  with  the  sup- 
port of  the  maritime  states.1  In  this  Athens  had  been  care- 
ful to  keep  the  peace.  No  one  was  forced  to  come  in ;  each 
treaty  provided  for  local  freedom  and  autonomy.  The 
assembly  of  the  allies  met  free  from  Athenian  interference 
and  only  required  Athenian  sanction  for  action.  No  tribute 
was  collected,  but  ships  and  money  were  to  be  contributed 
when  needed.  The  purpose  of  the  league  was  defence 
against  Sparta. 

Thebes  meanwhile  had  been  able  to  drive  the  Spartan 
garrison  out  of  the  citadel  and  to  reorganize  the  Boeotian 
League.2  In  alliance  with  Athens  accordingly  she  declared 
war  upon  Sparta  for  the  freedom  of  Hellas.3  Though  the 
allies  outmatched  Sparta  in  strength,  they  were  unable  to 
make  headway.  Thebes  left  the  prosecution  of  the  war  to 
Athens  and  turned  to  increasing  her  own  power  at  the  cost 
of  the  very  principles  of  liberty  and  law  for  which  she  had 
gone  to  war.  Thespiae  was  subjugated.  Plataea  was  de- 
stroyed again,  and  the  conquest  of  Phocis  was  started.4 
Athens  became  alarmed  and  turned  to  Sparta.  In  374  a 
peace  conference  at  Sparta  reaffirmed  the  principles  of  the 
King's  Peace.  But  the  difficulties  had  not  been  settled. 
The  democratic  party  in  a  small  state  appealed  for  help, 

1  Marshall,  The  Second  Athenian  Confederacy  (Cambridge,  1905), 
pp.  14  et  seq. 

2  On  the  organization  of  this  confederacy  cf.  Botsford,  "  The  Constitu- 
tion and  Politics  of  the  Boeotian  League,"  in  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
vol.  xxv  (1910),  pp.  271-296. 

3  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  381. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  390  et  seq. 


509]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  ric 

and  Timotheus,  the  Athenian  admiral,  gave  it.  Elsewhere 
the  same  consequences  followed.  Sparta  continued  to 
establish  oligarchies  and  Athens  to  aid  democracies  and 
the  war  continued.1  To  put  an  end  to  this,  to  check  the 
advancing  power  of  Thebes  and  to  bring  an  end  to  hostil- 
ities a  congress  was  called  to  meet  in  Sparta  in  371."  Here 
was  represented  all  Hellas,  and  Persia  as  well,  in  an  at- 
tempt to  secure  a  general  peace.  Though  men  felt  that  it 
was  impossible  to  put  an  end  to  all  wars,  they  sought  a  way 
to  prevent  the  disputes  which  were  the  most  prolific  causes 
of  strife.  It  was  recognized  that  the  chief  difficulty  lay  in 
the  governmental  differences  between  Athens  and  Sparta. 
In  every  small  state  in  Greece  the  democratic  party  looked 
to  Athens  for  support  and  the  oligarchic  to  Sparta.  Alli- 
ances followed  the  will  of  the  party  in  power.  Party  strife 
led  to  appeals  on  both  sides,  and  these  involved  the  two 
leading  states  in  war  with  each  other.  It  was  agreed  that 
the  only  solution  lay  in  open  friendship  between  the  two 
powers  and  an  agreement  not  to  interfere  in  such  local  dis- 
putes. To  compass  such  a  state  of  affairs,  the  peace  pro- 
vided that  all  governors  should  be  withdrawn,  each  state 
should  be  left  free  to  choose  its  own  form  of  government 
and  its  own  alliances,  and  armaments  should  be  disbanded, 
both  naval  and  military.  Furthermore,  "  if  any  state  trans- 
gressed these  stipulations,  it  lay  at  the  option  of  any  power 
whatsoever  to  aid  the  states  so  injured,  while  conversely, 
to  bring  such  aid  was  not  compulsory  on  any  power  against 
its  will."  3  The  last  provision  proved  to  be  the  weak  link 
in  the  chain. 

The  success  of  the  plan  involved  the  end  -of  the  growing 
power  of  Thebes.    Athens  and  Sparta  would  allow  no  rival. 

1  Diodorus  xv,  4.    Xen.,  Hell,  vi,  2. 

2  Xen.,  Hell,  vi,  3. 

3  Ibid.,  vi,  3,  20. 


iI6  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [-IO 

Epaminondas,  the  Theban  representative,  was  ordered  by 
the  congress  to  sign  for  Thebes  only  and  to  allow  the  other 
Boeotians  to  sign  for  themselves.  This  meant  the  end  of 
the  Boeotian  League.  Rather  than  yield  to  what  they  re- 
garded as  virtual  destruction,  the  Thebans  withdrew  from 
the  conference  and  their  state  was  excluded  from  the  treaty.1 
Sparta  thereupon  took  up  the  burden  of  enforcing  the  peace 
against  Thebes."  One  Spartan  opposed  this  action  before 
the  assembly  and  made  a  remarkable  suggestion.  He  pro- 
posed that  the  army  should  be  recalled  and  disbanded  ac- 
cording to  the  treaty;  that  contributions  should  then  be 
placed  at  Delphi ; 

then,  if  any  one  violated  the  peace  or  the  independence  of  the 
states,  all  others  could  be  invited  in  and  funds  would  be  at  hand. 
The  sanction  of  heaven  and  the  enforcement  of  the  peace  would 
thus  be  secured  with  the  least  annoyance  to  the  states.  But  the 
assembly  on  hearing  these  words  agreed  that  this  man  was  talk- 
ing nonsense.3 

The  Spartan  army  advanced  against  Thebes  unsupported  by 
Athens.  Leuctra  followed,  and  with  it  came  the  collapse  of 
Spartan  supremacy  and  the  end  of  all  the  bright  hopes  of 
the  peace  conference.  Every  state  remembered  its  long 
years  of  oppression  and  broke  loose  from  Sparta.  Athens, 
in  spite  of  her  recent  pledge  and  the  mutual  obligation  for 
the  war  against  Thebes,  made  use  of  the  situation  to  in- 
crease her  own  powers.  She  gathered  around  herself  a 
group  of  the  smaller  cities,  held  a  conference  and  secured 
peace  among  them  with  a  pledge  to  protect  them  in  case  of 
need.4     Thebes  followed  up  her  victory  by  an  invasion  of 

1  Xen.,  Hell.,  vii,  i  et  seq. 
*  Diodorus  xv,  6. 

3  Xen.,  Hell.,  vi,  4,  2.    Trans,  by  Dakyns,  3  vols.  (New  York,  1890-97). 

4  Ibid.,  vi,  5,  I  et  seq. 


c 1 1  ]  THE  FO URTH  CE.WTUR Y  \\j 

the  Peloponnesus.       The  old  alliance  was  broken  up,  Mi 
sene  was  rebuilt  and  a  league  was  formed  among  the  Arca- 
dians to  act  as  a  check  on   Sparta.1     Not  until  Theban 
power  became  threatening  did  Athens  remember  her  oaths 
and  engage  in  the  war  in  defence  of  the  peace." 

The  army  of  Thebes  was  not  strong  enough  to  secure  her 
position,  so  she  in  turn  called  a  series  of  meetings,  with  the 
aid  of  Persia,  whose  trade  was  suffering  from  the  prolon- 
gation of  hostilities.  Meetings  were  held  at  Delphi  and  at 
Susa,  which  attempted  to  destroy  Athenian  naval  power 
and  to  secure  recognition  of  Theban  leadership,  but  they 
resulted  only  in  contempt  for  the  Great  King.  A  seventh 
meeting,  this  time  at  Thebes,  resulted  in  the  acceptance  by 
many  smaller  states  of  the  usual  terms  of  freedom  and 
autonomy.  They  refused,  however,  to  take  any  oath  which 
would  bind  them  to  Thebes.  It  is  probable  that  the  Thc- 
bans  proposed  an  alliance  to  compel  Sparta  to  accept  the 
peace  and  recognize  Messene.  This  the  other  states  de- 
clined.3 The  final  effort  of  the  Thebans  to  secure  control 
and  of  the  other  states  to  defend  themselves  came  at  Man- 
tinea.  Though  a  Theban  victory,  it  resulted  in  the  death 
of  Epaminondas  and  the  end  of  the  power  of  his  city.4 

No  one  state  stood  out  in  the  general  chaos  strong  enough 
to  dominate.  A  balance  of  power  more  stable  it  was  thought 
than  that  between  Athens  and  Sparta  had  been  established. 
All  save  Sparta  united  and  a  common  peace  was  made,  "  so 
that  putting  aside  the  war  against  each  other,  each  shall 
make  his  own  city  as  great  and  prosperous  as  possible,  and 

1  Meyer,  op.  cit,  vol.  v,  pp.  449  et  seq. 

2Xen.  Hell,  vii,  i;  cf.  Dittenberger,  Sylloge  InscripHonum  graecorum 
(3d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1915),  *59- 

*Xen.  Hell,  vii,  I,  27,  33  et  seq.,  39  et  seq.;  cf.  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v, 
P-  430. 

*  Xen.,  Hell,  vii,  5,  25- 


H8  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [512 

shall  remain  useful  to  friends  and  strong."  An  offer  to 
unite  with  revolting  satraps  against  Persia  was  refused.  If 
the  Great  King  did  not  interfere  with  them,  they  would  not 
make  war  on  him.1 

The  hope  for  peace  was  vain.  A  quarrel  between  Thebes 
and  Phocis,  which  had  not  been  settled,  led  to  strife,  which 
was  easily  turned  into  a  Sacred  War  by  the  Thebans. 
Athens  and  Sparta  went  to  the  aid  of  the  Phocians,  and  the 
Thebans  called  in  Philip  of  Macedon.  With  his  entrance  a 
new  element  appeared  in  Hellenic  history. 

In  the  meantime  the  second  Athenian  Confederacy,  from 
which  so  much  had  been  expected,  had  fallen  on  difficult 
times.  The  Athenians  had  departed  from  their  lofty  re- 
solves, had  failed  to  protect  the  allies  properly  and  had 
spent  the  money  of  the  league  for  their  own  purposes. 
Some  of  the  states  had  been  reduced  to  subjection  and 
others  had  been  plundered  by  the  mercenary  soldiers  which 
were  hired  to  defend'  them.  Epaminondas  had  stirred  up 
discontent  among  the  allies,  and  in  357  several  of  the 
islands,  led  by  Chios,  Rhodes  and  the  city  of  Byzantium, 
and  supported  by  Mausolus  of  Caria.  revolted.  Persia  in- 
terfered, and  the  Athenians  were  compelled  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  seceders.  There  were  some  who  op- 
posed the  peace  in  the  hope  of  regaining  what  had  been 
lost,  but  sound  counsels  of  finance  and  polity  prevailed  and 
peace  was  made.  Within  a  year  the  confederacy  had  col- 
lapsed entirely.  Thus  because  of  the  short-sighted,  self- 
seeking  policy  of  Athens  the  last  experiment  in  Hellenic 
unification  during  the  days  of  Greek  freedom  had  failed.2 
All  the  powers  had  passed — Athenian,  Spartan,  Olynthian, 
Theban,  and  Athenian  again.     There  was  no  power  strong 

1  Dittenberger,  182.    Diodorus,  xv,  10. 

2  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  113  et  seq. 


513]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  IIO/ 

enough  to  lead,  no  city  willing  enough  to  follow.  When 
peace  and  unity  came  to  the  Hellenic  world,  it  was  com- 
pelled from  without. 

To  the  north,  in  the  valley  above  modern  Saloniki,  lay 
Pella,  capital  of  the  kingdom  of  Macedon.  Its  kings  had 
been  in  close  relations  with  Athens  for  a  century.  In  the 
early  part  of  the  fourth  century  before  the  Christian  era, 
the  throne  had  been  seized  by  Philip.  He  possessed  a  genius 
for  organization,  remarkable  foresight,  a  shrewd  mind,  but 
an  unscrupulous  character.  The  greatest  general  Greece 
had  produced  had  been  his  tutor  in  military  science.  He 
had  acquired  the  throne  by  violence  and  he  knew  his  own 
powers  and  the  absolute  nature  of  his  rule.  In  early  life 
he  had  learned  what  the  weaknesses  of  Greece  were  and 
how  they  might  be  used  to  his  advantage.  It  became  his 
ambition  to  raise  himself  with  his  little  kingdom,  despised 
as  barbarian  by  the  cultured  Greeks  of  the  south,  to  a  con- 
trolling place  in  the  Greek  world.1 

Philip's  first  task  was  the  organization  of  his  own  king- 
dom. All  opposition  was  crushed.  Every  man  subject  to 
him  was  trained  in  the  newest  methods  of  warfare.  Sup- 
plies of  money  and  munitions  were  gathered  and  the  entire 
nation  was  placed  on  a  war  basis.  The  citizen  armies  of  the 
Greek  states  had  been  accustomed  to  righting  only  in  dull 
seasons.  To  the  armies  that  Philip  organized,  seasons  made 
no  difference ;  they  were  ready  to  fight  at  any  time,  in  any 
place,  under  any  conditions.2 

The  problem  of  foreign  relations  was  solved  with  the 
same  efficiency.    Measures  were  taken  to  secure  friends  and 

1  Pickard-Cambridge,  Demosthenes  and  the  Last  Days  of  Greek  Free- 
dom (London,  1914),  PP-  x43  et  seq. 

2  Demosthenes,  ed.  Dindorff.  rev.  by  Blass,  3  vols.  (Leipzig,  1891- 
1907),  trans,  by  Kennedy,  C.  R.,  5  vols.  (London,  1003  L  Phil,  Hi,  49, 
01.  i,  4- 


I2o  HELLEX1C  COXCEPTIGXS  OF  PEACE  [514 

prevent  a  coalition  of  Greeks  against  him.  Gold  was  dis- 
bursed freely  among  the  venal  to  obtain  support.  For  some, 
lattery  of  friendship  sufficed.  Others  were  gained  by 
promises  of  support  in  local  politics  or  petty  wars.  Exhi- 
bitions of  his  power  won  the  fearful.  Before  the  final  con- 
met  began  there  was  a  strong  Macedonian  party  in  every 
city  of  Greece  and  some  cities  had  declared  themselves  his 
friends.1 

Philip  was  entirely  without  scruple.  The  old  rules  of 
warfare  did  not  bind  him.  Treaties  and  truces  he  broke 
whenever  his  purposes  required.  Frequently  he  avowed 
friendship  for  a  city  and  promised  support  and  alliance. 
Once  a  foothold  was  secured  in  this  way.  he  forgot  his 
promises  and  the  city  fell.  Captured,  it  might  expect  no 
mercy.  The  surrounding  country  was  devastated,  the  city 
destroyed,  its  men  killed  or  sold  into  slavery,  while  its 
women,  too  often,  suffered  a  worse  fate.  In  the  neighbor- 
hood a  colony  of  Macedonians  was  settled  to  secure  the 
region.2  Spies  in  Philip's  employ  were  everywhere.  One 
Athenian  was  executed  for  accepting  his  bribe  to  burn  an 
arsenal  in  Athens.3 

Two  things  were  needed  to  establish  his  place  in  the  sun 
f  the  JEgean  world :  recognition  by  the  Greek  states  as  a 
leading  power  in  order  that  he  might  dominate  their  councils, 
and  the  stretch  of  seacoast  reaching  from  Saloniki  to  Byzan- 
tium— modern  Constantinople — to  secure  for  him  the  rich 
gold  mines  of  Thrace,  but  above  all  to  give  him  a  vantage 
point  from  which  he  might  outrival  and  crush  the  com- 
mercial and  naval  power  of  Athens.  Conquest  of  Thessaly 
and  the  Theban  invitation  to  take  part  in  the  Sacred  War 

1  Cf.  Dem.,  Phil,  i,  6;  ii,  19. 

2  Pickard-Cambridge,  op.  cit.,  pp.  155  et  scq.,  159  et  seq.,  pp.  191  et  seq., 
206  et  seq. 

3  Demosthenes,  On  the  Crown,  132. 


5I-]  THE  FOURTH  CE.XTURY  121 

secured  him  the  first  of  these.  Success  made  him  head 
of  the  Amphictyonic  Council,  the  great  religious  body 
of  Greece,  with  tremendous  prestige.1  All  his  resources 
and  all  his  ability  were  directed  towards  gaining  the  coast- 
land.  Clever  trickery  and  quick  action  won  him  important 
gains  in  the  very  beginning.  Success  attended  him  nearly 
to  the  end. 

One  Athenian  saw  the  purposes  of  Philip  and  realized 
what  threatened.  Demosthenes,  the  orator,  went  before  the 
people  and  declaimed  against  Philip.  He  showed  them  that 
Philip  was  a  despot  who  desired  universal  empire  and 
sought  it  without  regard  to  peace  or  justice;  -  that  he  had 
the  advantages  of  a  despot  in  his  ability  to  send  his  men 
whenever  and  wherever  he  willed,  answerable  to  no  one, 
publishing  or  concealing  his  designs  as  he  chose;  that  he 
was  unscrupulous  in  strategy  and  brutal  in  execution,  plun- 
dering and  pillaging,  enslaving  and  murdering  without 
mercy.3  The  wealth  and  power  of  Athens,  Demosthenes 
declared,  was  the  king's  ultimate  objective;  her  democratic 
constitution,  his  most  hated  foe.  "  Democracies  and  des- 
pots cannot  exist  together."  "  Every  king  and  despot  is  a 
foe  to  freedom."'  4  In  democratic  Athens  leaders  could 
not  act  save  after  deliberation  by  the  people,  and  to  the 
people  they  must  report.  Philip's  speed  and  precision  were 
impossible  to  them.  Preparedness  was  the  only  means  of 
safety  :  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  large  fleet,  and  the 
training  of  a  strong  citizen  army.  Hasty  levies  of  citizens, 
called  to  arms  only  at  the  approach  of  danger,  would  be  of 
no  avail  against  the  skilled  forces  of  Philip.5 

1  Pickard-Cambridge,  op.  cit.,  pp.  288  et  seq. 

2Dem.  Phil,  ii,  7,  & 

3  Id.,  01.  i,  4,  25 ;  et  seq. 

*  Id.,  Phil.  11,25;  01.  i,  5- 

5  Id.,  Phil,  i,  4- 


I22  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [516 

The  situation  in  Thrace  called  for  immediate  attention. 
Demosthenes  showed  the  nature  of  Philip's  treachery  there, 
and  called  on  the  people  to  avenge  and  protect  their  friends 
and  allies.1 

Opposition  immediately  arose.  Some  asked,  "  What 
does  all  this  signify?  How  is  the  state  concerned  in  Philip's 
actions  in  Thrace?"  To  them  he  replied:  "  Religion  and 
justice  have  the  same  obligation,  be  the  subject  of  the  offence 
great  or  small."  '  "  But  the  war  is  far  off  and  of  no  con- 
cern to  Athens.  Philip  is  friendly  toward  the  city  and 
would  be  on  good  terms  with  us."  "  Philip's  character  will 
not  let  him  rest  content.  xMready  made  great  by  Athenian 
neglect,  he  will  soon  be  bringing  the  war  to  Attica.  Pro- 
testations of  friendship  wrought  the  ruin  of  the  Thracian 
cities,  as  they  will  of  Athens  if  we  are  careless.  The  choice 
is  between  war  yonder  with  an  enemy  discredited  by  deceit 
or  war  close  by  with  a  successful,  and  therefore  more 
powerful  enemy."  3 

Men,  probably  in  the  pay  of  Philip,  attacked  Demosthenes 
bitterly.  They  called  him  a  soured  water-drinker,  declared 
that  he  was  in  the  employ  of  Philip's  opponents  in  other 
cities  or  else  that  Philip's  offer  to  him  had  not  been  suffi- 
ciently high.  They  extolled  the  character  and  ability  of 
Philip  and  claimed  that  it  was  useless  for  Athens  to  fight 
him.  "  Better  to  be  on  good  terms  with  the  coming  leader 
of  the  Greeks."  These  men  Demosthenes  attacked  as  trai- 
tors who  measure  happiness  by  their  belly  and  all  that  is 
base,  while  freedom  and  independence  they  count  as 
nothing.4 

1  Demosthenes,  01.  i,  passim. 

2  Id.,  Phil,  Hi,  16. 

3  Id.,  01.  i,  14,  15.  26. 

4  Pickarcl-Cambridge,  op.  cit.,  p.  280,  Dem.,  Phil,  ii,  30;  On  the  Crown, 
296;  Aeschines,  On  the  Crown,  81,  173. 


517]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  123 

Lovers  of  peace  talked  of  the  great  prosperity  of  Athens, 
the  abundant  blessings  of  tranquility,  and  compared  them 
with  the  breakdown  of  trade,  the  expense  of  maintaining 
large  forces,  the  loss  of  men  and  money,  and  all  the  evils  in 
the  train  of  war.1     They  thought  it  better  to  suffer  humilia- 
tions in  Thrace  than  to  risk  all  in  war.     Isccrates  even  ap- 
pealed to  Philip  to  be  the  leader  of  the  Greeks,  and  held  that 
his  only  opponents  were  those  whose  personal  interests  were 
challenged.2    The  rich  objected  to  the  expense  and  concealed 
their  wealth,  Demosthenes  declared,  to  escape  the  burdens. 
The  artisans  in  the  city  were  willing  to  vote  for  war  in  the 
assembly,  but  were  not  willing  to  go  themselves.     Success 
or  failure  in  the  war  meant  little  to  them,  while  absence  on 
service  meant  possibly  loss  of  life,  but  surely  ruin.     Xen  - 
phon  complained  that  they  would  not  leave  their  benches 
though  Attica  itself  were  invaded.     The  farmer  could  not 
see  beyond  the  confines  of  Attica.     He  was  ever  ready  to 
fight  in  defence  of  his  own  fields,  but  was  not  interested  in  a 
war  in  far-off  Thrace  which  did  not  appear  to  be  his  own.3 
The  peace  party  declared  the  whole  dispute  was  due  to  the 
desire  of  a  few  men  to  plunder  the  public  treasury.4     To 
such  men  Demosthenes  could  only  show  the  reality  of  the 
danger,  the  menace  of  Philip's  despotism  to  free  Athens. 
He  reminded  them  of  the  glories  of  past  days,  of  the  men 
who  scorned  to  live  if  it  could  not  be  with  freedom.5     He 
pointed  the  way  to  success  : 

1  Dem.,  On  the  Peace,  24,  5-  On  the  Chersonese,  8.  On  the  Embassy, 
88  ct  seq. 

2  Isocrates,  Philippus  73  ct  seq. 

3  Dem  On  the  Naval  Boards,  25;  Xen.,  Econ.  vi.  5-8.  cf.  Pickard- 
Cambridge,  Public  Orations  of  Demosthenes  (Oxford.  1912),  Intro- 
duction, p.  20. 

4  Dem.,  On  the  Chersonese,  52. 

-Id.,  01.  iii,  28  ct  seq.  On  the  Chersonese  40;  On  the  Crown,  205 
el  seq. 


I24  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [518 

If  each  of  you  can  be  relied  upon  to  act  when  his  duty  bids  him 
and  when  his  services  will  be  of  use  to  his  country ;  if  he  who 
has  money  will  contribute  and  he  who  is  of  military  age  will 
enlist  for  the  campaign.1 

Not  her  marketable  commodities  made  Athens  great  and 
wealthy,  but  her  freedom  and  power.2 

The  fire  of  the  orator's  eloquence  aroused  the  people  to 
momentary  enthusiasm.  They  voted  for  war  and  for  large 
expeditions,  then  failed  to  contribute  money  or  to  enlist. 
The  time  of  the  assembly  was  wasted  in  discussions  over 
the  conduct  of  the  generals  and  the  advisability  of  entrust- 
ing larger  forces  to  them.  As  a  result  but  small  fleets  and 
armies  were  dispatched,  and  these  arrived  too  late.3  Demos- 
thenes tried  in  vain  to  secure  speed  and  service.  "All  words 
without  action  are  vain  and  idle."  4  "  Voting  alone  will 
not  save  the  state."  5  He  went  throughout  the  Peloponne- 
sian  states  in  a  hopeless  attempt  to  form  a  league  against 
Philip.  The  Greeks  mistrusted  Athens  and  would  not  fol- 
low her.G 

Philip  advanced  with  constant  success  until  he  reached 
the  Bosphorus  and  threatened  the  Athenian  food  supply. 
Then  Athens  awoke.  Alliances  were  made,  fleets  and  armies 
dispatched,  and  Philip  was  driven  back  from  under  the  walls 
of  Byzantium.7  Athenian  power  alone  blocked  his  path  to 
empire.  On  a  convenient  pretext,  he  marched  south  into 
Greece.     The  words  of  Demosthenes  had  come  true,  the 

1  Dem.,  Phil,  i,  7. 

-  Id.,  Phil,  iv,  50. 

3  Id.,  01.  iii,  4- 

*Id.  01.  ii,  12;  Phil,  ii,  3- 

&Id.,  On  the  Chersonese,  77. 

6  Pickard-Cambridge,  Demosthenes,  p.  306. 

7  Ibid.,  pp.  348,  ct  seq. 


519]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  125 

war  was  coming  home.  The  Athenians  rallied.  An  alli- 
ance was  secured  with  Thebes,  the  army  was  organized  and 
sent  forth  to  meet  him.  All  was  too  late.  The  citizen  levies 
of  Athens  and  Thebes  were  no  match  for  the  trained  armies 
of  the  Macedonian  king.  The  battle  of  Chaeronea  estab- 
lished Philip's  power  in  Greece.1  The  character  of  Hellenic 
history  was  changed.  The  clay  of  the  city-state  had  passed. 
The  long  series  of  wars  and  the  many  attempts  to  end 
them  led  to  greater  discussion  of  the  question  of  peace  and 
war  by  thinking  men.  Supporters  of  war  like  Xenophon 
and  Demosthenes,  the  philosophers,  Socrates,  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  and  orators  like  Lysias  and  Isocrates,  all  had 
something  to  say  about  the  general  problem. 

Though  Xenophon  might  admit  that  peace  was  a  blessing 
and  war  a  curse,2  yet  his  experiences  with  the  Ten  Thou- 
sand and  with  Agesilaus  in  Asia  had  given  him  a  martial 
fervor.  He  judged  all  things  in  the  state  by  their  relation- 
ship to  war.  Industry  he  condemned  because  it  produced  a 
class  who  were  not  warlike  by  nature  but  docile,  unwilling 
to  expend  toil  or  to  venture  their  lives  in  defence  of  the 
state.3  On  the  other  hand,  he  called  agriculture  noble,  be- 
cause it  trained  body  and  soul  for  war,  taught  the  lessons 
of  co-operation  and  gave  men  a  willingness  to  fight  on  be- 
half of  their  own  lands.4  Pie  condemned  the  coward  and 
thought  him  a  butt  of  ridicule.5  His  ideal  hero  was  a  great 
general  like  Agesilaus  as  he  conceived  him  to  be,  a  leader 
good  and  brave,  lofty  of  soul  and  large  of  judgment,  a  man 
of  scientific  knowledge  in  the  business  of  war,  a  strong  and 
stout  commander,  able  to  secure  from  his  soldiers  such  obe- 

1  Pickard-Cambridge.  op.  cit.,  pp.  359,  et  seq. 
2Xen.,  Hiero,  ii,  6. 

3  Id.,  Econ.  vi,  5-8. 

4  Id.,  Econ.  v,  6. 

5  Id.,  Symp.  xi,  14- 


I26  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [520 

dience  and  respect  that  they  would  follow  him  through  fire 
and  into  the  jaws  of  death  and  would  achieve  great  deeds 
under  his  eyes.1  Xenophon's  symbol  of  order  and  efficiency 
was  a  well-organized  army  or  a  noble  trireme,  a  splendid 
sight  for  friendly  eyes,  but  a  thing  of  terror  to  the  enemy. 
But  a  disorganized  force  was  the  worst  example  of  confu- 
sion and  failure.2  He  knew  from  his  own  experience  all  the 
things  that  make  war  hard,  the  tasteless  food,  the  restless 
slumber,  the  pains  and  the  horrors  of  battle.3  But  he  had 
also  tasted  of  the  joys  of  victory,  the  rout  of  the  enemy,  the 
pursuit,  the  slaughter. 

In  what  language  shall  I  describe  the  exultation  of  these 
warriors  at  their  feats  of  arms.  With  what  assumption  they 
bind  on  their  brows  the  glittering  wreath  of  glory;  with  what 
mirth  and  jollity  they  congratulate  themselves  on  having  raised 
their  cities  to  newer  heights  of  fame.  Each  citizen  claims  to 
have  shared  in  the  plan  of  campaign  and  to  have  slain  the 
greatest  number.  Indeed  it  would  be  hard  to  find  where  false 
embellishment  will  not  creep  in,  the  number  stated  to  be  slain 
exceeding  those  that  actually  perished.  So  truly  glorious  a 
thing  does  it  seem  to  them  to  have  won  so  great  a  victory.4 

For  a  man  who  had  experienced  such  feelings  war  had  lost 
most  of  its  terrors.  The  method  of  prevention  of  war 
which  appealed  to  him  as  best  was  preparedness.  Though 
he  recognized  that  a  standing  mercenary  army  would  lead 
a  neighboring  state  to  desire  peace,  the  best  protection  he 
felt  was  not  a  brilliant  armor  like  that  but  the  warlike 
aspect  of  the  whole  state.5 

1  Xen.,  Econ.  xxi,  3-6;  Agesilaus,  passim. 

2  Id.,  Econ.  vii,  4-6. 

3  Id.,  Hiero  vi,  15. 

4  Ibid.,  ii,  14  et  seq. 

5  Ibid.,  x,  7 ;  xi,  3. 


521]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  l2y 

With  the  attitude  of  Xenophon,  Demosthenes  concurred. 
The  only  salvation  he  saw  for  Athens  was  a  renewal  of  the 
ancient  spirit  and  the  creation  of  a  strong,  well-trained 
citizen  army.  But  his  efforts,  as  has  been  seen,  were  of  no 
avail.  He  found  his  solution  of  the  difficulties  among  the 
Greeks  in  a  maintenance  of  the  existing  balance  among  the 
states ;  and  to  that  end  he  strove  to  prevent  any  state  from 
becoming  strong  enough  to  assume  again  a  dominating 
position.1 

In  the  immediate  problems  of  Hellas  the  philosophers 
were  not  particularly  interested.  In  their  discussions  of 
politics,  however,  the  general  question  of  war  came  up  for 
discussion. 

In  the  Memorabilia  of  Xenophon  a  few  expressions  of 
Socrates  are  recorded.  Himself  a  soldier  of  Athens,  he 
apparently  felt  the  futility  of  war.  When  Glaucon  urged 
upon  him  that  the  state  might  by  going  to  war  enrich  itself 
out  of  the  resources  of  its  enemies,  he  rejoined  that  there 
was  equal  chance  of  defeat  and  the  loss  of  valued  posses- 
sions.2 He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  preparedness 
was  no  guarantee  of  protection,  that  though  men  had  built 
walls,  collected  armaments  and  secured  allies,  yet  they  had 
been  attacked  and  had  fallen  victims  to  injustice.3 

Plato  regarded  war  as  inevitable,  a  natural  state,  based 
on  the  struggle  of  country  against  country,  village  against 
village,  family  against  family,  and  individual  against  indi- 
vidual, and  of  every  man  against  himself.4  As  such  it  was 
the  product  of  civilization.     Primitive  man  had  not  known 

1Cf.  Demosthenes,  For  the  Megalopolitans. 

2  Xen.,  Mem.  iii,  6,  8. 

3  Ibid.,  ii,  i,  4. 

*  Plato,  ed.  Burnet,  5  vols.  (Oxford,  1900-1907),  trans,  by  Jowett, 
5  vols.  (3d  ed.  London,  1892),  Lams  625  et  seq.  Cf.  Shorey,  "Plato's 
Laws  and  the  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought"  in  Classical  Philology  ix 
(1914),  pp.  360  et  seq. 


I28  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [~22 

wars,  but  when  men  had  been  compelled  to  live  together 
they  had  learned  the  art  of  war  as  a  part  of  the  arts  of 
government.1  The  causes  of  war,  he  said,  were  the  same  as 
the  causes  of  all  the  other  evils  in  the  state :  discontent,  de- 
sire for  money,  for  power,  for  expansion  of  territory  at  the 
cost  of  one's  neighbor.2  The  basis  for  all  these  he  found  in 
injustice,  which  in  turn  was  founded  on  that  ignorance 
which  led  men  to  regard  expediency  as  the  best  test,  to  dis- 
regard what  they  had  agreed  to  observe,  to  hate  the  good 
and  to  embrace  the  evil.3  In  view  of  this  he  felt  that  the 
guilt  of  war  was  confined  to  the  few  discontented  persons 
who  stirred  up  the  evil.4  He  condemned  the  search  for 
power,  the  ambition  for  glory,  the  desire  for  plunder  which 
led  the  rulers  of  the  state  to  involve  their  people  in  war  and 
to  destroy  cities  and  devastate  lands.5  In  the  Statesman, 
Plato  pointed  out  that  those  who  were  continually  urging 
war  from  an  excessive  love  of  the  military  life,  raised  up 
enemies  for  the  state  and  in  the  end  either  ruined  it  or  en- 
slaved it  to  its  foes.  On  the  other  hand,  he  held  that  people 
who  were  too  busy  making  money  and  quietly  looking  after 
their  own  affairs  to  take  war  in  earnest,  found  ways  too 
readily  to  keep  the  peace  out  of  season,  made. their  sons 
and  their  state  unwarlike,  and  so  lay  at  the  mercy  of  their 
enemies  and  inevitably  became  slaves.6 

Wars  between  Hellenes,  the  philosopher  particularly 
deprecated.  Since  they  were  brothers  and  kinsmen,  he 
called  strife  among  them  discord  and  disorder  rather  than 
war.     The  only  justification  which  he  admitted  for  it  was 

'Plato,  Laws  678-9;  Protagoras  322. 

2  Id..  Republic  351,  373,  4;  Ale.  i,  109,  112;  Euthyphro  7;  Phaedo  66  C. 

3 Id.,  Ate.  i,  113;  Republic  338;  Laws  686-601. 

*Id.,  Republic,  471  E,  575  B. 

5  Ibid.,  544  et  seq. 

6  Id.,  Statesman  307,  308. 


523]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  I2g 

the  necessity  of  securing  freedom.  Then  it  should  be  so 
waged  as  to  punish  the  guilty  few  and  to  lay  as  little 
burden  as  possible  on  the  many  innocent.  Houses  should 
not  be  burned  nor  crops  carried  off,  nor  Hellenic  freemen 
be  made  slave.  The  whole  affair  should  be  waged  with 
reconciliation  in  mind.  The  barbarians,  however,  he  viewed 
as  natural  enemies  on  whom  Hellenes  should  make  war  in 
the  common  interest  of  Hellas.1 

Plato  believed  thoroughly  in  preparedness  as  a  distinct 
advantage,  as  well  as  a  necessity  for  the  individual  and  for 
the  city.  Every  boy  and  every  girl,  he  declared,  should  re- 
ceive some  training  so  that  they  might  aid  in  defence  of  the 
city.2  Not  only  was  such  training  useful  in  time  of  neces- 
sity, but  it  developed  the  body  and  taught  the  noble  lessons 
of  valor  and  self-control.a  Even  the  ideal  state  required 
trained  defenders.  But  they  should  be  trained  not  only  in 
those  arts  which  taught  courage  and  removed  fear  of  death, 
but  also  in  philosophy  which  embraced  other  virtues,  that 
they  might  be  like  watch-dogs,  gentle  toward  friends  and 
fierce  only  toward  enemies.4  In  the  Laws  he  showed  that 
the  Cretan  and  Spartan  law-givers  had  erred  in  that  they 
prepared  their  citizens  only  for  war,  forgetting  that  cour- 
age is  but  one  of  the  virtues  and  that  not  the  highest,  that 
a  man  must  be  just  and  temperate  and  wise  as  well  as  cour- 
ageous.5 Since  he  felt  that  only  the  perfectly  just  could 
ever  attain  the  highest  aim  and  be  safe  from  injury  from 
others,  he  advised  for  the  average  city  preparation  for  war 
in  times  of  peace.6    Hence  it  was  that  education  and  the  arts 

1  Plato,  Republic,  470  et  seq. ;  Menexcnus  239. 

2  Id.,  Laws,  813,  4;  Republic  422. 

3  Id.,  Laches  182;  Republic  399!  Laws  815,  6;  Protagoras  359- 

4  Id.,  Republic  373  et  seq. 

5  Id.,  Laws  630,  661,  7. 
*Ibid.,  829. 


I30  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [524 

of  war  and  peace  were  to  be  in  common,  and  the  best  phil- 
osophers and  the  bravest  warriors  should  be  kings.1 

In  the  last  analysis  Plato  felt  that  war  was  to  be  waged 
for  but  one  purpose,  which  was  peace.  "  There  neither  is, 
has  been,  nor  ever  will  be  any  amusement  or  instruction 
worth  speaking  of  in  war.  Peace  should  be  kept  as  long 
and  as  well  as  it  can  be."  2 

No  one  can  be  a  true  statesman  whether  he  aims  at  the  happi- 
ness of  the  individual  or  the  state  who  looks  only  or  first  of 
all  to  external  warfare ;  nor  will  he  ever  be  a  sound  legislator 
who  orders  peace  for  the  sake  of  war  and  not  war  for  the  sake 
of  peace.  And  is  there  not  room  for  courage  in  peace  as 
in  war  ? 3 

With  the  views  of  Plato,  Aristotle  did  not  materially 
differ.  He  regarded  self-interest  as  the  greatest  of  the 
causes  of  war.  The  men  who  had  brought  on  the  wars 
which  had  so  racked  Hellas  he  declared  had  looked  only  to 
their  own  advantage  and  the  interest  of  their  own  form  of 
government  and  were  not  really  concerned  with  the  public 
interest  at  all.4  The  desire  to  dominate  over  others  he  felt 
to  be  unlawful.  "  How  can  that  which  is  not  even  lawful 
be  the  business  of  the  statesman  or  legislator.  Unlawful  it 
certainly  is  to  rule  without  regard  to  justice  where  there  is 
might  but  no  right."  5  So  he  condemned  the  Spartan  and 
Cretan  statesmen  who  had  framed  their  constitutions  solely 
with  a  view  to  war,  to  conquer  and  to  rule.  Knowing  no 
higher  employment  than  war,  their  citizens  knew  not  how  to 
use  peace.  Like  iron  unused,  they  had  rusted.  They  had 
not  attained  happiness  and  their  empires  had  passed  away.6 

1  Plato,  Republic  543-  2  Id->  Laws  8°3- 

3  Id.,  Laws  628;  Laches  191. 

4 Aristotle,  ed.  Acad.  reg.  boruss,  5  vols.   (Berlin,  1831-70);  Politics, 
trans,  by  Jowett,  2  vols.  (Oxford,  1885),  iv,  11,  18. 
*Ibid.,  vii,  2,  12.  6Ibid.,  vii,  2,  18;  13. 


-25]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  ^j 

Preparedness  he  supported  thoroughly,  both  on  the  part 
of  the  ruler  and  the  individual.  It  was  the  business  of  the 
leaders  of  the  state,  he  held,  to  know  not  only  its  own 
power,  capacity  and  history,  but  also  the  power  and  capac- 
ity of  its  neighbors  and  the  results  of  wars  elsewhere,  that 
it  might  keep  peace  with  the  stronger  and  have  the  option 
of  making  war  on  the  weaker.1  He  appreciated  the  advan- 
tages of  the  virtues  of  military  life,  the  lessons  of  discipline 
and  courage.2 

Aristotle  commended  the  business  of  war  only  as  a  means 
to  the  final  end  of  peace.3  Those  who  brought  on  wars  for 
selfish  reasons  or  for  the  sake  of  war  itself  he  called  blood- 
thirsty villains.4  In  peace  only  was  a  proper  development 
of  virtue  possible.5  "  The  good  lawgiver  should  inquire 
how  states  and  races  of  men  and  communities  may  partici- 
pate in  a  good  life  and  in  the  happiness  which  is  attainable 
by  them."  6 

The  great  champion  of  Hellenic  peace  was  the  rhetoric- 
ian, Isocrates.  He  saw  the  dark  side  of  the  condition  of 
Hellas,  the  endless  wars,  the  wasting  of  lands,  the  enslave- 
ment of  cities,  the  destruction  of  property,  and  the  country 
full  of  exiles  wandering  and  serving  in  armies  for  hire. 
Yet  men  saw  fit  to  weep  over  the  tales  of  calamity  composed 
by  the  poets,  and  statesmen  were  so  taken  up  with  petty 
interests  that  they  were  not  moved  by  the  actual  calamities 
of  Greece.7  He  saw  peace  treaties  made  which  failed  to 
settle  the  problem;  eternal  jealousies  and  hatreds  which 
were  never  blotted  out. 

1  Aristotle,  Rhetoric  i,  4,  9 

2  Id.,  Politics  vii,  15,  3 ;  Ethics  iii,  6,  7. 

3  Id.,  Politics  vii,  13-     Ethics  U77  b. 

4  Id.,  Politics  v,  11,  10. 

5  Ibid.,  vii,  I,  14- 
*Ibid.,  vii,  2,  16  et  seq. 

7  Isocrates,  Panegyricus  167  et  seq.,  Epist.  ix,  4,  Phil.  2. 


I32  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [526 

It  is  to  no  purpose  that  we  make  treaties  of  peace ;  for  we  do 
not  settle  our  wars  but  only  defer  them  and  wait  for  the  time 
when  we  shall  be  able  to  inflict  some  irremediable  injury  on  one 
another.1 

He  therefore  attacked  the  war  party  in  Athens  vigorously. 
When  they  spoke  of  recovering  lost  property,  he  pointed  out 
that  war  had  taken  away  safety  and  prosperity  and  even  the 
necessities  of  life,  and  had  destroyed  the  good  repute  of 
Athens.  He  drew  a  comparison  between  the  Thessalians 
rich  in  fertile  and  extensive  lands  yet  reduced  to  want  by 
never-ending  wars,  and  the  Megarians  who  had  little  or 
nothing  to  start  with  and  yet  by  keeping  peace  with  all  had 
become  the  wealthiest  among  the  Hellenes.2  He  com- 
plained of  the  fact  that,  though  the  democracy  had  been 
overthrown  in  war,  yet  the  people  regarded  the  war  party  as 
the  true  democrats  and  the  supporters  of  peace  as  oligarchs.3 
He  attacked  the  imperialistic  treatment  of  the  allies  and  the 
use  of  mercenary  troops  in  defence  of  the  empire.4  Vic- 
tories such  as  the  Spartans  and  the  Thebans  had  gained 
contrary  to  right,  with  contempt  for  oaths  and  agreements, 
he  regarded  as  more  shameful  and  disgraceful  than  defeats 
suffered  without  cowardice.  In  the  long  run  justice  would 
prevail  and  right  win  over  might.5  On  the  other  hand,  he 
declared  that  true  prosperity  was  gained  by  peace  founded 
on  justice.  For  then  followed  freedom  from  wars,  dangers 
and  civil  disturbances,  increase  in  business,  release  from  the 
burdens  of  war  and  the  privilege  of  tilling  the  land,  sailing 
the  sea  or  engaging  in  any  other  occupation  without  fear. 

1  Isocrates,  Panegyricus  172. 

2  Id.,  Peace  6,  117. 

3  Ibid.,  51. 

4  Id.,  Areop.  9;  Phil.  96;  Paneg.  i3s ;  Peace  47. 

5  Id.,  Peace  136;  Archidamus  34. 


327]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  133 

Then  merchants  and  aliens  flocked  to  Athens  and  revenues 
and  income  increased  abundantly.1 

In  common  with  all  Greek  thinkers,  Isocrates  believed  in 
defensive  war  and  in  wars  against  oppression  on  behalf  of 
liberty.2  He  was  proud  of  the  record  of  Athens  in  this  re- 
spect. "  Not  always  is  it  to  be  considered  glorious  to  fall 
in  battle,"  he  wrote  Philip,  "  but  it  is  worthy  of  praise  when 
in  defence  of  country,  parents  and  children."  3  When  there 
was  danger  that  Thebes  might  secure  a  union  of  the  Greeks 
and  accomplish  the  destruction  of  Sparta,  he  wrote  a  pamph- 
let purporting  to  be  a  speech  of  Archidamus,  the  purpose  of 
which  was  to  arouse  the  Spartans  and  probably  to  suggest 
that  Athens  would  not  consent  to  such  a  project.4  In  this 
he  qualified  his  pacific  utterances  by  explaining  that  nothing 
was  absolutely  good  or  bad,  and  that  war,  though  uncertain, 
might  lead  to  prosperity  as  well  as  to  loss.5  He  called  upon 
the  Spartans  to  remember  that  it  was  in  war  that  distinc- 
tion and  renown  were  won,  and  that  it  was  better  to  ex- 
change a  perishable  body  for  imperishable  fame  than  to 
purchase  a  few  more  years  of  life  with  cowardice  and  dis- 
grace.6 For  such  a  war  he  believed  that  preparedness  was 
necessary.  For  the  individual  he  prescribed,  "  a  good  gov- 
ernment, a  life  of  self-control,  and  readiness  to  fight  to  the 
death  against  the  foe."  7  His  advice  for  the  state  he 
summed  up  in  a  Golden  Rule  for  nations.  "  Be  warlike  as 
concerns  knowledge  of  war  and  preparations  for  it,  but 
peaceful  in  committing  no  unjust  aggression.     Let  your  m- 

1  Isocrates,  Peace  25;  Arcop.  51. 

2  Id.,  Paneg.  75;  Panath.  60. 

3  Id.,  Epist.  ii,  4- 

* Id.,  Archidamus;  cf.  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  450. 
hId.,  Archidamus  49- 
6  Ibid.,  104,  107. 
Ubid.  59. 


I34  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [528 

tercourse  with  weaker  states  be  such  as  you  would  require 
that  of  stronger  states  to  be  with  you."  1 

The  solution  which  Isocrates  had  to  offer  for  the  difficul- 
ties of  Hellas  he  presented  through  speeches  to  be  delivered 
at  the  great  festivals.  The  value  of  these  gatherings  he 
appreciated,  and  he  praised  their  founders  for  giving  to  the 
Greeks  a  custom  which  led  them  to  assemble  together  as 
Hellenes,  to  lay  aside  quarrels  and  to  make  treaties  of 
peace.2  Gorgias  and  Lysias  had  both  urged  a  union  of  the 
Greeks  for  a  war  upon  Persia.  This  proposition  Isocrates 
developed  in  380  B.  C.  in  the  Panegyricus.3  The  first  essen- 
tial of  his  scheme  was  a  symmachia,  an  offensive  alliance 
under  a  strong  leader.  Nominally  he  proposed  a  joint 
leadership  of  Athens  and  Sparta ;  actually  the  burden  of  the 
speech  was  the  right  of  Athens  to  command  and  the  unfit- 
ness of  Sparta.  It  was  probably  a  piece  of  propaganda  to 
aid  in  making  the  second  Athenian  Confederacy  an  Hellenic 
League.4  He  recalled  the  glorious  past  of  Athens,  showed 
how  the  Athenians  had  stood  in  the  forefront  of  battle  in 
the  defence  of  Hellas.  He  brought  back  to  mind  the  peace 
and  prosperity  of  the  period  of  Athenian  rule  in  the  pre- 
ceding century  and  compared  it  with  the  great  unhappiness 
caused  by  the  Spartan  empire.  Idealizing  the  past,  he 
painted  what  he  hoped  for  the  future.  He  acknowledged 
the  wrongs  done  by  Athens,  but  claimed  that  from  her 
downfall  as  a  result  of  them  Athens  had  learned  her  lesson. 

The  first  necessity  that  he  laid  down  was  a  sound  demo- 
cratic government  in  Athens  under  the  leadership  of  her 
best  men,  such  a  government  as  she  had  had  in  the  days  of 
the  Persian  wars.    The  leaders  must  then  lay  aside  all  jeal- 

1  Isocrates,  Ad  Nicoclem  24. 

2  Id.,  Paneg  43. 

3  Kessler,  Isokrates  und  die  panhellenische  Idee  (Berlin,  1911),  p.  8. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  24  et  seq. 


529]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  1 35 

ousy  and  greed  and  adopt  a  true  Panhellenic  policy  in  their 
administration  of  the  state.1  Furthermore,  he  called  for 
righteous  treatment  of  the  allies,  with  no  interference  in 
their  internal  affairs  by  Athens  except  in  defence  of  the 
democracy.  Such  a  program  he  felt  would  bring  all  the 
Greeks  willingly  to  the  support  of  Athens.  All  the  small 
states  could  count  on  protection  from  larger  states,  the  sea 
would  be  freed  from  pirates  and  Hellas  would  be  delivered 
from  slavish  homage  to  the  Great  King.2 

The  second  essential  of  the  alliance  was  a  strong,  bind- 
ing purpose.  This  the  orator  found  in  the  principle  of  the 
first  Hellenic  league  war  against  Persia.3  Such  a  war  he 
felt  would  be  more  like  a  sacred  embassy  than  a  campaign. 
It  would  bring  peace  at  home  for  those  who  desired  it;  it 
would  free  the  Asiatic  Greeks  from  slavery ;  the  homeless 
unfortunate  would  be  given  employment  and  a  chance  for 
a  new  start  at  the  expense  of  the  barbarians.4  Of  the  suc- 
cess of  such  an  expedition  there  was  no  room  for  doubt,  as 
the  march  of  the  Ten  Thousand  had  shown.5 

The  plan  was  impossible  of  accomplishment,  since  Sparta 
entirely  disregarded  it.  Agesilaus  had  made  his  own  attempt 
at  such  an  expedition  and  had  not  gained  support.  The 
second  Athenian  Confederacy  was  formed,  and  then  failed 
because  of  the  shortsightedness  of  the  Athenian  leaders. 
Still  Isocrates  did  not  despair.  In  the  speech  On  the  Peace, 
in  356,  and  in  the  Areopagiticus,  in  355,  he  once  again  pre- 
sented the  same  arguments.  Reform  of  the  administration 
of  Athens,  the  laying-aside  of  that  overweening  ambition 
which  had  again  caused  her  downfall,  the  strict  enforcement 

1  Isocrates,  Panegyrikos  76  et  seq. 

2Ibid^  104;  cf.  Kessler,  op.  cit.,  pp.  12  et  seq. 

'Isocrates,  Paneg.  158. 

*Ibid.,  173. 

5  Ibid.,  182. 


I36  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [530 

of  the  terms  of  peace,  which  had  ended  the  Social  War,  the 
grant  of  independence  to  the  allies,  the  discharge  of  all  the 
mercenaries  who  had  done  so  much  to  make  Athens  hated, 
the  end  of  all  cleruchies  which  plundered  other  states — these 
were  the  only  things  the  orator  felt  that  could  restore 
Athens  to  her  former  high  estate.  Such  reforms  would  be 
sufficient  defence  against  Thebes,  he  argued,  for  then  the 
other  states  would  come  nocking  to  the  aid  of  Athens.1 
But  Athenian  democracy  could  not  be  reformed  and  the 
Greek  states  had  learned  to  distrust  Athens,  as  Demosthenes 
found  out.  Thus  the  glorious  dream  of  Isocrates  failed  of 
realization. 

Isocrates  had  not  trusted  to  Athens  alone  but  had  looked 
afield  for  a  leader  wherever  he  might  find  one.  He  appealed 
without  response  to  Jason  of  Pherae,  to  Dionysius  of  Syra- 
cuse and  to  Archidamus  of  Sparta.2  In  Philip  of  Macedon  3 
he  saw,  not  as  did  Demosthenes  the  man  who  would  rule,  but 
the  man  who  would  lead  the  Greeks.  Philip,  he  believed, 
was  descended  from  the  great  Panhellenic  hero,  Heracles ;  he 
would  not  be  involved  in  local  quarrels  or  affected  by  jealous- 
ies, but  would  know  all  Hellas  as  his  fatherland.4  So  to  him 
Isocrates  in  his  old  age  turned.  He  called  upon  him  to  form 
a  friendly  alliance  of  all  the  Greeks,  to  organize  a  council  in 
which  the  Greeks  might  deliberate  under  his  presidency,  and 
to  lead  them  against  Persia.5  He  felt  that  the  attacks  upon 
Philip  amounted  to  nothing.  But  they  persisted  and  war 
followed.  In  the  midst  of  this  Isocrates  issued  his  Panathe- 
naicus,  a.  eulogy  of  the  glorious  past  of  his  native  city,  per- 
haps to  make  clear  to  Philip  what  a  city  it  was  that  he  was 

isocrates,  Areopagiticus,  passim;  Peace  19,  20,  44!  136-40;  *'•  Ql- 
2  Id.,  Phil.  119;  Epist.  i,  ix. 
s  Id.,  Phil. ;  Epist.  ad  Phil. 
*  Id.,  Phil.  127. 
6  Ibid.,  16. 


531  ]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  T37 

preparing  to  crush.  Chaeronea  was  to  him,  not  the  death  of 
Hellenic  freedom,  but  the  overthrow  of  a  faction  in  Athens 
which  made  possible  the  consummation  of  his  plan.  Before 
the  congress  of  Corinth  met  Isocrates  had  died.  But  that 
congress  adopted  his  program :  freedom  and  autonomy  in  all 
states  with  support  of  the  democracy,  peace  and  security  at 
home,  the  end  of  wars,  exiles  and  piracies,  an  alliance  of  the 
Greeks  under  Macedonian  leadership  and  declaration  of  war 
on  Persia.1  Unfortunately  for  the  Greeks  it  was  a  peace 
forced  from  without.  Liberty  and  autonomy  were  but 
names  and  with  peace  came  stagnation. 

In  the  same  year  that  Isocrates  issued  his  speech  on  the 
peace  an  unknown  writer  wrote  a  treatise  on  the  revenues 
of  Athens.2  It  was  an  effort  to  show  the  Athenians  how 
they  might  regain  the  wealth  and  power  they  had  lost.  He 
felt  that  the  first  essential  was  peace.  Those  states  he  said 
were  the  most  fortune-favored  which  had  peace  in  longest 
season.  It  was  in  times  of  peace  that  all  men  flocked  to 
Athens — the  mariner,  the  merchant,  the  wealthy  dealer  in 
corn  and  wine,  the  owner  of  many  cattle,  the  banker,  the 
artist,  the  artisan,  the  sophist,  philosopher  and  poet  and  the 
pleasure-seeker,  to  add  to  the  glory  and  wealth  of  the  city. 
All  the  wealth  that  had  been  gained  in  times  of  peace  was 
lavished  in  war,  while  the  chief  sources  of  revenue  were 
themselves  cut  off.  The  method  of  prevention  which  the 
writer  suggested  was  novel.  Let  the  Athenians  appoint  a 
board  to  act  as  guardians  of  the  peace,  to  settle  disputes 
among  the  states,  to  see  to  it  that  Athens  refrained  from  in- 
justice and  to  harmonize  warring  states  and  warring  fac- 
tions in  them ;  let  the  center  of  their  endeavor  be  to  pre- 
serve  the   independence   of   the   Delphic   shrine.      Such   a 

1  Kessler,  op.  cit.,  pp.  67  et  seq. ;  pp.  73  et  seq. 

*Xen.,  Poroi  v.  vi.  This  treatise  is  traditionally  ascribed  to  Xenophon. 
On  the  (fate,  cf.  Schaefer,  Demosthenes  und  seine  Zeit  (Leipzig,  1885), 
vol.  i,  p.  193- 


138  HELLENIC  CONCEPTIONS  OF  PEACE  [532 

scheme,  backed  up  by  the  sending  of  embassies  throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  Hellas,  could  not  fail,  he  thought, 
to  bring  the  Greeks  flocking  to  the  support  of  Athens.1 

All  these  efforts  to  secure  peace  among  the  Hellenes  dur- 
ing the  fourth  century  failed,  as  arbitration  had  failed  in 
the  preceding  century.  Though  the  Olympic  priests  refused 
to  receive  as  gifts  trophies  won  from  war  between  Hel- 
lenes,2 religion  was  not  strong  enough  to  compass  the  end  of 
such  wars.  Neither  the  arguments  of  the  peace  leaders  nor 
the  endeavors  of  the  statesmen  at  the  general  conferences 
were  of  any  avail.  Occasional  appeals  to  arbitration  met 
with  no  response.  Part  of  the  answer  to  the  question 
why  may  be  found  in  the  changed  conditions  of  warfare. 
Though  the  development  of  trade  and  industry,  the  growth 
of  individual  appreciation  of  the  finer  things  of  life  and  of 
desire  for  ease  and  comfort,  the  general  relaxation  of  the 
bonds  by  which  the  man  was  held  to  the  state  made  peace 
seem  more  than  ever  desirable  and  the  burdens  of  war  more 
irksome  and  less  to  be  borne,  the  nature  of  war  itself  had 
changed  to  meet  these  conditions.  The  surplus  of  population 
in  the  country  districts  of  Arcadia  and  northwestern  Greece 
and  the  great  and  increasing  number  of  exiles  furnished  a 
body  of  men  who  were  ready  to  remove  the  burden  of  in- 
dividual service  from  the  citizens  for  a  price.  The  growth 
of  mercenary  armies  led  to  specialization  in  warfare  and 
the  formation  of  a  professional  military  class.  They  fur- 
nished at  one  time  a  constant  war  party  and  an  outlet  for 
the  duties  of  war.3  The  people  could  easily  be  stirred  up  to 
vote  for  a  war  in  which  they  took  little  part.  Since  the 
mercenaries  usually  lived  on  the  country  in  which  they 
were  fighting,  the  expense  was  less  for  the  city  which  em- 

1  Xen.,  Poroi  v. 

2  Cf.  Xen.,  Hell.  iii.  2,  21. 

3  Pickard-Cambridge,  Demosthenes,  pp.  101  et  seq. 


53$]  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  T^g 

ployed  them.  These  circumstances  account  for  the  diffi- 
culty which  Demosthenes  encountered  when  he  tried  to  get 
the  Athenians  to  take  part  in  the  war  with  Philip  and  for 
the  ease  with  which  Philip  won  that  war. 

The  many  conferences  failed,  the  principles  of  freedom 
and  autonomy  were  of  no  avail,  because  the  position  of 
weaker  states  was  not  permanently  established  with  an 
organization  for  their  protection.  The  very  guarantor  of 
their  position  was  their  most  dangerous  enemy.  Accord- 
ingly they  were  forced  into  the  arms  of  one  or  another  of 
the  more  powerful  states  and  their  independence  was  lost. 
The  same  conditions  prevailed  with  regard  to  the  agree- 
ments to  enforce  peace.  When  the  enforcement  was  left  to 
the  great  states  it  opened  tempting  paths  to  self-aggrandize- 
ment; when  left  to  several  or  all  the  states  without  com- 
pulsion, old  jealousies  and  fears  intervened  and  wars  fol- 
lowed on  the  general  line  of  previous  divisions.  Any  state 
strong  enough  and  covetous  enough  might  break  the  peace 
with  assurances  of  support,  and  hence  comparative  impun- 
ity. The  only  suggestion  to  establish  a  central  organism 
was  disregarded  as  foolish. 

In  all  of  their  agreements  the  Greeks  failed  because  they 
did  not  face  and  settle  the  basic  problems  of  interstate 
relations.  No  real  effort  was  made  to  bridge  the  gap  of 
distrust  and  misunderstanding  between  Athenian  democracy 
and  Spartan  oligarchy.  None  of  the  states  was  willing  to 
accept  the  diminution  of  pride  and  power  necessary  to 
establish  a  lasting  compromise.  Athens  was  never  willing 
to  give  up  her  claims  to  power;  Sparta  felt  that  she  could 
not  part  with  her  military  system;  Thebes  would  not  sur- 
render her  hopes  for  the  hegemony  of  Greece.  Whenever  a 
settlement  was  near,  some  element  of  jealousy  or  of  hatred, 
some  fear  of  undue  influence  or  interference,  some  unwill- 
ingness to  yield  the  least  jot,  lest  pride  and  prestige  be  in- 
jured, came  up  to  wreck  all  hopes  of  lasting  peace. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

In  the  preparation  of  this  work  the  standard  texts  and  hand- 
books have  been  used.  Through  the  kindness  of  Mrs.  Botsford, 
the  author  was  able  to  use  the  manuscript  of  the  late  Professor 
Botsford's  Hellenic  History,  which  has  served  as  a  guide 
throughout  the  historical  part  of  the  study.  The  author  is 
indebted  to  Professors  Young,  Van  Hook  and  Sturtevant  of 
the  Department  of  Classical  Philology  in  Columbia  University 
for  many  helpful  criticisms  and  suggestions. 

140  [534 


STUDIES  IN  HISTORY 

ECONOMICS  AND 

PUBLIC  LAW 


EDITED  BY 

THE  FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

OF  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME  EIGHTY-FOUR 


New  Dork 
COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY 

LONGMANS,  GREEN  &  CO.,  AGENTi 

Lonpon  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son,  Ltd. 

1919 


CONTENTS 


i.  The  Royal  Government  in  Virginia — Percy  Scott  Flippin, 

Ph.D i 

2.  Hellenic  Conceptions  of  Peace — Wallace  E.  Caldwell, 

Ph.D 395 


Qfolumtfa  mtiixrjersitg 
in  fhz  ©it©  of  %zw  ^oxk 

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1.  The  Divorce  Problem.    A  Study  In  Stattstics^  p  ^  ^^  ^  D     ^  ?$  ^ 

2.  The  History  of  Tariff  Administration  in  the  United  States,  from  Colonial 

Times  to  the  McKinley  Administrative  Bill.  . 

J_i  By  John  Dean  Goss,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

3.  History  of  Municipal  Land  OwnersM^onManha^^^^  ^  ^ 

4.  Financial  History  of  Massachusetts.^  ^^  R  ;  ^^  ph  D     ^ 

VOLUME  II,  1892-93.    (See  note  on  last  page.) 

1.  [5]  The  Economics  or  the  Russian  Village. 

x.  iwj  ..."  By  Isaac  A.  Hourwich,  Ph.D.     (CW  of  print). 

2.  [6]  Bankruptcy.    A  Study  in  Comparative  Legislation.      ,„....        ,  .    . 

*'  l    J  ^      J  By  Samuel  W.  Dunscomb,  Jr.,  Ph.D.     (Not  sold  separately.} 

3.  [71  Special  Assessments;  A  Study  in  Municipal  Finance.  p  v.  <   ™ 

°  - L    J      *^  By  Victor  Rosewates,  Ph.D.     Second  Edition,  1898.     Price,  <i.oo. 

VOLUME  III,  1893.    465  pp.    (See  note  on  last  page.) 

1.  T81  *History  of  Elections  in  American  Colonies. 

i.  ioj     n«"»u  »'  By  Cortland  F.  Bishop,  Ph.D.     {Not  sold  separately.) 

2.  [9]  The  Commercial  Policy  of  England  toward  the  American  Colonies. 

By  Gborge  L.  Beer,  A.  M.     ((Jut  of  print.) 

VOLUME  IV,  1893-94.    438  pp.    (See  note  on  last  page.) 

1.  [10]  Financial  History  of  Virginia^  ^^  ^  ^^  ^    {Not  sold  separatel^ 

3.  [ll]*The  Inheritance  Tax.  By  Max  West    Ph.D.     Second  Edition,  ,908      Price   $2.00 
3.  [12]  History  of  Taxation  in  Vermont.     By  Frederick  A.  Wood,  PnD.  (Out  of  print.) 

VOLUME  V,  1895-96.    498  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [13]  Double  Taxation  in  the  United  States.  . 

a.  L.«t»j  .^  By  Francis  Walkkr,  Ph.D.     Price,$i.oo. 

8.  [14]  The  Separation  of  Governmental  Powers. 

*    L      J  By  William  Bondy,  LL.B.,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

3.  [15]  Municipal  Government  in  Michigan  and  Ohio. 

L       J  By  Delos  F.  Wilcox.  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

VOLUME  VI,  1896.    601  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50  J  Paper  covers,  $4.00. 

[16]  History  of  Proprietary  Government;  in  Pennsylvania. 

L       J  By  William  Robert  Shepherd,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  VII,  1896.    512  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [17]  History  of  the  Transition  from  Provincial  to  Commonwealth  Gov- 
ernment in  Massachusetts.  By  Harry  A.  Cushing,  Ph.D      Price  $2.co. 
S .  r  IS  ^Speculation  on  the  Stock  and  Produce  Exchanges  of  the  United  States 

L       '  By  Henry  Crosby  Emery,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1. 50. 

VOLUME  VIII,  1896-98.    551  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  r  191  The  Struggle  between  President  Johnson  and  Congress  over  Recon- 
struction. By  Charles  Ernest  Chadsby,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.oo. 

2  T201  Recent  Centralizing  Tendencies  In  State  Educational  Administra- 
tion. By  William  Clarence  Webster,  Ph.D.     Price,  75  cents. 

3.  [SI]  The  Abolition  of  Privateering  and  the  Declaration  of  Paris.     . 

0.  l~*j  -»-"  By  Francis  R.  Stark,  LL.B.,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1  00. 

4.  [52]  Public  Administration  in  Massachusetts.    The  Relation  of  Central 

to  Local  Activity.  By  Robert  Harvby  Whittbn,  Ph.D.    Price, .  1.00. 

VOLUME  IX,  1897-98.    617  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  T23]  *English  X,ocal  Government  of  To-day.    A  Study  of  the  Relations  of 

Central  and  Local  Government.  By  Milo  Roy  Maltbik,  Ph.D.    Price,  $2.00. 

2.  [24]  German  Wage  Theories.    A  History  of  the^r  Development.   ^^ 

3.  [25]  The  Centralization  of  AdmlnlBto.tton ggS2XE2£iE&    Pr;ce,  *IOC, 


VOLUME  X,  1898-99.    409  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [2y]  Sympathetic  Strikes  and  Sympathetic  Lockouts. 

By  Fred  b.  Hall,  Ph.D.    P. ice,  |i.oo 

2.  [27]  *Rhode  Island  and  the  Formation  of  Ihe  Union. 

By  FRANK  Gkkenk  Bates,  Ph.D.     Price,  ■' 

3.  [28].  Centralized  Administration  of  Liquor  Laws  in  the  American  Com* 

monwealths.  By  Clement  Moore  Lacey  Sites,  Ph.D.     Price,  gi.oo. 

VOLUME  XI,  1899.    495  pp.    Price,  cloth,  4.0C;  paper  covers,  $3. 50. 

[29]  The  Growth  of  Cities.  By  Adna  Ferrin  Wbbbr   Ph.D 

VOLUME  XII,  1899-1900.    583  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.C0. 

1.  [30]  History  and  Functions  of  Central  Labor  Unions. 

By  William  Maxwell  Burke,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

2.  [31.]  Colonial  Immigration  Laws. 

By  Edward  Emerson  Propfr,  A.M.     Pi  ice,  75  cents. 

3.  [32]  History  of  Military  Pension  Legislation  in  the  United  States. 

By  William  Henry  Glasso:;,  Ph.D.     i  rice,  gi.co. 

4.  [33]  History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Rousseau, 

By  Charles  fc..  Mekkiam,  Jr.,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

VOLUME  XIII,  1901.    570  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.C0. 

1.  [34]  The  Legal  Property  Relations  of  Married  Parties. 

By  Isiuor  Loeb,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1. 53. 

2.  [35]  Political  Nativisrn  in  New  York  State. 

By  Louis  Dow  Scisco,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2.00. 

3.  [38]  The  Reconstruction  of  Georgia.        By  Edwin  C.  Woollby,  Ph.D.    Price,  $1.00. 

VOLUME  XIV,  1901-1902.    576  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [37]  Loyallsm  in  New  York  during  the  American  Revolution. 

By  Alexander  Clarence  Flick,  Ph.D.     Price.  $2.00. 

2.  [3S]  The  Economic  Theory  of  Risk  and  Insurance. 

By  Allan  H.  Willrtt.  Ph.D.     Price,  J1.50. 

3.  [39]  The  Eastern  Question:  A  Study  in  Diplomacy. 

L       J  By  Stephen  P.  H.  Duggan.  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.co. 

VOLUME  XV,  1902.    427  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50;  Paper  covers,  $3.00. 

[40]  Crime  in  Its  Relation  to  Social  Progress.       By  Arthur  Cleveland  Hall,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XVI.  1G02-19C3.    547  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.C0. 

1.  [411  The  Past  and  Present  of  Commerce  in  Japan. 

By  Yetaro  Kinosita,  Ph.D      Price,  gi  50. 

2.  [421  The  Employment  of  "Women  in  the  Clothing  Trade. 

*.   L^*j   j.xx  *>      j  By  Mabel  HurdWillet,  Ph.D.     Price,  J1.50. 

3.  [43]  The  Centralization  of  Administration  in  Ohio 

l  By  Samuel  P.  Orth,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

VOLUME  XVII,  1903.    635  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [44]  *Centralizing  Tendencies  in  the  Administration  of  Indiana. 

L       J  By  William  A.  Rawles,  Ph.D.     Price,  £2.50 

2 .  [45]  Principles  of  Justice  in  Taxation.    By  Stephen  F.  Weston,  Ph.D.    Price,  $2.00. 

VOLUME  XVIII,  1903.    753  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [46]  The  Administration  of  Iowa.       By  Harold  Martin  Bowman,  Ph.D.    Pnce,  J1.50. 

2.  [47]  Turgot  and  the  Six  Edicts.  By  Robert  P.  Shkphsrd,  Ph.D.    Price,  fi.50. 

3.  [48]  Hanover  and  Prussia,  1795-1SOS.       By  Guy  Stanton  Ford,  Ph.D.    Price,  $3.00. 

VOLUME  XIX,  1903-1905.    588  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [49]  Joslah  Tucker,  Economist.  By  Walter  Ernest  Clark   PhD.     Price  $i;o. 

2    L50]  Hiltorv  and  Criticism  of  the  Labor  Theory  of  Vail  e  in  English  Polit- 
ical Economy.  By  Albert  C.Whitakek,  Ph.D.    Price.  Jx.3o. 

3.  F5  J 1  Trade  Unions  and  the  Law  In  New  lork.  ™_  ™     *>  •      « 

a.  ioi  i   iiaue  umui«     uu  By  George  Gorham  Groat,  Ph.D.     Price,  «i.oo. 

VOLUME  XX,  1904.    514  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $3.50. 

1.  [52]  The  Office  of  the  Justice  of  the  Peaceln  Enfland.^  ^    ^  ^ 

•■  ^ig5£&££mtm"  Government  %  S^.4SS5£*U6rfittSiS 

VOLUME  XXI,  1904.    746  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [54]  'Treaties,  their  Making  and  Enforcement.  ^  ^^  ph  D  Pr£ce>  $I  ., 
3.  [55]  The  Sociology  cfa  New  York  City  moTCk.MAsjEssBjoNEsphD  Prlce>.ioo 
3.  [56]  Pre-Malthuslan  Doctrines  of  Popn^tion^  SxANGHtAND   PhD.    Price,  fl,0. 


VOLUME  XXII.  1905.    520  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50;  paper  covers,  $3.00. 
[57]  The  Historical  Development  of  the  Poor  Law  of  Connecttont^^  ^   D 

VOLUME  XXIII,  1905.    594  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1 .  [58]  The  Economics  of  Land  Tenure  ^Georgia.  ^^  Banks>  n  D     PricC(  ^ 

2.  [59]  Mistake  in  Contract.    A  Study  in  Compa^ive^Y^prudence^  ^ 

3.  [60]  Combination  in  the  Mining  Industry^  ^^  r  ^^  ^  D     pHce  p  ^ 

4.  [6 1]  The  English  Craft  Guilds  and  the  Governmeat.^^  ph  D     ^  ^ 

VOLUME  XXIV,  1905.    521  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  t6»]  The  Place  of  Magic  in  the  ^tellectual^Histor^of ;Enpo^e.     prf^  ^ 

2.  [63]  The  Ecclesiastical  Edicts  of  the  TheodosianCode.^^  ^  ^    p  ^  ^ 

3.  [64]  *The  International  Position  of  Japan  as  f^reat  Power.  D_    p  .  £  ^ 

VOLUME  XXV,  1906-07.    600  pp.    (Sold  only  in  Sets.) 

1.  [65]  'Municipal  Control  of  Public  Utilities^  ^  ^  ^  D     ^  ioldseJ>araUb) 

2.  [66]  The  Budget  in  the  American  Commonwealths.    ^^  ph  D     ^  ^ 

3.  [67]  The  Finances  of  Cleveland.  By  Charles  C.  Williamson,  Ph.D.    Price,  *2.oo. 

VOLUME  XXVI,  1917.    559  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1    [68]  Trade  and  Currency  in  Early  Oregon^  ^^  &  Q  ^^  ph  D     ^.^  ^ 

2.  [69]  Luther's  Table  Talk.  By  Preserved  Smith,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00 

3.  tTOj  The  Tobacco  Industry  In  the  United  States^  Jagobstbin  ph  d     Price>  $1  $0 

4.  [71]  Social  Democracy  and  Population.  By  Alvan  A  Tenney>  PhD.    Price,  75  cents. 

VOLUME  XXVII,  1907.    578  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [73]  The  Economic  Policy  of  Robert  Walpole^^ ^  ^^  ph  D  ^  fj  ^ 

2.  [73]  The  United  States  Steel  Corporation  ^^  Bkrclund>  ph  d  Prke>  $1  ^ 

3.  [74]  The  Taxation  of  Corporations  in  Massachusetts.^^  ph  D  ^  ^ 

VOLUME  XXVEII.  1907.    564  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 
1.  [75]  DeWItt  Clinton  and  the  Origin  of  ge^poUs^^em  ta  New  Tork^ 

5.  [76]  TheDevelopmentofthel-^slatupeofCoJonJaJ^glnia.    Price,  *i.5c 
3.[7  7]  The  Distribution  of  Ownership.  ^  ^^  Undbrwood>  ph  d>    Prlce>  $l^ 

VOLUME  XXIX,  1908.    703  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1     [78]  Early  New  England  Towns.  By  Anne  Bush  MacLbar,  Ph.D.    Price,  $1.50. 

8.   L79J  New"  Hampshire  as  a  Royal  Province.^  ^^^  R  ^  ^     Price>  fooo, 

VOLUME  XXX,  1908.    712  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50 ;  Paper  covers,  $4.00. 

[80]  The  Province  of  New  Jersey,  1664-1738.  By  Edwin  P.  Tanner,  Fn.D. 

VOLUME  XXXI,  1908.    575  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [81]  Private  Ereight  Cars  and  American  Railroad^  ^^  ph  D     ^.^  $j^ 

3.  [821  Ohio  before  1850.  ^   By  Robert  E.  Chaddock   Ph.D.    Price,  |i.5o. 

3.  [83]  ConsangntoeousMarria^statteAmerica^^p^atten.  ^^^ 

4.  [84]  Adolphe  Quetelet  as  Statistician.       By  Frank  H.  Hankins,  Ph.D.    Price,  $1.25. 

VOLUME  XXXII,  1908.    705  pp.    Price,  cloth,  4.50;  paper  covers,  $4.00. 

85]  The  Enforcement  of  the  Statutes  of  Laborers^  ^^  ^^  Puti<AMj  ph  D 
VOLUME  XXXIII,  1908-1909.    635  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50- 

1    [86]  Factory  Legislation  in  Maine.  By  E.  Stagg  Whitin, A.B.    Price,$i.oo. 

2.  [87]  'Psychological  Interpretations  otySociety  .^  ^^  Jf    ph  D     ^  ^ 

3.  [88  J  *An  Introduction  to  the  Sources  relating  to^the  Ge^mamc  Invasions. 


VOLUME  XXXIV,  1909.    628  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $-1.50. 

1.  [89]  Transportation  and  Industrial  Development  In  the  Middle  West. 

By  William  F.  Gbphakt,  Ph.D.     Price,  ji.oa. 

2.  [90]  Social  Reforni  and  the  Reformation. 

By  Jacob  Salwyn  Schapiro,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.25. 

8.  [91]  Responsibility  lor  Crime.  By  Philip  A.  Parsons,  Ph.D.    Price,$i.5<j. 

VOLUME  XXXV,  1909.    568  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [98]  The  Conflict  over  the  Judicial  Powers  in  the  United  States  to  1870. 

By  Charlks  Grove  Haini:s,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.su. 

2.  [93]  A  Study  of  the  Population  of  Manhattanville. 

By  Howard  Brown  Woolston,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji. 25. 
8.  [94]  *  Divorce:  A  Study  In  Social  Causation. 

By  Jambs  P.  Lichtbnbbrgbp.,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

VOLUME  XXXVI,  1910.    542  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [951  *  Reconstruction  In  Texas.     By  Charlbs  William  Ramsdbll,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2.50 

2.  1961  *  The  Transition  in  Virginia  from  Colony  to  Commonwealth. 

By  Charles  Ramsdell  Liwgley,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji. 50. 

VOLUME  XXXVII,  1910.    606  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [97]  Standards  of  Reasonableness  in  Local  Freight  Discriminations. 

By  John  Maurice  Clakk,  Ph.D.     Price,  J1.25. 

2.  [98]  Legal  Development  In  Colonial  Massachusetts. 

By  Charles  J.  Hilkey,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.25. 

3.  [99]  *  Social  and  Mental  Traits  of  the  Negro. 

By  Howard  W.  Odum,  Ph.D.     Price,  J2.00. 

VOLUME  XXXVin,  1910.    463  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [lOO]  The  Public  Domain  and  Democracy. 

By  Robert  Tudor  Hill,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2.00. 

2.  [lOlj  Organismic  Theories  of  the  State. 

By  Francis  W.  Cokbr,  Ph.D.     Price,  fz.fo. 

VOLUME  XXXIX,  1910-1911.    651  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [102]  The  Making  of  the  Balkan  States. 

By  William  Smith  Murray,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

2.  [1031  Political  History  of  NewTork  State  during  the  Period  of  the  Civil 

War.  By  Sidney  David  Brummbr,  Ph.  D.     Price,  3.00. 

VOLUME  XL,  1911.    633  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [104]  A  Survey  of  Constitutional  Development  in  China. 

By  Hawkling  L.  Yen,  Ph  D.     Price,  Ji.oo. 
8.  [105]  Ohio  Politics  during  the  Civil  War  Period. 

By  George  H.  Porter,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.75. 

3.  [106]  The  Territorial  Basis  of  Government  under  the  State  Constitutions. 

By  Alfred  Zantzingkr  Reed,  Ph.D.     Price, $1. 75. 

VOLUME  XLI,  1911.    514  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50;  paper  covers,  $3.00. 

[107]  New  Jersey  as  a  Royal  Province.  By  Edgar  Jacob  Fishbk,  Ph.  D. 

VOLUME  XLH,  1911.    400  pp.    Price, cloth,  $3.00;  paper  covers,  $2.50. 

[108]  Attitude  of  American  Courts  In  Labor  Cases. 

By  George  Gorham  Groat,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XLIII,  1911.    633  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1,  [109]  "Industrial  Causes  of  Congestion  of  Population  in  New  York  City. 

By  Edward  Ewing  Pratt,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2.00. 
8.  [HO]  Education  and  the  Mores.  By  F.  Stuart  Chapin,  Ph.D.    Price,  75  cents. 

8.  till]  The  British  Consuls  in  the  Confederacy.  .  «»     _ 

By  RiiLLKDGE  L.  Bonham,  Jr.,  Ph.D.    Price,  $2.00. 

VOLUMES  XLIV  and  XLV,  1911.    745  pp. 
Price  for  the  two  volumes,  cloth,  $6.00  ;  paper  covers,  $5.00. 

[112  and  113]  The  Economic  Principles  of  Confucius  and  his  School. 

By  Chen  Huan-Chang,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XL VI,  1911-1912.    623  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [114]  The  Ricardian  Socialists.  By  Esther  Lowentkal,  Ph  D.    Trice.  Ji.oo 

S.  [1151  Ibrahim  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier  of  Suleiman,  the  Magnificent. 

1  By  Hbstkk  Donaldson  Jenkins,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

3.  [1161,  'Syndicalism  in  France. 

L  By  Louis  Levine,  Ph.D.    Second  edition,  iota.    Price,  ft. 50 

4.  [117]    A  Hoosier  Village-  By  Nwm  Leu     •  :  i&u,  Pu.F      Price.  $t.yx 


VOLUME  XLVII,  1912.    544  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [118]  The  Polities  of  Michigan,  1865-1878. 

By  Harriette  M.  Dilla,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2.00. 
3.  [119]  *The  United  States  Beet  Sugar  Industry  and  the  Tariff. 

By  Roy  G.  Blakey,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2. 00. 

VOLUME  XL VIII,  1912.    493  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [ISO]  Isidor  Of  Seville.  By  Ernest  Brehaut,  Ph.  D.     Price,  fla.oo. 

3.  [131]  Progress  and  Uniformity  in  Child-Labor  "Legislation. 

By  William  Fielding  Ogburn,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.75. 

VOLUME  XLIX,  1912.    592  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [133]  British  Radicalism  1791-1797.  By  Walter  Phelps  Hall.  Price.g2.00. 

3.  [123J  A  Comparative  Study  of  the  Law  of  Corporations. 

By  Arthur,  K.  Kohn,  Ph.D.  Price,  gi.50. 
3.  [124]  *The  Negro  at  Work  in  New  York  City. 

By  George  E.  Haynes.  Ph.D.  Price, $1. 25. 

VOLUME  L,  1911.    481  pp.    Price,  c.'otii,  $4.00. 

1.  [135]  The  Spirit  of  Chinese  Philanthropy.       By  Yai  Yue  Tsu,  Ph.D.    Price,  $1.00. 
3.  [136]  *The  Alien  in  China.  By  Vi.  Kyuin  Wellington  Koo,  Ph.D.     Price,  52.50. 

VOLUME  LI,  1912.    4to.  Atlas.    Price:  cloth,  $1.50;  paper  covers,  $1.00 

1.  [137]  The  Sale  of  Liquor  in  the  South.  „  „,  „ 

By  Leonard  S.  Blakey,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  LII,  1912.    489  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [I3S1  *Provincial  and  Local  Taxation  in  Canada. 

By  Solomon  Vinebbrg,  Ph.D.     Price,  gi.50. 

3.  [129]  *The  Distribution  of  Income. 

By  Frank  Hatch  Streightofp,  Ph.D.     Price,  gi.50. 
8.  [130]  *The  Finances  of  Vermont.  By  Frederick  A.  Wood,  Ph.D.    Price,  #1.00. 

VOLUME  LIK,  1913.    789  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50;  paper,  $4.00. 
[131]  The  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction  In  Florida.        By  W.  W.  Davis,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  LIV,  1913.    604  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $4.50. 

1.  T133]    *  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  Citizens  of  the  United  States. 

By  Arnold  Johnson  Lien,  Ph.D.    Price,  75  cents. 
3.  [133]    The  Supreme  Court  and  Unconstitutional  Legislation. 

By  Blaine  Free  Moore,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

3.  [134]  *Indian  Slavery  in  Colonial  Times  within  the  Present  Limits  of  the 

United  States.  By  Almon  Wheelek  Laubkk,  Pli.U.     Pr.ce,|3.oo. 

VOLUME  LV,  1913.    665  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [135]    *A  Political  Ilistory  of  the  State  of  New  York. 

By  Homer  A.  Stbbbins,  Ph.D.     Price,  $4.00. 

3.  [136]    *The  Early  Persecutions  of  the  Christians. 

ByLEONH.  Canfield,  Ph.D.     Price,    J1.50. 

VOLUME  LVI,  1913.    406  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [137]  Speculation  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  1904-1907. 

By  Algernon  Ashbukner  Osborne.      Price,  $1.50. 
3.  [138]  The  Policy  of  the  United  States  towards  Industrial  Monopoly. 

By  Oswald  Whitman  Knauxh,  Ph.D.     Price.  J2.00. 

VOLUME  LVII,  1914.    670  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [139]  *The  Civil  Service  of  Great  Britain. 

By  Robert  Moses,  Ph.D.     Price,  £2.00. 

3.  [140]  The  Financial  History  of  New  York  State. 

By  Don  C.  Sowers.     Price,  $2.50. 

VOLUME  LVIII,  1914.    684  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50;  paper,  $4.00. 

[141]  Reconstruction  in  North  Carolina.  _ 

By  J.  G.  dh  Roulhac  Hamilton,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  LIX,  1914.    625  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [143]  The  Development  of  Modern  Turkey  by  means  of  its  Press. 

By  Ahmed  Emin,  Ph.D.     Price,  #1.00. 

S.  [143]  The  System  of  Taxation  in  China,  1614-1911. 

By  Shao-Kwan  Chen,  Ph.  D.     Price,.  £1.00. 

3.  1144]  The  Currency  Problem  in  China.  By  Wen  Pin  Wei,  Ph.D.    Price,  gi.25. 

4.  [146]  *Jewitih  Immigration  to  the  United  States.  ««.«,«_, 

By  Samuel  Joseph.  Ph.D.    Price,  ft. 50. 


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